US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3963

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DIA FOR DIRECTOR VADM JACOBY FROM CHARGE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2025 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, PINS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: TF FREEDOM AND TF WARRIOR LNO TO 
TURKISH MILITARY IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy seeks urgent DIA assistance in 
filling the position of Liaison Officer to the Turkish 
Special Forces in Northern Iraq.  This position is vital in 
order to collect intel on the Turks' plans and intentions for 
Iraq, for crisis management, and for helping us pass 
real-time, accurate information on developments in northern 
Iraq to the Turks so that they can base their policies on 
fact, not fiction.  We cannot afford to have our Defense 
Attache Office fill this billet indefinitely; to do so would 
endanger the mil-to-mil relationship we have worked so hard 
to rebuild after 2003.  End summary. 
 
2. (S/NF) Embassy Ankara requests urgent DIA assistance to 
fill an empty billet of significant importance to U.S. 
efforts in Iraq.  Since 2003, DIA has assigned a liaison 
officer to serve as the bridge between the northern MNF-I 
commands--Task Force Freedom (TFF) and Task Force Warrior 
(TFW)--and the Turkish forces in northern Iraq.  Turkey has 
maintained a 1500-troop presence in northern Iraq, ostensibly 
to monitor the activities of the Turkish Kurdish separatist 
group, the PKK.  The LNO lives at the Turkish SF Brigade HQ 
in the border town of Silopi, Turkey, but travels frequently 
throughout TFF and TFW's AOR.  We have identified some Turkey 
FAOs who would be excellent candidates to fill this position, 
but their commands have not permitted them to fill the billet. 
 
3. (S/NF) This position was created as a direct result of the 
July 4, 2003 incident at Suleimaniyah, where U.S. forces 
detained Turkish SF who were planning to assassinate the 
mayor of Kirkuk and a Turkman politician.  This incident--in 
which Turkish soldiers were shown in the press bound and 
bagged as they were transported to Baghdad--caused a huge 
rift in U.S.-Turkish relations, especially on the mil-to-mil 
side, from which both sides are still recovering.  The 
primary mission of the LNO, therefore, is to collect as much 
information as possible on the plans and intentions of the 
Turkish SF in order to head off such incidents in the future. 
 The two main incumbents in the position have been Turkey 
FAOs who have used their language skills to great effect, 
building trust with the SF up to and including the one-star 
commander.  It is vital that we maintain this position so we 
can continue to keep an eye on our (sometimes difficult) ally. 
 
4. (S/NF) It has proven effective to have the LNO move freely 
between Iraq and Turkey.  He frequently visits the TU SF 
outposts in northern Iraq, building relationships but also 
tacitly reminding the Turks that we are keeping an eye on 
their movements.  In 2004, the Turks neglected to inform us 
that they had moved some small regular army units just inside 
the Iraqi border to watch for PKK infiltrators.  Our LNO 
discovered this by spotting the outpost and politely--but 
insistently--demanding access.  This incident embarrassed the 
Turks into "remembering" to inform us of all/all their 
deployments in Iraq. 
 
5. (S/NF) But the LNO's mission goes well beyond collection. 
For this Embassy--indeed for the USG's mission to keep the 
Turks positively engaged with the new Iraq--this LNO position 
is crucial.  First, the LNO has proved indispensable in times 
of crisis.  In December 2004, insurgents in Mosul attacked a 
convoy of Turkish National Police officers on their way to 
provide security at the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad.  This 
incident caused a sensation in Turkey: all the country's top 
leaders attended the officers' funeral.  CF engaged the 
insurgents and collected the dead and wounded.  Yet without 
our LNO, it would have been impossible to provide real-time 
updates to the GOT on events, coordinate moving the Turkish 
KIA to the border and the Turkish WIA back home.  His actions 
and information ensured the stories that appeared in the 
Turkish media implying CF did nothing to help the Turks were 
effectively countered by GOT officials.  The LNO played a 
similar role in Sept. 2004 in assisting with a U.S. military 
medivac of a Turkish Red Crescent worker who was seriously 
wounded in an insurgent attack in Iraq. 
 
6. (S/NF) Second, the LNO has served as a vital information 
link between the Embassy and TFF and TFW.  Events in northern 
Iraq--such as in Kirkuk and the northwest Ninewah province 
city of Talafar (which has a large Turkmen population)--are 
of great interest to the Turks.  Unfortunately, the Turks' 
intelligence and press sources in Iraq are poor, and their 
intel assets often provide them false or highly exaggerated 
information.  This misinformation dominated the front pages 
of Turkish newspapers during Sept. 2004 coalition 
counterinsurgency operations in Talafar.  The GOT lacked good 
information and so did the Turkish press, which grossly 
exaggerated the level of destruction in the city.  Events 
reached a head mid-month when the Turkish Foreign Minister 
threatened to cease all cooperation with us on Iraq over 
Talafar.  It was only when the LNO was able to get direct, 
real-time, releasable battle updates from TFF that we were 
able to calm the GOT. 
 
7. (S/NF) With counterinsurgency operations again in full 
swing in Talafar--and with the controversy surrounding the 
future of Kirkuk--the LNO continues to provide us with 
real-time updates on the situation in northern Iraq.  We are 
able to pass this to the Turkish military and the government, 
both of which are much better informed and can now make 
decisions based on accurate information, not overblown press 
reports.  We believe this information flow has been a 
significant part of the GOT's decidedly more constructive 
policy toward Iraq in 2005. 
 
8. (S/NF) We want to counter one argument that some may make 
about the importance of this position, and that is that the 
Turks themselves have LNOs in Talafar, Kirkuk, and Mosul. 
They do, but the Turks have proven to be notoriously poor at 
sharing information outside their direct chain of command. 
Their LNOs report up to the J3 in TGS, but the information 
they gain almost never goes to other military staff 
directorates, and certainly never outside the Turkish 
military to interested parties, such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  Not having the U.S. LNO in place will allow 
the Turks to pass important information only through their 
narrow funnel, and we will not achieve our aim. 
 
9. (S/NF) When we have experienced staffing gaps for this 
position, the Embassy's Defense Attache Office has been 
compelled to send one of its attaches to fill in.  This comes 
at a time when DAO is already spread thin: the Assistant ARMA 
(a Turkey FAO) is serving a six-month TDY in Afghanistan.  We 
are facing significant gaps between the departing and 
arriving Navy and Marine Attaches.  The DATT is Air Force, 
and both he and the Asst Air Force Attache carry significant 
C-12 flight responsibilities in addition to their regular 
work. 
 
10. (S/NF) For the foreseeable future, post's ARMA will fill 
the LNO slot.  Yet this comes at a time when we are working 
especially hard to repair the very damage to our mil-to-mil 
relationship--especially Army-to-Army--caused in part by the 
Suleimaniyah incident.  Beginning last summer, the ARMA's 
main diplomatic effort has been to restore U.S.-Turkish 
mil-to-mil relations to a pre 2003 level.  ARMA has 
successfully coordinated a visit by the Turkish Land Forces 
Commander to last year's CEA, followed by USAREUR Commander 
GEN Bell's CPV to Turkey.  ARMA is currently working a 
reciprocal CPV by the TLFC to GEN Bell.  In addition to all 
the coordination necessary to put these important counterpart 
visits into place, there is the potential this fall for a CPV 
invite from the Turkish TRADOC Commander (GEN Kocman) to the 
incoming U.S. TRADOC Commander.  At this time, we do not know 
how the ARMA can complete his chief mission here if he must 
continue to fill in as the LNO. 
 
11. (C/NF) The bottom line for this Embassy is that we simply 
must fill this billet--soon--if we are to achieve our 
objectives of keeping the Turks positively engaged in 
supporting the new Iraq and of furthering U.S.-Turkey 
mil-to-mil relations. 
MCELDOWNEY