US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2856

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: HARD-LINE SUNNI ARAB GROUP URGES U.S. STAY IN IRAQ 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  A Sunni Coalition that had gained 
prominence in the negotiations for government 
positions and Sunni participation in the 
constitutional drafting process lobbied visiting 
Senator Levin on July 5 for a continued presence of 
Coalition Forces.  They complained bitterly of abuses 
allegedly committed by the Iraqi Security Forces while 
they also perceive the steady marginalization of 
Iraq's Sunni Arab community by the Shia/Kurdish 
majority.  Two of Senator Levin's guests are on the 
Constitution Committee and they said they would push 
hard to see the constitution draft finished by August 
so that national elections can be held in December. 
However, they said it would be hard to find agreement 
on constitutional treatment of federalism, the role of 
religion and the state and the structure of the future 
state.  They recommended resolution of these 
contentious issues be put off until later.  (Our Shia 
and Kurdish contacts dismiss this idea, saying they 
will be able to reach a deal on the full set of 
constitution issues.)  As groups like these Sunni 
hard-liners engage more on a political track, we find 
they are thinking more creatively - but not 
necessarily more realistically yet.  End Summary. 
 
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Participants 
------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) List of participants: 
 
Dr. Saleh Mutlak, Middle Democratic Party and 
Spokesman for the National Dialogue Council, holds a 
PhD in Agricultural Economics from Aberdeen, Scotland; 
member of Constitution Committee.  He is an Arab 
nationalist but left the Baath party 20 years ago. 
 
Dr. Makhmood Mashhadani, Salafist and medical doctor 
with the Ministry of Health; member of Constitution 
Committee. 
 
Sheikh Abdul Nassir Yousef Janabi, Secretary for the 
National Dialogue Council and Administrative Head of 
the Sufi Committee, holds a Masters in Sharia law. 
 
Dr. Fakhri Kaissy, Secretary of the Salafi Higher 
Committee for the issuance of Fatwas, Professor in the 
School of Dentistry. 
 
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Constitution: Meeting August 15 Deadline 
---------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) National Dialogue and, now, Constitutional 
Drafting Committee members Drs. Saleh Mutlak and 
Makhmood Mashhadani both expressed their desire to 
meet the rapidly approaching constitution drafting 
deadline, if only to prevent an extension granting the 
current government more time in office.  Mutlak 
highlighted that several complex issues require more 
time than the few remaining weeks, but nothing should 
delay the next elections.  He proposed leaving the 
most contentious issues until a new Assembly is seated 
in January, producing -- instead -- a temporary 
constitution by August.  He argued that the three most 
difficult issues: the system of government (i.e. 
presidential versus prime ministerial), federalism and 
the role of religion 'require more participation' by 
all groups.  (Comment:  By contrast, our Shia and 
Kurdish contacts, while acknowledging that these 
issues are contentious, think an agreement about even 
these issues is possible by August 15.  End Comment.) 
 
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Coalition Forces: Should We Stay or Should We Go? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4.  (C) Mutlak warned that if the Americans leave at 
this time, Iraq faced real danger from its neighbors. 
The presence of U.S. troops, he emphasized, was a 
source of pressure on their Sunni constituents, but 
the withdrawal of forces to bases outside the cities 
would mitigate this.  Sheikh Abdul Nasser stated that 
the violence would not end 'as long as the Americans 
are here'; in his next breath, he said to withdraw now 
was a mistake.  Mashhadani claimed that a complete 
withdrawal was contrary to U.S. national interests. 
Identifying himself as a part of the Salafist 
movement, he identified a dilemma:  on the one hand, 
'from a legal point of view and representing a 
religious community', Salafists cannot argue for a 
continued CF presence.  Nonetheless, from a realistic 
perspective, he observed 'we need them'.  He argued 
against setting a date for a complete pullout, 
claiming the U.S. had the 'moral responsibility' to 
secure the welfare of the Iraqi people. 
 
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Preparing for an Eventual American Withdrawal 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Sheikh Abdul Nasser suggested the U.S. 
announce plans for an eventual withdrawal and make a 
'token' withdrawal of 10,000 troops to convince the 
insurgents the U.S. was not here to stay.  He said, 
however, that any complete withdrawal must be preceded 
by the conclusion of a U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, 
in which the U.S. commits to protecting Iraq against 
its neighbors.  The way forward, according to Janabi, 
is for Sunni leaders to convince their constituents, 
based on a token withdrawal and signed security 
agreement, that the Americans only seek democracy in 
Iraq.  Mashhadani said the signal (by the token 
withdrawal) that the U.S. intends to leave should be 
combined with serious negotiations with the 
insurgents.  He recommended that over a gradual period 
of one or two years, the U.S. could continue to 
withdraw while standing up the Iraqi security Forces 
(ISF). 
 
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Negotiating with Insurgents 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Mashhadani claimed that 80 percent of the 
resistance could be won over by serious ('without 
impediments') inclusion in the political process. 
Even elements of the remaining 20 percent could be 
enticed into ending the violence.  Convincing the 
Sunni community to lay down their arms was hard, 
according to Mashhadani, due to their lack of access 
to media outlets.  He said Sunni Arabs' have no 
newspaper, no satellite TV, no resources', while the 
Kurds and Shia basically have their own states and are 
using this position to solidify their gains.  He said 
negotiating with the insurgents might surprise the 
U.S., in that they might ask the CF to stay. 
(Comment:  It is not surprisingly that these hard-line 
Sunni Arabs would welcome direct negotiations between 
the U.S. and the insurgents.  They also hope the U.S. 
will pressure the ITG on behalf of Sunni Arab 
grievances.  By contrast, the National Assembly, 
dominated by Shia and Kurds, earlier this week 
denounced the idea of any negotiations with the 
"Baathist insurgents."  End Comment.) 
 
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Sunni Participation in Upcoming Elections 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Mutlak said the continued raids and detentions 
in Sunni Arab communities in Baghdad and throughout 
the triangle could adversely affect voter turnout 
among Sunni Arabs.  He pressed for U.S. support of 
moderates, conceding some Shia were also moderates. 
Nonetheless, Mutlak observed that the Sunni face 
immense obstacles, noting they cannot get out to speak 
to their constituents and their cities are being hit 
everyday.  Sheikh Abdul Nasser proposed delaying 
Saddam Hussein's trial until after the elections or 
transferring his case to the International Court of 
Criminal Justice, stating the former dictator still 
commands the support of over one million Iraqis. 
 
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Sunni Paranoia: 
Doesn't Mean They're Not Out To Get Them 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Mashhadani noted that there are widening gaps 
between the Sunni community and the Americans, which 
are fomented by the expatriate Iraqis who currently 
run the government.  Their goal, he opined, was to 
destroy the Sunni community.  Mashhadani warned that 
if the U.S. left Iraq without 'restoring it to its 
original position,' America's enemies would fill these 
gaps.  (Comment.  Several of the group repeated this 
word 'eradication' during the conversation, a new term 
in our discussions with them.  It highlights their 
feeling that they are in a tenuous position, as CF and 
ISF operations pressure Sunni Arab communities, 
'Zarqawis' threaten them for their political activity 
and finally, and most significantly, they continue to 
be outwitted and outmaneuvered by the Shia/Kurdish 
majority in the game of politics.  While they have 
their representation on the Constitutional Drafting 
Committee, it is not clear they will come up with a 
deal acceptable to them.  End Comment.) 
 
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The Rise of Sectarianism 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (C) Mashhadani bemoaned the fact that since the 
fall of the regime, religion has become politicized. 
He said he has no disagreement with the 'Iraqi Shia,' 
that there had not existed a 'religious crisis' 
(sectarianism) until the end of the regime.  Sheikh 
Abdul Nasser observed that 80-90 percent of the Arab 
World is Sunni, and that they are committed to 
protecting their Sunnis in Iraq.  This, he claimed, 
was demonstrated by the influx of foreign fighters or 
jihadists into the country.  He said these fellow 
Sunnis have concluded that the Shia aim to eradicate 
Iraqi Sunnis.  (Comment:  In fact, public statements 
from Mashadani and Janabi frequently inflame sectarian 
antagonisms here.  End Comment.) 
 
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Iraqi Security Forces 
--------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Sheikh Abdul Nasser said that only a 
reconstituted Iraqi Army could prevent the 'excesses' 
perpetuated by the current Iraqi Army and Iraqi 
Police.  He noted Sunnis hope that the Americans 
detain them -- rather than the ISF - because Americans 
are less likely to commit abuses.  Mahmood claimed 
that the ISF has adopted Saddam's approach, 'go out 
and eradicate.'  He claimed the ISF tortures 
detainees, citing the discovery of the bodies of 
former detainees with holes drilled by power tools. 
 
11.  (C) Comment.  The National Dialogue is a 
relatively new faction in the murky and fractious 
Sunni political landscape.  It rose to prominence 
during the prolonged maneuvering for Sunni inclusion 
the government, and most recently the Constitutional 
drafting process.  In what should have been a 
victorious moment (at the same time as this meeting 
the Transitional National Assembly's Constitutional 
Drafting Committee was to have hosted their latest 
members Mutlak and Mashhadani to lunch) the National 
Dialogue appeared apprehensive about the future. 
Their hyperbole about Iraqi security forces 
notwithstanding, there are documented cases of hard- 
line opposition Sunni Arab imams being detained by men 
in security uniforms, tortured and murdered.  In 
response, the Dialog Council members raised with 
Senator Levin an appeal for Coalition Forces not to 
withdraw and the desire to secure a security 
agreement.  Mutlak, for one, has come 180 degrees on 
this point; six months ago he vehemently demanded the 
immediate withdrawal of CF.  As their room to maneuver 
becomes steadily decreased, even Sunni Arabs like the 
Dialog Council are starting to think in more creative 
- if not always realistic - ways.  End Comment. 
 
12.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield