US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3954

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003954 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2025 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, TU, IZ, IR, SY, Iraq, PKK 
SUBJECT: GEN BASBUG AND CHARGE DISCUSS IRAQ, PKK, BILATERAL 
RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Deputy TGS Chief GEN Ilker Basbug believes 
that MNF-I has a new order to "track and capture" PKK 
personnel in Iraq.  (We are checking.)  He thought this was a 
positive indication of US intentions towards the terrorist 
group.  The Charge told Basbug she would have an answer soon 
to his request for more information on IEDs.  Basbug accepted 
ODC-T Chief MajGen Sutton's offer to ask JAC Molesworth if 
they could evaluate the causes of the recent PKK violence. 
He quizzed CDA about where the differences between the US and 
Turkey over Syria lie; when she mentioned politicians' 
statements he dropped the subject.  He was unsure of the 
impact of Ahmadinejad's election on Turkey-Iran relations, 
but did not believe Iran would walk away from the EU-3 
negotiations.  End summary. 
 
Bilateral Relations 
------------------- 
2. (C) The Charge paid an initial call on DCHOD Gen Basbug on 
July 5.  Recalling that the last High Level Defense Group 
(HLDG) meeting was in November 2003, Basbug encouraged the 
Charge to work with his successor (he expected to be 
reassigned in August) to hold another HLDG in the near 
future.  The Charge agreed that these meetings were 
important.  She noted that the cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base 
was working smoothly, and that both sides would need to 
ensure that cooperation at the local level continued after 
the changes in command expected at the base this summer. 
 
PKK: "Track and capture" and IEDs 
--------------------------------- 
3. (S) Basbug told the Charge that he had talked to VCJCS Gen 
Pace on June 30.  He already knew about the fragmentary order 
"CENTCOM issued" two to three months earlier regarding the 
handling of PKK terrorists detained during normal coalition 
operations.  However, during the call with Gen Pace, he said, 
the VCJCS "said something different."  He recalled Gen Pace 
as saying that there had been a meeting of the intelligence 
community on the PKK and that there was a new "direct order" 
or "specific order" to US forces to collect information and 
conduct operations targeting the PKK -- "track and capture," 
was what Basbug said he heard.  Basbug was heartened because 
this "indicates a positive intention" even though concrete 
results may require some more time.  The Charge said that she 
had not seen this order, but undertook to look into it. 
 
4. (C) Looking forward to the Washington visit by GOT Iraq 
Coordinator Osman Koruturk, the Charge noted that the US was 
also working on other tracks against the PKK, such as 
encouraging the Europeans to address front offices and 
sources of PKK finances and establishing a trilateral 
(US-TU-Iraq) intelligence sharing mechanism. 
 
5. (C) The Charge recalled that the US still owed Basbug an 
answer to his request to Gen Pace in Washington for IED 
countermeasures.  CHOD GEN Ozkok had also raised this with 
visiting USNAVEUR Commander and Joint Allied Forces Naples 
Commander ADM H.G.Ulrich (septel).  Basbug recalled receiving 
a pamphlet on the subject.  The Charge noted that the USG 
owed Turkey more on this score.  She undertook to have a more 
satisfactory response "in a matter of days," noting that JCS 
and EUCOM staff were actively working it. (Note: A JCS team 
is expected in Ankara the week of July 17.) Basbug agreed 
that this was an important issue for the TGS. 
 
6. (C) Returning to this subject later in the discussion, 
Basbug turned to ODC-T Chief MajGen Sutton and asked for his 
assessment "from a military point of view" of the reasons 
behind the increase in IEDs in Turkey.  General Sutton 
reported that he had not seen any intelligence on the issue, 
but offered to ask JAC Molesworth for its assessment of 
whether the PKK has developed IED capability via direct links 
with the insurgents in Iraq or by simple observation of open 
sources.  Basbug agreed.  He and TGS/J3 LTG Metin Yavuz 
Yalcin expressed satisfaction with the functioning of the 
intelligence fusion cell EUCOM created in Ankara last year. 
 
7. (C) The Charge asked Basbug for his assessment of what is 
causing the increased PKK violence in Turkey.  He said TGS 
was still attempting to determine the answer.  However, it 
was either an effort to keep the organization together 
("terrorist organizations cannot survive without taking 
action") or represented a reconciliation of the PKK's 
previously divided leadership, with those advocating a more 
active/violent approach winning the day.  Upon further 
reflection, he offered a third alternative:  central control 
has weakened and individual cells are operating autonomously. 
 
 
CENTCOM/EUCOM Visit 
------------------- 
8. (C) Basbug said that CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid 
and EUCOM Commander Gen James Jones' expected visit in 
September "was another development."  The Charge responded 
that their coming was positive and expressed the hope that 
the visit would produce tangible results.  Basbug agreed, 
saying that something that could be shared with the public in 
Turkey would be important.  He and the Charge agreed to share 
thoughts in the weeks ahead about how this might be achieved. 
 
Iraq/Syria/Iran 
--------------- 
9. (C) Basbug asked about the current situation in Iraq, 
particularly regarding the constitution drafting process. 
The Charge reviewed the difficult issues to be faced, 
including how to define federalism, but noted the progress 
made in including Sunnis in the drafting committee.  Basbug 
quizzed the Charge on the process, asking whether the US 
wanted an Iraq based on federalism (answer: yes), whether the 
central government would be strong or weak (answer: in 
control of security and resources), and whether Kirkuk's 
status would be "solved" in the constitution (answer: it will 
be "addressed"). 
 
10. (C) The Charge recalled raising Syria with Turkish 
politicians, and relayed to Basbug continuing USG concern 
about differences in approach between Turkey and the US. 
Perhaps feigning surprise, he inquired about the differences. 
 He asserted that Turkey shared the US goals of stopping 
Syrian or Syrian-based interference in Lebanon, Iraq and the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue.  "Whenever we talk to Syria, we 
warn them that these are serious issues they must address." 
He asked why the US did not have a trilateral mechanism with 
Syria and Iraq to discuss border and other issues.  The 
Charge responded that the real issue is Syrian actions and 
the need to press Damascus to take appropriate concrete 
measures. 
 
11. (C) The Charge asked Basbug for his read on Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad.  Basbug said it was not an easy question.  He 
recalled that Rafsanjani had been a radical reformer when he 
was first elected and he is now a moderate.  In fact, "we 
wish a more moderate man had been chosen," but one "can't 
second guess the Iranian people."  Ahmadinejad was reportedly 
close to the religious hierarchy, but Turkey would need to 
make a proper assessment to draw real conclusions.  The 
Charge noted concern at Ahmadinejad's remarks on the nuclear 
issue, but Basbug thought that Iran's nuclear program had 
widespread support and statements would not be significantly 
different if someone else had been elected.  He also did not 
believe Ahmadinejad would walk away from the EU-3 process. 
Yet, he allowed that if Ahmadinejad reverted to "old 
strategies," he could impact (negatively) Turkey-Iran 
relations.  He asked that when the USG has an assessment of 
him that we share it. 
MCELDOWNEY