US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1182

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
NSC FOR DORMANDY 
LONDON FOR BELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Tsunami, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  MUSLIM LEADER RALLYING OPPOSITION TO 
P-TOMS 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1128 
     B. COLOMBO 1044 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakeem 
continues to urge members of his community to oppose the 
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), also 
known as the "joint mechanism," signed by the Government of 
Sri Lanka (GSL) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
on June 24.  Hakeem sees the P-TOMS as a "precursor" to a 
final resolution to the ethnic conflict that gives the LTTE 
political and administrative control over the Muslim 
community in the east--a "virtual trap" for Muslims he vowed 
not to support.  The Norwegian Charge and Peace Secretariat 
Head Jayantha Dhanapala have both appealed to the Ambassador 
for assistance in persuading the Muslims to participate. 
Hakeem may be exploiting this for his own political purposes, 
but a boycott of the joint mechanism by the very community 
worst affected by the tsunami would undermine the P-TOMS' 
claims to ensure equity for all tsunami victims.  End summary. 
 
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SLMC:  P-TOMS IS "VRTUAL TRAP" 
FOR MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
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2.  (C) In the two weeks since the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed 
an agreement to coordinate tsunami relief, Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress (SLMC) Leader Rauff Hakeem is intensifying his 
party's opposition--and attempting to consolidate his divided 
community--against the Post-Tsunami Operational Management 
Structure (P-TOMS), also known as the "joint mechanism." 
After spearheading a series of general strikes, or "hartals," 
against the agreement in the east, Hakeem told poloff on July 
7 that he is planning another set of rallies and meetings in 
Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara over the next few days. 
The P-TOMS has "serious implications" for the political 
rights of eastern Muslims, he charged, since the 
administrative structures set up in the agreement, 
particularly at the regional level, are a "precursor" to a 
pernicious "final solution" that will allow Muslim rights to 
be subsumed under LTTE domination.  With their bid to gain 
such power under the LTTE-proposed Interim Self-Governing 
Authority (ISGA) frustrated, the Tigers are gaining 
equivalent authority through the P-TOMS, Hakeem asserted, 
which he described as a "virtual trap" for his community.  By 
combining authority for the north and east into a single 
regional committee--in which LTTE representatives outnumber 
Muslims and the LTTE Chair wields the deciding vote--the 
P-TOMS "has made us a minority once again," Hakeem 
complained, even though Muslims suffered the heaviest losses 
from the tsunami of all three communities.   The impetus 
behind creation of the regional committee is patently 
political, he continued, and no more than "a stepping stone 
to ISGA," since all tsunami relief work could be adequately 
handled by the district and central committees.  The only 
need for the regional committee, the SLMC Leader argued, was 
as an "inducement to the LTTE to remain in the Ceasefire 
Agreement." 
 
3.  (C) Hakeem expressed substantial outrage that Muslims 
were not even consulted during a negotiating process that 
dealt directly with the fate of their community; "once again 
we are consigned to an insignificant minority"--even in areas 
where Muslims are in the majority.  That Muslims were 
completely excluded from these discussions is "a serious 
threshhold issue for us."  For the SLMC to urge its followers 
to comply with the P-TOMS would be "to compromise our 
mandate" to represent the best interests of the Muslim 
community.  His constituents in the east are angry and 
frustrated that once again the LTTE and the GSL have ignored 
their interests, he claimed, raising the danger that Muslim 
youth, disillusioned by the failure of democracy to fulfill 
its promises of equity and justice, might turn to more 
radical means--like the LTTE--to achieve their aims.  The 
SLMC must fill the "vacuum" created by this disaffection with 
democracy lest other, more inimical forces do so, he hinted; 
hence the compulsion to lead a "non-cooperation campaign" 
against the agreement.  President Kumaratunga told him the 
day before the GSL signed the agreement that she had tried 
unsuccessfully to argue for changes to the draft to 
accommodate Muslim concerns, Hakeem said, adding that for the 
President to "cave in" to LTTE intransigence sends the "wrong 
signal" to Muslims. 
 
4.  (C) Acknowledging that the P-TOMS likely does not contain 
every feature the SLMC might want included, poloff said that 
the agreement nonetheless has several advantages that could 
be used to advance Muslim interests.  For the first time, for 
example, the Tigers will have to sit across the table from 
Muslim representatives to discuss and negotiate their 
community's concerns.  Donor observers and GSL 
representatives at the regional and central levels, moreover, 
could act as safeguards to protect Muslim interests.  To 
accept the P-TOMS is to relegate the Muslims to being "a 
perpetual minority" always "subject to safeguards" from 
others that are never adequately implemented, Hakeem 
rejoined.  He predicted that continued resistance by the 
Muslim community to the joint mechanism would make the 
agreement inoperable and thus force both the LTTE and GSL to 
rethink their positions.  "We are open for negotiations" on 
the subject, he said, but the parties must be willing to 
address our concerns.  (He indicated that New Unity Alliance 
Leader and Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff, in contrast, 
seems more willing to compromise with the GSL on 
participation.)   "I blame the Norwegians for all of this," 
he concluded; "in attempting to solve one problem, you must 
not create another." 
 
 
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NORWEGIANS, GSL SEEK HELP 
FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
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5.  (C) In a July 5 telephone conversation with the 
Ambassador, Jayantha Dhanapala, head of the GSL Peace 
Secretariat, appealed for help from the international 
 
SIPDIS 
community in persuading the Muslims to support the agreement. 
 In a meeting with the Ambassador the following day, 
Dhanapala described the Muslim community as "angry but 
divided."  Amb. Jawed Yusuf, the head of the Muslim Peace 
Secretariat (which would be responsible for appointing Muslim 
 
SIPDIS 
representatives to the high-level and regional committees) is 
a reasonable man, Dhanapala observed, but cannot move ahead 
without the consent of political leaders like Rauff Hakeem 
and Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff.  Dhanapala enumerated 
several GSL efforts to respond to Muslim concerns.  First, 
Muslim numbers at the regional level could be "plussed up" by 
appointing a Muslim to serve as one of two GSL 
representatives.  Moreover, Dhanapala commented, bilateral 
and multilateral observers on the regional and high-level 
committees would serve as a "moderating force" to ensure 
equitable distribution of all funds.  Second, the GSL was 
attempting to secure LTTE agreement to changing the venue for 
regional committee meetings.  Dhanapala indicated that the 
LTTE might be more flexible than suggested in its public 
statements about having the meetings, if not the actual 
P-TOMS secretariat, located outside of Kilinochchi.  The GSL, 
through the Norwegian facilitators, is pursuing this 
possibility, he noted.  Third, to address Muslim objections 
at not being a signatory, the GSL could conclude a bilateral 
P-TOMS-like agreement with Muslim representatives, Dhanapala 
suggested, adding that "two bilaterals make a trilateral" 
agreement. 
 
6.  (C)  The Ambassador urged the GSL to conduct a public 
relations campaign to dispel misperceptions about the P-TOMS. 
 He recounted for Dhanapala a July 5 meeting with members of 
the Sinhalese nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in which 
the Buddhist monk MPs made plain that they believe the P-TOMS 
will funnel reconstruction funding from donors directly into 
LTTE coffers.  (Note:  The JHU representatives seemed 
genuinely surprised by the Ambassador's explanation that the 
funds will go to the Treasury instead.  End note.)  The GSL 
is attempting to do just that, Dhanapala replied 
7.  (C)  In a July 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Norwegian 
Charge d'Affaires Oddvar Laegreid expressed concern that the 
Muslims might boycott the P-TOMS, which he feared would 
undercut the value of the entire agreement.  The Norwegians 
believe that pressure from the international community would 
be the best way to prevent that.  At the same time, like the 
GSL, the Norwegians are trying to respond to some of the 
concerns cited by Muslim leaders.  In preliminary meetings, 
Laegreid reported, LTTE Political Chief Thamilchelvan had 
shown some flexibility in relocating the regional committee 
meetings to the east.  He has since changed that line, 
Laegreid said, now maintaining  that the regional committee 
itself (in which the LTTE wields the casting vote) should 
determine the venues.  Special Envoy Erik Solheim will try to 
urge the LTTE to be more flexible on this issue, Laegreid 
said, adding the Norwegians may propose that meeting venues 
rotate between the Wanni and the east. 
 
8.  (C)  The Ambassador observed that much of the Muslim 
leaders' opposition to the P-TOMS might be attributed to 
their resentment at not having been adequately consulted 
and/or included in the negotiating process.  While conceding 
this point, Laegreid said he believed the opportunism of SLMC 
Leader Hakeem, who sees opposition to the P-TOMS as a 
rallying point from which to unify the divided Muslim 
electorate and bolster his sagging political prospects, was 
the biggest stumbling block. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C)  We agree that Rauff Hakeem may be exploiting the 
P-TOMS for his own political aims, hoping that the 
controversy will unite the badly divided Muslim 
community--preferably under his own leadership.  That said, 
the perception among Muslims that they have been marginalized 
once again is strong; that the pretext used this time is an 
agreement purporting to help tsunami victims (the majority of 
whom are Muslims) only rubs salt into these old wounds.  We 
will continue to urge the GSL (and the LTTE, through 
intermediaries) to make better and more visible efforts to 
address Muslim concerns.  The Ambassador will meet Muslim 
leader Ferial Ashraff on July 8 the make the case for Muslim 
participation in the P-TOMS. 
LUNSTEAD