US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2849

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002849 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab 
SUBJECT: TWO SUNNI LEADERS SHARE SUNNI INITIATIVES AND 
CONCERNS WITH CODEL LEVIN 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister Abid Mutlak al- 
Jaburi and Deputy Constitution Committee Chairman 
Adnan al-Janabi, both Sunni Arabs, offered Senator 
Carl Levin a wide range of initiatives to reach out to 
their community in a July 5 dinner meeting.  Both 
Jaburi and Janabi supported holding to the TAL 
timeline for constitution drafting and elections. 
They called for a halt to what they called 
indiscriminate and aggressive military operations 
targeting Sunni areas, and they complained that the 
Iraqi security services were poorly led and 
inadequately trained.  They also sought the release of 
high-profile detainees and an improved process to 
disseminate information about detainees.  Jaburi 
warned that the Jafari government risks further 
alienating the Sunni population with a plan to 
confiscate the assets of former Ba'athists and regime 
officials.  (However, one leading Iraqi government 
official has since told us there is no such plan under 
consideration.)  Both Jaburi and Janabi expected 
strong Sunni Arab participation in the next elections 
but said the IECI needs to be replaced because it is 
politicized. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Codel Levin explored possibilities for 
improved Sunni Arab outreach in a dinner July 5 with 
Deputy Prime Minister Abid Mutlak al-Jaburi and Deputy 
Constitution Committee Chairman Adnan al-Janabi.  Both 
Jaburi and Janabi supported sticking with the TAL 
deadlines on constitution drafting, the referendum, 
and the next elections.  Janabi said that following 
the induction of Sunni Arabs into the constitution 
drafting committee, he was optimistic that the 
document could be completed on time.  But Jaburi 
lamented that Sunni extremists, Shia extremists, and 
leaders in "neighboring states" were all working to 
keeping the Sunni Arab population marginalized from 
the political process.  He warned, "Our non- 
participation will halt the whole American plan here - 
- our children and the Americans will still be 
fighting instead of living in freedom and democracy." 
 
----------------------- 
LISTING THE INITIATIVES 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The following set of initiatives was proposed 
over dinner with the Charge and the Iraqi leaders. 
Jaburi elaborated on some of them in a letter he wrote 
to Senator Levin and the Charge, excerpts of which 
have been translated below.  The central goal of all 
of these plans, both men said repeatedly, was to end 
the "humiliation" of the Sunni community so it can 
reclaim a place of honor in the political process. 
 
-- HALT AGGRESSIVE "ANTI-SUNNI" OPERATIONS: Both 
Jaburi and Janabi were convinced that arrest campaigns 
and military operations were being deliberately 
targeted at the Sunni community.   When Senator Levin 
pointed out that this was natural since the Sunni 
community was the center of the insurgency, neither 
man was assuaged.  The names of the operations are 
themselves provocative, Jaburi said, referring to 
Operations "Lightning" and "Spear."  Jaburi said, 
"Every day hundreds are killed or hurt in these 
attacks."  Particularly offensive are raids on mosques 
and the detention of women, he said.  In sum, he said, 
he was asking for "more mercy" and more thought about 
excessive use of force.  Janabi said that he 
successfully coordinated North Babil operations while 
serving as Minister of State in the Allawi government. 
The lesson of the experience was that random military 
searches only provoked the population while targeted 
operations was much more effective at winning local 
trust. 
 
-- RELEASE PROMINENT DETAINEES, IMPROVE INFORMATION 
FLOW: Jaburi said that the Iraqi government and MNF-I 
should build confidence with the Sunni Arab community 
by releasing detained clerics, former senior officers, 
and local notables. "Even if they've made small 
mistakes, close your eyes a little bit," Jaburi said. 
Jaburi's letter calls for the release of those who did 
not committee a "witnessed crime."  Janabi said the 
process of informing Iraqis about detained relatives 
was improved, but he complained that Iraqis still have 
too much trouble finding out the nature of the charges 
against them.  (NOTE: MNF-I currently has under 
detention thirty-eight Sunni clerics, nineteen rated 
high or extreme threat, ten as medium threat, and nine 
still in initial interview.  A number of former senior 
Ba'ath officials categorized as "High-Value Detainees" 
have been approved by MNF-I for release, but these 
releases have been awaiting ITG approval for months, 
and several of these HVDs are now under consideration 
for trial by the Iraqi Special Tribunal.  END NOTE) 
 
-- IMPROVE PROFESSIONALISM IN THE IRAQI FORCES: 
Jaburi said that politicized and under-qualified 
personnel plague the Iraqi security services.  Too 
many former criminals and low-ranking officers have 
been unduly promoted to senior rank.  "Some men who 
never attended a military academy are colonels," he 
said. "There are thieves who are captains."  Jaburi 
alleged in his letter that many soldiers are stealing 
property during raids and demanding ransom in exchange 
for the release of detainees.  Militias, he argued, 
must be dissolved and assurances must be made that 
soldiers are serving the nation, not their sect. 
 
-- BE MORE REALISTIC ON IRAQI MILITARY TRAINING: 
Jaburi, a former Iraqi army officer himself, called 
for more intensive and realistic approach to the 
training of the Iraqi military.  Figures on Iraqi 
force strength are exaggerated because large numbers 
of soldiers are absentees, he claimed.  Speaking as a 
former division commander, Jaburi said that Iraq does 
not really have 10 divisions despite announcements to 
that effect.  Each group falls short of 1,000 soldiers 
even though the government is allocating funding for 
that amount and seeing it disappear.  Jaburi pointed 
out that Iraq's monarchy held the country under its 
control with a force of only 15,000 soldiers.  The 
1958 coup was carried out with only one division, and 
the Ba'athist coup in 1968 was pulled off with less 
than a hundred leading Ba'athists in charge and an 
extremely small number of troops.  If the government 
really controlled some 170,000 soldiers -- the current 
statistic -- then all would be well, he said. 
-- FIND MORE OBJECTIVE ELECTION OVERSIGHT: Both Jaburi 
and Janabi were convinced that the IECI was a partisan 
body in the service of Kurdish and Shia interests. 
They want it replaced altogether in time for the next 
elections.  Jaburi's letter recommends having the 
"Iraqi judiciary" oversee the elections rather than 
the IECI.  The letter also suggests having an 
"international neutral party provide oversight in the 
presence of an American official," mentioning as 
examples the UN and the Arab League.  (Note: The TAL 
states that IECI has sole authority for elections 
throughout Iraq during the transitional period.  Also, 
there already exists a non-voting UN Commissioner seat 
in the IECI Board of Commissioners.  End Note.) 
 
-- ELECTIONS BY DISTRICTS:  Both men supported holding 
future elections with slots allotted to each district. 
This step would ensure representation for each 
province, unlike the previous system, they said. 
(Comment: We understand most members of the 
constitution drafting committee are leaning in this 
direction.  End Comment) 
 
-- INITIATE MORE MEETINGS: Jaburi's letter calls for 
Iraqi and U.S. officials to increase the tempo and 
scope of their outreach meetings with notables and 
shaykhs and former officers to encourage participation 
in the political process and hear complaints. 
 
-- HALT THE "NEW GOVERNMENT CONFISCATION CAMPAIGN": 
Jaburi claimed that the Iraqi Council of Ministers had 
passed or would soon pass a policy to confiscate the 
assets of all Ba'ath Party "Division Members" and all 
former regime officials who held the rank of Director 
General or higher.  Jaburi claimed that the policy 
would stretch back to assets acquired since 1979 and 
would bankrupt a wide swath of Sunni Arabs.  The 
government planned to carry out the policy through the 
creation of a special court, he said.  Jaburi said 
only he and Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi had 
opposed the plan.  In his letter, Jaburi warned, "This 
decision will be more disastrous and dangerous than 
the dissolution of the army and the de-Ba'athification 
campaign." (Comment: Jaburi appears to be entirely 
mistaken here, but his fears reflect the widespread 
sense of persecution that De-Ba'athification policies 
have created, even amongst those who have nothing to 
fear from the process.  Da'wa Party leader and Jafari 
colleague Nuri Kamil told Poloff on July 6 that no 
such confiscation policy has been presented or 
contemplated.  Kamil said the only possible grain of 
truth in this allegation was that Ba'athists had 
stolen Iraqi assets and the Iraqi government, by law, 
has always reserved the right to reclaim assets stolen 
from the Iraqi people.  And, of course, De- 
Ba'athification law does single out Division Level 
Ba'athists and Directors General as the lowest rung of 
"senior" members of the former regime.  Kamil 
emphasized that in practice the government has never 
made a single confiscation.  "It is just ink on 
paper," he said.  End Comment) 
 
----------------------------- 
COMMENT: Buttressing the IECI 
For the Battle Ahead 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The doubts both men expressed over the IECI 
are real cause for concern.  While we will work 
diligently to keep them on board, there is a real 
danger that some Sunni Arab leaders -- perhaps even 
members of the committee -- could campaign to vote 
down the constitution in the referendum.  The Sunni 
Arabs likely to lead such an effort will undoubtedly 
be among those who are convinced that the Sunni Arabs 
hold a majority in this country and an overwhelming 
majority in several provinces.  They are likely to 
fail in the referendum because, despite these dreams, 
Sunni Arabs lack two-thirds of the votes in three 
provinces.  When they do fail, these Sunni Arab 
leaders will face a choice: accept the legitimacy of 
the referendum and the concurrent fact that Sunnis are 
not even close to a majority in Iraq, or reject the 
legitimacy of the IECI and cling to the illusion that 
they are Iraq's majority.  They are depressingly 
likely to make the latter choice, which means the IECI 
will already be under fire from some leaders in the 
Sunni Arab community at precisely the moment when we 
are gearing up to encourage wide Sunni Arab 
participation in the next elections. 
 
5.  (C) It will, therefore, be important to boost the 
credibility of the IECI among the Sunni community. 
Doing that will require more contact between the IECI 
and Sunni Arab organizations, political and non- 
political, and a solid demonstration by the IECI that 
it is sensitive to the election-related needs of the 
Sunni Arab community.  In contrast to other parts of 
Iraq, a higher-profile role by the UN and other 
international observers would be helpful in Iraqi 
Sunni Arab areas.  If some of those observers are 
credible representatives from other Sunni Arab states, 
this would further ease Iraqi Sunni Arab suspicions. 
 
6.  (C) List of participants: 
 
Deputy Prime Minister Abid Mutlak al-Jaburi 
Deputy Constitution Committee Chairman Adnan al-Janabi 
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) 
Mr. Richard DeBobes, Minority Staff Director 
Mr. Daniel Cox, Professional Staff Member 
Major John Ulrich, US Army Liaison 
Charge D'Affaires David Satterfield 
Political Counselor Robert Ford 
Political Officer Jeff Beals 
Legislative Liaison Robert Kelley 
 
7. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield