US embassy cable - 05GENEVA1667

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 001667 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FODAG 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND OES 
PASS TO HHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO, WHO 
SUBJECT: WHO: 58TH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: WHO TECHNICAL 
BRIEFING ON STRENGTHENING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS 
AND RESPONSE 
 
 
1.  The Global Health Security Action Initiative (GHSI) and 
the WHO Secretariat hosted a technical briefing on pandemic 
influenza preparedness and response at the 58th World Health 
Assembly on May 18 2005.  Formal presentations included Dr. 
Guenael Rodier, Director, Department of Communicable Disease 
Surveillance and Response (CSR)/WHO; Dr. Richard Nesbit, 
Director, Programme Management, WHO Regional Office for the 
Western Pacific (WPRO); Dr. Klaus Stohr, Coordinator, WHO 
Global Influenza Programme; Dr. Ungchusak Kumnuan, Director, 
Bureau of Epidemiology, Department of Disease Control, 
Ministry of Health, Kingdom of Thailand; Dr. Bruce Gellin, 
Director, National Vaccine Program Office, U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services; and Dr. David Salisbury, Principal 
Medical Officer, Department of Health of the United Kingdom 
for the GHSI.  Representatives of national delegations to the 
WHA, WHO staff, and the public attended the briefing. 
 
2.  The general theme of the briefing was that, while the 
timing is unpredictable, experts are certain that a new 
influenza pandemic will occur in the foreseeable future. The 
assembled experts at the briefing emphasized that, because of 
a pandemic's inherent threat to public health, the 
probability of significant economic and social disruption, 
and the predictability that countries will be unable to 
control a pandemic within their borders once it starts, all 
countries need to have and exercise influenza pandemic 
response and contingency plans in anticipation of a 
pandemic's emergence.  According to the presentations, 
national health authorities should base these plans on sound 
science, and use culturally and socially acceptable public 
health practices, and fit within the constraints of resources 
available to a country, and these plans should form the basis 
of a national pandemic strategy.  The experts underlined that 
both plans and strategies should have a focus on preparedness 
action, including strengthening national influenza diagnostic 
capability, improving practices in hospital care and patient 
management, expanding the ability to detect influenza cases 
through epidemiological surveillance, and timely as well as 
transparent reporting of human and avian influenza cases. 
 
3.  A general consensus emerged among presenters that the 
H5N1 strain of highly pathogenic avian influenza, as a risk 
factor for a pandemic emergence, is now entrenched in wild 
life and silent reservoirs in East and South East Asia. 
Control of the virus will require improved communications and 
cooperation between Ministries of Health and Ministries of 
Agriculture in the affected countries to improve the 
detection of avian influenza cases in animals and develop an 
accurate interpretation of their significance to public 
health. The group also concluded that control will need to 
include such activities as improved biosecurity practices for 
poultry, protecting agricultural workers from avian influenza 
virus exposure, and promoting food safety practices to 
prevent the transmission of the virus to humans from chicken, 
duck and goose blood or uncooked flesh. (NOTE: Scientists 
believe proper cooking of fowl kills the virus; therefore 
eating cooked chickens, ducks and geese does not present a 
risk. END NOTE.) 
 
4. The experts urged all countries to strengthen their 
political commitment to influenza pandemic preparedness and 
planning, at the national level. The presenters emphasized 
that it is the investment in preparedness now, nationally, 
regionally and globally, that countries make in themselves 
that will mitigate the effects of a pandemic when it strikes. 
Moley