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| Identifier: | 05GENEVA1665 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05GENEVA1665 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | US Mission Geneva |
| Created: | 2005-07-07 10:46:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | TBIO WHO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 001665 SIPDIS FODAG DEPT FOR IO/T AND OES PASS TO HHS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO, WHO SUBJECT: WHO:58TH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: U.S.-HOSTED MINISTERIAL MEETING ON AVIAN INFLUENZA REF: STATE 80654 1. U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Michael O. Leavitt hosted a Ministerial meeting on avian influenza at the 58th World Health Assembly on May 16, 2005. The meeting brought together the Ministers of Health and representatives from Australia, Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, East Timor, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom and Great Britain, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the European Commission, the World Health Organization (WHO) Headquarters, the WHO Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) and the WHO Regional Office for Southeast Asia (SEARO). Participants offered their comments and views on the current priorities and/or challenges related to the threat of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza. General focal points for discussion included improving surveillance; outbreak response; and inter-Ministerial and international coordination, collaboration, and communication. 2. The more formal Ministerial comments revolved around the chronology of the H5N1 outbreak in Asia, how countries dealt with their outbreaks, the imperative of strong political leadership and the need for continuing support for H5N1 control and prevention activities by both agriculture and public health authorities. 3. Many delegations described the different approaches their countries have taken to manage outbreaks, including improved information-sharing between various stakeholders; research and development towards better vaccines; increased training, education, and awareness among providers; and enhanced epidemiological surveillance. China stated that its approach is on the prevention of human cases through poultry flock biosecurity and vaccination (risk reduction). Under this system, national-level professionals provide guidance and oversight to assure adherence to quality-control principles. The implementing framework is a national surveillance system that includes local and provincial centers that conduct surveillance and response activities at those administrative levels. China emphasized the need for information-sharing, but cautioned that authorities must focus on accuracy to limit misinformation and rumors. They also emphasized the need to strengthen coordination with the WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the need for increased communication and scientific exchanges between agriculture and public health authorities and interest groups in the Asian region. 4. Thailand emphasized that avian influenza control was a national priority, and distributed their published national strategy and plan for avian influenza as a pandemic influenza threat. The Thais said they had been slow to realize the implications and scope of the poultry outbreak until the occurrence of the first human case. They, like the Chinese, are now focusing on controlling the outbreak in birds, but through culling and not vaccination. They seek a coordinated regional and international response to avian influenza, including a willingness to serve as a regional training center. The Thais also support the idea of an international stockpile of antivirals, and a greater investment in H5N1 vaccine research and development. 5. South Korea emphasized the central role of transparent reporting and immediate notification in controlling the December 2003 outbreak in their country. Viet Nam expressed its concerns that sensitive information countries provide to the WHO Secretariat and other international agencies during outbreaks remain confidential. Laos emphasized the need for enhanced capacity-building with respect to disease surveillance. 6. In U.S. closing remarks, Secretary Leavitt summarized the key messages received at the meeting as follows: a) Greater transparency in information about the outbreaks and quicker sharing of human and animals samples and isolates; b) Equitable access to safe and effective vaccines when they become available; c) A global network of collaboration that uses both the WHO laboratory network and the OIE animal diagnostic lab network; d) Strengthened multilateral as well as bilateral collaboration and coordination on H5N1 avian influenza surveillance and control activities, both human and veterinary; e) Better access to Biosafety Level-three (BSL-3) capability in Southeast Asia; f) Expanded global vaccine production capabilities; g) Research on both human and animal vaccine efficacy and safety; h) Better communications with and training for health care providers and animal workers on personal protection and H5N1 case detection; and i) Joint need to learn from the lessons of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and the mistaken distribution of H2N2 samples. Moley
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