US embassy cable - 05GENEVA1665

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

WHO:58TH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: U.S.-HOSTED MINISTERIAL MEETING ON AVIAN INFLUENZA

Identifier: 05GENEVA1665
Wikileaks: View 05GENEVA1665 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: US Mission Geneva
Created: 2005-07-07 10:46:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: TBIO WHO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 001665 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FODAG 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T AND OES 
PASS TO HHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO, WHO 
SUBJECT: WHO:58TH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: U.S.-HOSTED 
MINISTERIAL MEETING ON AVIAN INFLUENZA 
 
REF: STATE 80654 
 
1. U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Michael 
O. Leavitt hosted a Ministerial meeting on avian influenza at 
the 58th World Health Assembly on May 16, 2005.  The meeting 
brought together the Ministers of Health and representatives 
from Australia, Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of 
China, East Timor, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Laos People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom and Great Britain, 
the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the European Commission, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Headquarters, the WHO 
Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO) and the WHO Regional 
Office for Southeast Asia (SEARO).  Participants offered 
their comments and views on the current priorities and/or 
challenges related to the threat of highly pathogenic H5N1 
avian influenza.  General focal points for discussion 
included improving surveillance; outbreak response; and 
inter-Ministerial and international coordination, 
collaboration, and communication. 
 
2.  The more formal Ministerial comments revolved around the 
chronology of the H5N1 outbreak in Asia, how countries dealt 
with their outbreaks, the imperative of strong political 
leadership and the need for continuing support for H5N1 
control and prevention activities by both agriculture and 
public health authorities. 
 
3.  Many delegations described the different approaches their 
countries have taken to manage outbreaks, including improved 
information-sharing between various stakeholders; research 
and development towards better vaccines; increased training, 
education, and awareness among providers; and enhanced 
epidemiological surveillance.  China stated that its approach 
is on the prevention of human cases through poultry flock 
biosecurity and vaccination (risk reduction).  Under this 
system, national-level professionals provide guidance and 
oversight to assure adherence to quality-control principles. 
The implementing framework is a national surveillance system 
that includes local and provincial centers that conduct 
surveillance and response activities at those administrative 
levels.  China emphasized the need for information-sharing, 
but cautioned that authorities must focus on accuracy to 
limit misinformation and rumors.  They also emphasized the 
need to strengthen coordination with the WHO, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the need for 
increased communication and scientific exchanges between 
agriculture and public health authorities and interest groups 
in the Asian region. 
 
4. Thailand emphasized that avian influenza control was a 
national priority, and distributed their published national 
strategy and plan for avian influenza as a pandemic influenza 
threat.  The Thais said they had been slow to realize the 
implications and scope of the poultry outbreak until the 
occurrence of the first human case.  They, like the Chinese, 
are now focusing on controlling the outbreak in birds, but 
through culling and not vaccination.  They seek a coordinated 
regional and international response to avian influenza, 
including a willingness to serve as a regional training 
center.  The Thais also support the idea of an international 
stockpile of antivirals, and a greater investment in H5N1 
vaccine research and development. 
 
5. South Korea emphasized the central role of transparent 
reporting and immediate notification in controlling the 
December 2003 outbreak in their country.  Viet Nam expressed 
its concerns that sensitive information countries provide to 
the WHO Secretariat and other international agencies during 
outbreaks remain confidential. Laos emphasized the need for 
enhanced capacity-building with respect to disease 
surveillance. 
 
6.  In U.S. closing remarks, Secretary Leavitt summarized the 
key messages received at the meeting as follows: 
 
a)  Greater transparency in information about the outbreaks 
and quicker sharing of human and animals samples and 
isolates; 
 
b)  Equitable access to safe and effective vaccines when they 
become available; 
 
c)  A global network of collaboration that uses both the WHO 
laboratory network and the OIE animal diagnostic lab network; 
 
d)  Strengthened multilateral as well as bilateral 
collaboration and coordination on H5N1 avian influenza 
surveillance and control activities, both human and 
veterinary; 
 
e)  Better access to Biosafety Level-three (BSL-3) capability 
in Southeast Asia; 
 
f)  Expanded global vaccine production capabilities; 
 
g)  Research on both human and animal vaccine efficacy and 
safety; 
 
h)  Better communications with and training for health care 
providers and animal workers on personal protection and H5N1 
case detection; and 
 
i)  Joint need to learn from the lessons of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome and the mistaken distribution of H2N2 
samples. 
Moley 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04