US embassy cable - 05MANILA3115

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 003115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D, P, EAP, EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP, EAP/PD, EAP/EP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, PINR, RP 
SUBJECT: A GMA INSIDER GETS OUT 
 
REF: A. MANILA 3093 
 
     B. MANILA 3061 
     C. MANILA 2993 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Andrew McClearn for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) Summary.  The defection from GMA ranks of Congressman 
Golez is a blow to Arroyo.  He believes she has lost the 
"moral high ground" and civil society support.  There are no 
signs yet of other significant political defections or 
military unrest, but the situation remains highly fluid.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (S) Charge met with Representative Roilo Goilez on July 7 
at the latter's request.  Golez, who was Arroyo's National 
Security Adviser from 2001-04, resigned from Arroyo's 
coalition party KAMPI and from his position as chair of the 
House's Committee of National Defense on June 29.  At that 
time, he called on Arroyo to resign. 
 
3.  (S) Golez reported that Arroyo's hold on the Senate is 
now very shaky.  He mentioned that Arroyo's control of the 
body shows signs of shifting, especially with senators such 
as Ramon Magsaysay Jr., who he characterized as one of 
several who could be convinced to oppose the President's 
continuation in power.  Once the opposition has a majority, 
he said, they could make a "sense of the Senate" declaration 
calling on her to resign.  (Note:  The Senate would also be 
the tribunal to convict or acquit her on any impeachment 
motion that might be approved by the lower House after it 
resumes on July 25, though Golez believes no impeachment by 
the House is likely.  End Note.) 
 
4.  (S) Referring to Arroyo's majority in the House, Golez 
said the President's reliance on this bloc would further 
compromise her authority to govern effectively even if she 
survives.  He noted she would be stuck in a vicious downward 
spiral, beholden to so many special interests and members of 
the Congress that she would have to give even more favors and 
do even more questionable things in order to retain her 
position. 
 
5.  (S) Golez stressed to Charge that the current crisis over 
the legitimacy of the presidency was worse than all other 
related crises faced by Arroyo since she came to power in 
2001.  He noted that this crisis is distinct from the other 
three critical moments Arroyo has faced -- EDSA 3 in May 
2001, the Oakwood Mutiny in July 2003, and the July 2004 
Angelo de la Cruz Iraq hostage affair -- because for the 
first time she, in her own eyes and in the eyes of the 
people, no longer has the moral high ground.  Using the 
analogy of racing horses, he said Arroyo is like a 
thoroughbred -- but one who is now permanently crippled. 
Vice President Noli de Castro is just a run-of-the-mill horse 
used to haul wagons.  But now, Golez asserted, that 
run-of-the-mill horse could win the race.  In any case, he 
said the Philippines would do better with De Castro than with 
Arroyo at this point.  Charge underscored that the U.S. 
supported accountability, but also emphasized the importance 
of following the Constitution and due process.  Golez said 
that he would only support constitutional measures, which 
include resignation. 
 
6.  (S) Charge noted President Arroyo's tenacity and 
determination to remain in power, which Golez downplayed for 
the following three reasons: 
 
-- First, as noted above, he asserted she has lost the moral 
high ground and therefore lacks the firm conviction she once 
had of her "mission" to govern the country; 
 
-- Second, her presumption of the role of "civil society" 
president leaves her much more vulnerable than her 
predecessor (former president Joseph Estrada) to criticism 
from powerful and influential sectors such as the Catholic 
bishops and prominent national universities such as the 
University of the Philippines, Ateneo, and De La Salle. 
Estrada, he said, didn't care about what civil society said 
because he had the masses -- Arroyo does not; 
 
-- Third, she has in the past been worried about violence. 
During the aborted May 1, 2001, march on the Palace she heard 
false reports that a few Filipinos had been shot and she 
began to panic and almost lost control because of her fear of 
having caused the deaths. 
 
7.  (S) Golez said his pessimistic views on Arroyo's future 
seem to be shared by many others in high places.  Noting that 
he met with Cardinal Vidal last week, he claimed that Vidal 
took his hand and commended him for his public stance against 
Arroyo.  Golez also speculated that Arroyo is becoming 
depressed.  Shortly after Golez had publicly called for 
Arroyo's resignation and resigned from KAMPI on June 29, he 
claimed the President had called him and said plaintively: 
"Roi, you have left me already."  She was not angry, he 
noted, but clearly she felt lost, sad and betrayed.  Golez 
finished by noting that his stance is not necessarily a moral 
one.  Rather it is a clear-eyed decision to stay on the side 
of History.  Just as he did in 1986 and 2001, he senses that 
the days of the person in power are numbered. 
 
8.  (S) Comment:  Golez's decision to bolt Arroyo's coalition 
clearly came as a blow to Malacanang.  Golez, a U.S. Naval 
Academy grad, is highly regarded for his policy smarts, 
although many of his House colleagues resent him believing he 
is all elbows.  So far, none of Golez's colleagues in the 
pro-Arroyo majority have joined him by calling for her 
ouster.  We are picking up real signs of discontent towards 
Arroyo in the House and Senate, however, and her grip will 
loosen further if the controversy continues to swirl.  Per 
ref A, even House Speaker De Venecia, previously a close 
ally, told Charge of his deep concerns about Arroyo during a 
July 6 meeting.  Golez made a brief reference to some unrest 
in the military.  Mission will be reporting more on this area 
shortly.  At this point, we have no indications of unrest in 
the senior ranks and no reports of any significant pockets of 
opposition to Arroyo. 
 
MUSSOMELI