US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3890

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TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION DECLARATION

Identifier: 05ANKARA3890
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA3890 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-07-06 16:29:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL CY TU EU Accession
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003890 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, CY, TU, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION 
DECLARATION 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 427 
 
     B. ANKARA 879 
     C. ANKARA 1856 
     D. ANKARA 3558 
     E. BRUSSELS 2533 
     F. 1 JULY 2005 SCOTT/MARCIEL/SKINNER E-MAILS 
 
(U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Turkey is determined to issue a written 
declaration that extending the Ankara Agreement to the ten 
new EU members does not constitute recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC).  Domestic criticism that it does 
constitute recognition is pushing the Turks toward tougher 
non-recognition language, posing the risk that member states 
or the Commission will question whether Turkey has fulfilled 
the EU requirement to extend the Agreement.  This could 
possibly block the opening of negotiations.  As of July 5, 
the Turks had not shared their proposed non-recognition 
declaration text with anyone, not even the UK.  We urged the 
MFA to do so, and to use the most moderate language possible. 
 Turkey and some member states are also at odds about the 
modalities for extending the Agreement.  End Summary. 
 
 
Turks Firm On Written Declaration 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) The Turkish MFA continues to firmly state that Turkey 
will soon extend the Ankara Agreement to the ten new members, 
including the ROC.  The MFA is equally firm that Turkey will 
issue a written declaration that their extending the Ankara 
Agreement to the 10 new EU members does not constitute 
recognition of the ROC (refs a, b, c, d). 
 
3.  (C) Given continuing domestic criticism that it does 
constitute recognition, we see little chance Turkey can be 
persuaded otherwise.  Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs 
A/DDG Bilman called the idea of no declaration "impossible." 
He claims he is getting "hate letters" over Turkey's 
commitment to extend the Agreement to the ROC.  Bilman 
likewise dismissed the idea of an oral declaration, saying it 
will have "no meaning."  UK Embassy PolChief Miller says a 
minority of member states hope for an oral declaration. 
 
4.  (C) Bilman says the Turks are looking for "legal 
certainty" that extending the Agreement cannot be construed 
as recognition.  The MFA has consulted with several 
international lawyers (not Turks, according to Bilman) about 
what language will guarantee that.  European Commission 
Ankara Political Head Dawson and Miller think the Turks are 
wrong on the law, saying that Commission and UK lawyers agree 
that recognition cannot occur without Turkey actively 
intending it.  However, according to Dawson, the Turks 
continue to believe they can be "tricked" into recognition. 
 
5.  (C) Despite earlier statements, it now appears the Turks 
are prepared to live without EU acknowledgment of their 
non-recognition declaration.  Bilman acknowledged this was 
Turkey's "original position," but said he was not sure "if 
this (EU acknowledgment) will happen."  He then dropped the 
point. 
 
Turks, EU Have Not Discussed Specific Language 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  (C) Bilman, Miller and Dawson confirm Turkey has so far 
not shared its proposed text with the Commission, nor even 
with the UK, its strongest EU supporter.  Miller tells us the 
UK has asked to see the text before the Turks give it to the 
Commission, but had not seen it as of July 5.  Dawson said 
the Commission has not discussed specific language because it 
does not want to encourage a Turkish declaration, and because 
the Turks are reluctant to share the text.  UK Ambassador 
Westmacott has spoken to MFA U/S Tuygan and Deputy U/S Apakan 
regarding the text.  They promised his ideas will be taken 
into account.  We urged Bilman to consider at least sharing 
the text with the UK; he said he would consider this but was 
non-committal. 
 
7.  (C) Acknowledging this is an issue for Turkey and the EU 
to resolve, we also urged A/DDG Bilman to use moderate 
language in the declaration, the minimum possible to achieve 
Turkey's aims.  Bilman replied that several EU diplomats here 
have urged the same thing, but none has told him what 
language would be acceptable or unacceptable. Per ref e, we 
suggested that, as a starting point, stating that the 
protocol does not change Turkey's position would be 
preferable to stating that Turkey does not recognize the ROC 
and only recognizes the "TRNC." 
 
8.  (C) Bilman recalled that upon signing the EU Constitution 
Treaty, Turkey sent a letter to EU High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy Solana referring to -- but 
not reiterating -- the MFA's May 1, 2004 statement regarding 
"Southern Cypriot Greek Administration's Accession to the 
EU."  The May 1 statement said, in part, "Greek Cypriots" do 
not represent Turkish Cypriots, do not have authority over 
the whole island, and cannot be accepted as the legal 
government representing all the island (we have e-mailed a 
copy to the Department, USEU and Embassy London).  Bilman 
hinted that the coming Turkish declaration might again refer 
to, but not reiterate, the May 2004 statement.  However, even 
such a reference could be a problem -- Dawson also recalled 
the May 1 statement, terming it "not particularly 
encouraging." 
 
9.  (C) Whatever the language of the non-recognition 
declaration, the Turks will have to be careful.  While 
domestic criticism pushes them toward tougher, legally 
bulletproof text, both Miller and Dawson warn that extreme 
language will fuel doubts by members states about Turkey's 
intent to implement the extension protocol, or raise 
questions about the credibility of Turkey's ostensible 
agreement.  In effect, it would call into question whether 
Turkey has fulfilled the requirements for the opening of 
negotiations.  The worst case, according to Dawson, would be 
if the Commission legal service comes to such a conclusion. 
 
 
Letter Exchange v. Signing 
-------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) The Turks and some member states are also not in 
agreement on the modalities of how Turkey will extend the 
Ankara Agreement to the ten new members, including the ROC. 
The Turkish MFA wants a low-key exchange of letters to avoid 
inflaming domestic opponents; they want to avoid a 
high-publicity signing ceremony.  However, according to UK 
PolChief Miller, the letter exchange idea "won't fly in 
Brussels."  Although the Commission itself is neutral on this 
point, Dawson also notes signing is important to some member 
states.  Some member states will not agree to a letter 
exchange, pointing out the December Summit conclusions 
require Turkey to "sign."  In addition, Turkish refusal to 
sign could furnish another cause for some member states to 
question Turkey's commitment to implement the protocol. 
 
11.  (C) There is a middle ground:  Turkey could sign the 
extension protocol without a ceremony.  Miller said the FCO 
proposed this to MFA Deputy U/S for European Affairs Bozkir 
during his July 1 visit to London, but Bozkir still insisted 
on a letter exchange. 
MCELDOWNEY 

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