US embassy cable - 05HARARE928

C O N F I D E N T I A L  HARARE 000928 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, EAID, SOCI, ZI, Restore Order/Murambatsvina 
SUBJECT: UN ENVOY CRITICAL OF GOZ AND "RESTORE ORDER", 
ANTICIPATES ENGAGEMENT 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1 
.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) UN Special Envoy Anna Tibaijuka on July 4 told the 
CDA and visiting Congressional staff Gregory Simpkins and 
Pearl Alice Marsh that she found the GOZ's Restore Order 
campaign misguided, destructive, and wrong.  She said that 
GOZ officials, including President Mugabe, had been 
unapologetic about the operation but were willing to engage 
with the UN in providing for displaced populations.  She 
urged the USG to engage more with the GOZ and to remain open 
to potential support for a reconstruction program.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Critical of GOZ, Restore Order 
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2. (C) Over dinner at the Residence, Tibaijuka recounted to 
the CDA and visiting Congressional staff details of her 
recent visits to razed residential and commercial areas in 
Harare and Mutare.  She recognized that the GOZ was trying to 
stage-manage her travels; in Mutare, for example, UN staff 
had documented GOZ removal of truckloads of homeless families 
just before Tibaijuka arrived.  Nonetheless, she was being 
afforded access wherever she asked, and had talked to many of 
Restore Order's homeless victims.  She said there was no 
excuse for the GOZ's mistreatment of its people. 
 
3.  (C) Tibaijuka confirmed that the state media had been 
systematically misquoting her to portray her as supportive of 
the GOZ's campaign.  She underscored that she had been direct 
and unambiguous in her criticism of the program during 
meetings with various GOZ ministers and officials, including 
the President himself. 
 
4.  (C) Tibaijuka reported that Mugabe ardently defended 
Restore Order during his meeting with her but she questioned 
whether he really understood the scale of suffering wrought 
by the campaign.  His defense made her believe that some of 
his advisors had convinced him that the operation would 
alleviate many of the country's social and economic ills.  In 
fact, she observed, the operation was bound to exacerbate a 
variety of national problems and resolve none. 
 
5.  (C) The Special Envoy stressed that there was no question 
that the GOZ policies were "wrong."  The GOZ had to be made 
to understand that individuals had a right to live where they 
wanted inside their country and not be herded into the 
countryside to suit a government policy agenda.  She said she 
was especially troubled by the situation at Porta Farm and 
the GOZ's refusal to obey a court injunction there.  (N.B. 
She had witnessed residential demolitions there just hours 
after President Mugabe had assured her that the operation was 
winding down.)  Still, she was encouraged by the GOZ's 
willingness to engage and to collaborate. 
 
6. (C) Tibaijuka explained that Zimbabwe's antiquated legal 
infrastructure, which had been written by a colonial 
administration intent on controlling indigenous populations, 
was a substantial problem.  For example, local construction 
standards had been artificially inflated to exceed European 
standards just to assure than no blacks could move into 
certain areas.  The GOZ was now using these nonsensical codes 
as a pretext to demolish structures and relocate masses of 
humanity.  GOZ reliance on such relics reflected both cynical 
political opportunism and ignorance.  She and her UN 
colleagues were working to educate GOZ policy-makers on 
modern concepts of urbanization and to change attitudes. 
 
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Appeal for USG Engagement, Support 
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7.  (C) Looking to the future, Tibaijuka stressed the 
 
 
importance of international engagement in remedying the 
situation.  During her meetings, the GOZ had been receptive 
to international assistance in responding to the humanitarian 
crisis wrought by Restore Order.  She observed that the USG 
had a potentially key role to play and suggested that we 
reach out more to the GOZ in order to bolster our potential 
influence.  She also urged that we support international 
reconstruction efforts to provide for Restore Order's victims 
with provisions and new shelter. Nobody had wanted the 
country to go down this path but now we all had to 
collaborate on leading Zimbabweans out of it.  Echoing her 
appeal at an earlier diplomatic briefing, she said "you can 
write off a government, but you can't write off a people." 
 
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Report Coming, Political Statements Unlikely 
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8.  (C) In closing, Tibaijuka emphasized that as a special 
envoy, she would be submitting a report to the UN SYG but was 
unlikely to be making any significant public statements on 
the situation here.  Her UN agency, Habitat, was a "normative 
organ" that would permit her more latitude to make public 
comments but advice was likely to be more technical than 
political. 
 
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Comment 
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9.  (C) Tibaijuka appeared deeply and genuinely concerned 
about the plight of Zimbabwe's trampled IDPs and sincerely 
dismayed over the GOZ's callousness and unrepentnt attitude. 
 However, her visit was not successul in convincing the GOZ 
to end its operation an it remains to be seen what the UN 
will do folloing her report.  GOZ recalcitrance represents a 
slap in the international community's face, especially the 
UN.  However, it should be noted that the AU's envoy, Tom 
Bahare Nyanduga, has not left his hotel since his arriving on 
June 30 and the GOZ appears unlikely to let him proceed with 
his mission - a slap in Africa,s face as well that the 
continent appears all too willing to accept. 
 
10. (C) We would also note that GOZ receptivity to 
international assistance to clean up the mess it has made - 
essentially rewarding it for its inhumane war against its own 
people and thereby encouraging it to create more victims - 
poses a fundamental moral hazard for donors.  That said, the 
alternative - denying aid to the victims to punish the 
government that victimized them ) is maybe even less 
palatable. 
SCHULTZ 
 
 
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