US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI2975

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 002975 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2015 
TAGS: MCAP, MASS, AF, IZ, IR, PK, SA, TC 
SUBJECT: CENTCOM DEPUTY COMMANDER GENERAL SMITH VISITS UAE 
 
REF: A. BERN 1122 
     B. ABU DHABI 2946 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary: CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant General 
Smith met July 2 with UAE Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff 
Major General Mohammed Al Kaabi and UAE Air Force and Air 
Defense Commander Staff Pilot Major General Khaled Al 
Buainnan.  Smith briefed Al Kaabi on international troop 
deployments in both Afghanistan and Iraq in the run-up to 
their respective elections, and thanked the UAE for its 
contributions to security and stability in both countries. 
Smith and Al Kaabi agreed that land borders -) whether 
Iraq's or the UAE's -- remain vulnerable to smugglers and 
infiltrators and require greater protection.  Al Kaabi noted 
the mounting tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia that 
are in part related to an unresolved border dispute.  Smith 
and Al Buainnan reviewed the status of the UAE's Gulf Air 
Warfare Center, training needs, and the F-16 Block 60 fighter 
aircraft program.  End Summary. 
 
AFGHANISTAN UPDATE 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On July 2, CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant 
General Smith, accompanied by the Ambassador, Acting USLO 
Chief, and Pol Chief (notetaker) met with UAE Armed Forces 
Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Al Kaabi.  Al Kaabi was 
accompanied by Brigadier Obaid Al Hairi Salem Al Ketbi, 
Director of General Purchasing, and Jack McGuinness, advisor 
to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. 
 
3. (C) The bulk of the discussion concerned Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and UAE-Saudi border tensions.  Al Kaabi expressed his 
condolences for the 16 American service members in 
Afghanistan who died June 28 when their MH-47 helicopter 
crashed as they attempted to reinforce a small number of U.S. 
Special Forces.  Al Kaabi, who has twice been to Afghanistan 
to visit the UAE's Special Operations forces, and is familiar 
with its mountainous terrain, said he understood how 
insurgents in hiding could have employed a rocket-propelled 
grenade to down the helicopter.  Smith thanked the UAE for 
contributing its own Special Forces to Operation Enduring 
Freedom and for training a Bahraini Special Forces contingent 
to serve alongside them in Afghanistan. 
 
4. (C) Smith said he expected more violence in Afghanistan in 
the run-up to the September election.  If the remnant Taliban 
forces do not succeed in disrupting the election, "it's over 
for them," he said.  Already, 163 mid-level Taliban leaders 
have indicated they are "ready for conciliation."  Some of 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's followers are ready to reconcile as 
well, he added.  Al Kaabi said the Taliban did not have 
another option.  He noted that some Afghan expatriates with 
Taliban sympathies living in Al Ain in the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi had to be stopped from trying to create their own legal 
system.  Smith said the Taliban tried to re-establish 
themselves in the Kandahar area by taking over a village and 
establishing their own laws.  The government had to "go in 
and take it back."  Al Kaabi also said that President Karzai 
continued to view Pakistanis with suspicion.  "He sees a 
Pakistani behind every tree." 
 
5. (C) Smith briefed Al Kaabi on efforts to train the Afghan 
National Army, saying that 22,000 troops have received 
training to date, with a goal of training 70,000 troops by 
2007.  The challenge is finding suitable military leadership, 
he said.  Al Kaabi said if the U.S. provides the training and 
then turns over the military command to the Afghans, the 
Afghans "will find their way."  The U.S. is doing exactly 
that through "embedded training teams," Smith said.  Prior to 
the September election, there will be a troop increase, 
including one battalion each from Spain, the Netherlands, the 
UK, and the U.S., and three from NATO.  Those forces will 
stay on the ground for 90 days during the election period. 
After the election, if possible, the U.S. will reduce the 
number of its conventional forces slightly, Smith said. 
 
6. (C) Parenthetically, the Ambassador noted the strong 
relationship between the UAE and Pakistan (President 
Musharraf recently traveled to Abu Dhabi to meet with 
President Khalifa and senior leaders).  Al Kaabi, who spent 
seven months training in Peshawar earlier in his career, 
nodded in agreement and proceeded to describe the challenges 
of combatting the weapons and drug trade in the 
Pakistani-Afghan border areas. 
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ 
-------------------- 
 
7. (C) Smith also briefed Al Kaabi on the situation in Iraq, 
noting that 170,000 Iraqi troops had been trained and 
equipped to date, with the goal of training 200,000 troops by 
October 2005, and 205,000 troops by January 2006.  He said 
that the First Brigade in Baghdad is operating independently 
and is in control of some difficult neighborhoods.  An 
additional 22 battalions are within a few months of becoming 
independent, he said.  Iraqi troops are fighting successfully 
in Mosul and Fallujah, and are fighting in the Tigris and 
Euphrates valleys where U.S. forces believe some of the 
insurgent leadership is located and where Iraqis have helped 
find weapons caches.  Smith said the U.S. would probably 
increase its forces by a brigade for the October 2005 
constitutional referendum and the December 2005 election, and 
only begin to reduce forces after January 2006.  Smith said 
that U.S. forces serving on "transition teams" embedded with 
the Iraqi military are a success story.  Once the Iraqis say 
they are ready to take over, the U.S. forces will leave, he 
said. 
 
BORDER SECURITY ) A CHALLENGE FOR IRAQIS AND EMIRATIS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8. (C) Al Kaabi identified weak border security as a major 
challenge in Iraq and the UAE.  Smith recalled telling 
California Congressman Duncan Hunter, who had asked him 
whether having another U.S. division would secure Iraq's 
borders, that border security was not something land forces 
could do well.  Smith said the problem in Iraq was that the 
thousands of persons coming across the border from Syria, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia "appear to be legal."  Some may be 
using forged documents.  The authorities do not have any 
biomedical data that could help them determine who should and 
should not be admitted to Iraq.  Smith said that smugglers 
along the Iraq-Syria border were sophisticated tunnel 
builders, burrowing under berms and digging holes under 
fences.  Some prisoners in Iraq have employed ingenious 
techniques in an attempt to dig escape tunnels, he said. 
 
9. (C) Al Kaabi drew parallels with the UAE's border with 
Saudi Arabia, and noted that there were currently 10 firms 
building a wall along the entire UAE border in an attempt to 
stop smuggling and illegal immigration.  The project is 
scheduled for completion by the end of 2005.  Apparently 
prepared to discuss the topic of UAE-Saudi border tension, Al 
Kaabi produced a photo book containing illustrations of the 
UAE-Saudi border, the wall that is under construction, and 
the UAE frontier troops deployed there.  In response to the 
Ambassador's question, Al Kaabi said the Saudis were building 
up their border forces as well.  Al Kaabi said the UAE has 
witnessed the same determination by smugglers trying to enter 
into the UAE, or trying to smuggle drugs into the UAE. 
 
IRANIAN INFLUENCE ON IRAQ 
------------------------- 
 
10. (C) Al Kaabi said Iran was trying to influence Iraqi 
internal affairs, but he personally did not think Iran posed 
as much of a threat as Hizbollah in Lebanon.  Smith said the 
U.S. remains wary about the Iranians and Iranian influence on 
SCIRI and Moqtada Al Sadr.  However, he said that he was not 
that concerned that Iran would influence the new Iraqi 
government.  In Smith's view, Grand Ayattolah Ali Sistani was 
having a positive influence on the Iraqi political scene and 
did not appear to be interested in a close relationship with 
Iran.  Al Kaabi said to rule Iraq, you have to be tough, and 
that Iraqis were accustomed to having tough rulers.  Smith 
replied that the U.S. believes a representative government 
could work in Iraq.  Al Kaabi agreed, noting that Shi'a 
moderate Iyad Allawi could be a visionary leader who would 
not play the sectarian card.  (Note: Allawi remains a 
frequent visitor to Abu Dhabi.  Al Kaabi indicated that the 
had met Allawi during the latter's most recent visit.) 
 
REBUILDING IRAQ 
--------------- 
 
11. (C) Smith said that the new Iraqi ministers of defense 
and interior had been performing well and were determined to 
protect the country's oil and power infrastructure.  He cited 
an Iraqi opinion poll that found most Iraqis were more 
concerned about having electricity, water, and jobs than they 
were about security.  Al Kaabi said Iraq would be an 
important country in about five years' time and that its 
highly educated population would be an asset.  Smith said 
that Iraqis had a good work ethic, but Saddam had neglected 
the infrastructure in favor of building palaces instead of 
maintaining water treatment plants, power plants, and oil 
wells. 
 
12. (C) Al Kaabi said that Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed had instructed him to ask Smith how the 
UAE could be helpful in Iraq.  Smith said that Iraqis needed 
basic computer and communications training, as well as a 
modernized banking system, to make up for the years of 
neglect under Saddam.  Smith said one of the legacies of 
Saddam's time was that one-third of the Iraqi armed forces 
are on leave at any given time because soldiers and officers 
need time to collect their pay and return to their villages 
and take care of their families' needs.  Al Kaabi inquired 
about the status of members of Saddam's army and police. 
Smith said that many of the current police chiefs and 
officers were former army officers, and that the desertion 
problem has declined.  He acknowledged that it would take 
time for the Iraqi Transitional Government to allow former 
Saddam officials to fill leadership positions.  Former 
Republican Guard members are still not acceptable to the new 
Iraqi leadership, Smith said.  During the exchange, Al Kaabi 
confirmed that the Swiss government had finally approved the 
transfer of more than 150 M-113 Armed Personnel Carriers to 
Iraq via the UAE (ref A). 
 
UAE AIR FORCE UPDATE 
-------------------- 
 
13. (C) Smith, accompanied by Ambassador and Acting USLO 
Chief, also met July 2 with UAE Air Force and Air Defense 
Commander Major General Khaled Al Buainnan.  Khaled opened by 
noting the UAE's interest in building a high-speed rail line 
to Qatar.  The project, part of a planned causeway, is 
opposed by the Saudis because it bypasses the kingdom, Khaled 
said. 
 
14. (U) The UAE-Qatar causeway plan is one aspect of the 
mounting tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over their 
common boundaries.  The dispute dates back to a 1974 Border 
Agreement in which the UAE relinquished to Saudi Arabia a 
25-kilometer coastal area known as Khor Al Adeed, separating 
Abu Dhabi and Qatar, and also relinquished 80 percent of the 
giant Zararah/Shaybah oil field (ref B).  Deputy Prime 
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan 
bin Zayed told NEA PDAS Cheney during her June 26 visit that 
he would travel to Riyadh in July to meet again with Saudi 
Interior Minister Prince Nayef to follow up on Nayef's June 
19 visit to Abu Dhabi, but he was not optimistic about those 
talks. 
 
15. (C) Smith inquired about the UAE's F-16 Block 60 "Desert 
Falcon" fighter aircraft, the first batch of which was 
delivered on May 3.  Khaled expressed his satisfaction on 
this achievement.  They reviewed operational, maintenance, 
and training issues related to the fighter aircraft.  In 
discussing the UAE Desert Falcon program, Khaled stated that 
MBZ directed that only Lieutenants and Captains be assigned 
to fly the aircraft, no one higher.  All who have entered 
training with the exception of senior squadron leadership 
have been Captains, some of whom have since been promoted to 
Major while in training.  Khaled stated he had 61 pilots 
already trained (F-16 basic training provided by Turkey and 
the USAF, not Block 60 training) all of whom were First 
Lieutenants or Captains.  When asked about aircraft 
maintenance, Khaled noted UAE plans for long term follow-on 
support.  He acknowledged the UAEAF need for a dedicated FMS 
case but was non-committal on when he intended to pursue such 
support. 
 
16. (C) Khaled further requested the U.S. Navy's 
participation in future Gulf Air Warfare Center classes, UAE 
Air Force hosted exercises, and with US Navy ships in the 
Gulf.  Khaled indicated a strong desire for participation of 
AWACs or E-2C participation as well in future GAWC classes. 
Khaled concluded by asking for CENTCOM support in providing 
valuable air-to-air refueling operations to help his pilots 
maintain their currency.  Acting USLO Chief pointed out to 
Khaled that it was necessary to conclude the bilateral 
Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to help 
facilitate refueling operations.  Staff Pilot Col. Mahash Al 
Hameli, Chief of UAE Air Force Intelligence and Security, who 
also attended the meeting, acknowledged that the ACSA was key 
to going forward on the UAEAF aerial refueling operation 
request.  Khaled indicated his desire to have this agreement 
concluded soon.  As of July 3, to the Embassy's knowledge, 
ACSA was still in the interagency clearance process. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
17. (C) It was unusual for two UAE senior military officers 
to be making points about the UAE-Saudi border dispute, a 
political topic recently raised by Deputy Prime 
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan 
bin Zayed during NEA PDAS Cheney's June 26 visit (ref B). 
That Al Kaabi would produce a photo book showing the UAE's 
frontier corps on the border and construction of the wall, 
and that Khaled would mention the rail and causeway projects 
at the start of his meeting, are indications that UAEG 
officials are wanting to get their position out to a broader 
audience (septel to follow).  The local press has been giving 
the issue prominent coverage in recent days. 
SISON