US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2809

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MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ, CONSTITUTION, SHIITES, SUNNIS, NEGOTIATIONS, INSURGENCY; BAGHDAD

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2809
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2809 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-07-03 10:42:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: OPRC KMDR KPAO IZ Media Reaction
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, NEA/PPD, NEA/PPA, NEA/AGS, INR/IZ, 
INR/P 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC, KMDR, KPAO, IZ, Media Reaction 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: IRAQ, CONSTITUTION, SHIITES, 
SUNNIS, NEGOTIATIONS, INSURGENCY; BAGHDAD 
 
1. SUMMARY: The major themes in the daily newspapers on 
July. 3 were the preparations for drafting the 
constitution and the latest developments of the security 
situation. END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
----------------- 
 
A. "Yesterday's prey and today's hunter" (Al-Ittihad, 7/3) 
B. "Negotiations with resistance solve an American and not 
Iraqi problem" (Al-Mada, 7/3) 
 
---------------------- 
SELECTED COMMENTARIES 
---------------------- 
 
A. "Yesterday's prey and today's hunter" (Al-Ittihad, 7/3) 
 
Al-Ittihad (affiliated with PUK led by Jalal Talabani) 
published a fifth-paged editorial by Faryad Rawanduzi about 
the constitution: 
 
"Some individuals are asking why the Americans are 
insisting on Sunni participation in the constitutional 
committee and the political process in Iraq?  Those with 
inside knowledge may be asking why the U.S. is choosing to 
intervene directly on this issue while discussing other 
issues indirectly. In order to answer these two questions, 
we must ask if the Bush administration is afraid of failure 
in Iraq. Is it afraid of the current Iraqi politicians who 
have begun to implement this new project in Iraq? 
 
Without a doubt, the U.S. began reconsidering some of its 
policies regarding Iraq because the new situation has led 
the Shiites and Kurds - the winners of the political 
process - to dominate the political process. On the other 
hand, the Sunnis boycotted the elections because they 
thought that the Iraqi-American project opposed their own 
n 
aspirations. However, the U.S. objectives in Iraq also 
oppose some official and unofficial Shiite viewpoints. For 
this reason, the U.S. has had to resort to the "lost son" 
in order to restore balance to the unfair political 
process. The "lost son" that we are referring to is the 
Arab Sunni community. Indeed, the recent American 
discussions with the Arab Sunnis clearly indicates that the 
U.S. administration is confident with the Shiite 
understanding of the American role in Iraq. 
 
We realize that the U.S. has depended largely on the 
Shiites after it guaranteed the Kurds a major political 
role in an attempt to establish a country without anti- 
American sentiment. It is true that the participation of 
the Arab Sunnis is important to the Americans but it is 
also important for Iraq. In fact, the recent American 
insistence on supporting the Arab Sunnis represents a 
strong message to the Arab Shiites. This message informs 
the Shiites that the American strategy is to ensure the 
redistribution of the political balance in Iraq. The U.S. 
is conveying this message and providing concessions to the 
Arab Sunnis in an attempt to gain their participation and 
to end the Sunni insurgency. As a result, the Sunnis will 
participate in the U.S.-engineered political project. 
 
It appears that the Arab Sunnis have finally realized that 
they must knock at the American door if they want to 
participate in the political process. However, it is 
useless to knock on this door unless there have been real 
changes in the Arab Sunni's political strategy toward the 
American presence. Once that occurs, there will be American 
guarantees for Sunni participation in the political 
process. From their perspective, the Arab Shiites have 
begun to understand the significance of the new American 
orientation toward the Arab Sunnis. The Shiite political 
parties have been put on a state of alert because they 
understand that any American gesture to the Sunnis will be 
made at their expense. This implies that the Shiites will 
lose some positions and privileges. Therefore, if the 
Shiites do not make a gesture to support the new American 
position, the Iraqi equation will become more complicated. 
 
It is possible that the constitution will not be completed 
on time or new factors in the Iraqi political scene may 
come to the fore. The hawks in the White House will not 
hesitate to fly over the Sunni Triangle. Nor will they 
hesitate to build nests in the middle of the insurgency. 
The hawks will not hesitate to give yesterday's prey to the 
hunters in order to experience political profits in Iraq." 
 
B. "Negotiations with the 'resistance' solves the American 
problem, not the Iraqi problem" (Al-Mada, 7/3) 
 
Al-Mada (independent) published a front-page editorial by 
Jamal Abdul Rahim about the American negotiations with the 
Iraqi insurgency: 
 
"Over the past few days, the American government has 
announced that it has held negotiations with the Iraqi 
resistance. The Iraqi and foreign media outlets paid great 
attention to this frank confession. We all have the right 
to hypothesize that these negotiations will prove 
successful. But what would success mean to the Iraqi 
people?  Which party to the conflict will be able to free 
itself from its problems by experiencing success? Is it 
Iraq? The U.S.? Perhaps both? 
 
The answer to this question is very important for all 
Iraqis who are determined to stop the bloodshed in Iraq. 
The Iraqi people can urge the government to actively 
participate in these negotiations. However, our problem is 
that the real Iraqi picture is different from what the 
media outlets are portraying. The truth is that these 
negotiations will never improve the stability of the 
security situation in Iraq. Perhaps such negotiations can 
reduce pressure on the American government by leading to a 
reduction in the number of American loses in Iraq. I say 
that hypothetically because the Americans are negotiating 
with leaders of the Iraqi 'resistance' who supposedly only 
target foreign troops, not Iraqis. Is there any proof that 
verifies this statement? 
 
I think it is reasonable to discuss recent Iraqi and 
American reports that were published just days ago about 
the losses of Iraqi and American life in Iraq. The Pentagon 
published statistics stating that the number of American 
soldiers killed since last January has reached 307. 
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior announced that 
the Iraqi loses reached 8,175 killed and 12,000 wounded 
during this same period. These two results indicate that 
the American loses represent no more than 4 percent while 
the Iraqi losses make up 96%. 
 
It seems that the success of the negotiations with the 
resistance is aimed at reducing American loses. On the 
other hand, we do not know whether or not these 
negotiations will decrease the amount of Iraqi casualties. 
However, achieving success on this issue may uncover some 
armed groups that have insisted on provoking a civil war. 
These groups are undertaking operations under the slogan of 
jihad against the occupier. The supposed goal of these 
operations is to divide the Iraqi people into those that 
support the foreign forces and those that oppose them, 
thereby threatening Iraqi unity. 
 
I discuss these issues while remembering the anniversary of 
transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis. Thank God that we 
have obtained our full sovereignty, at least in general. 
However, we still face minor issues that must be addressed. 
For example, we do not control the presidential palace, we 
were not advised that the Americans wanted to build the 
largest embassy in the world here in Baghdad, and nobody 
asked for our opinion in choosing and replacing American 
ambassadors. Additionally, we do not have any input 
regarding Saddam's trial. If the reports on American 
negotiations with the resistance are true, then we can also 
add this issue to the list. In our completely sovereign 
state, neither the government nor the National Assembly 
know anything about these negotiations." 
 
SATTERFIELD 

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