US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2804

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002804 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NEA/I PLEASE PASS GRAMAGLIA, SILVERMAN, EB/TRA 
 
TAGS: EAIR, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, ECON, IZ 
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LIKELY TO CLOSE 
AGAIN AS "GOOD FAITH" BECOMES "BAD FAITH" 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  USG DISTRIBUTION ONLY  NOT 
FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2745 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) 
appears poised for closure yet again Sunday, July 3 at 1700 
local time due to the Iraq Transitional Government's (ITG) 
inability to meet the obligations it agreed to last week 
(REFTEL).  If Global Risk Management ("Global"), the 
current security contractor, orders another "stand down" on 
n 
July 3 the ITG will likely move to replace Global via an 
emergency bid process.  Our best guess is that BIAP will 
remain closed to civilian air operations for up to three 
weeks as the ITG mobilizes a new security force.  Before 
BIAP can reopen the new security procedures must be 
assessed and pass muster with both Coalition and Iraqi 
military commands at BIAP.  We raised the possible imminent 
closure of BIAP with Laith Kubba, an advisor to the Prime 
Minister on July 2.  Kubba was disturbed, saying he thought 
the matter had been resolved and that he would look into it 
immediately.  If Global departs and new security 
arrangements are put in place by the ITG, the Embassy will 
request the Department of Homeland Security to immediately 
redeploy a Transportation Security Administration team to 
BIAP in order to evaluate the new security operation and 
get the airport up and running again as soon as possible. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Despite agreed to "next steps" (REFTEL) on 
resolving the BIAP security situation, the ITG has not 
acted to meet its obligations to pay its outstanding debts 
to Global.  On June 29 the Prime Minister's office and the 
Ministry of Transportation should have sent paperwork to 
the Ministry of Finance to effect payment of the close to 
$12 million owed to Global.  This did not occur, despite 
draft language and other support provided by both the 
Embassy's IRMO Finance and IRMO Transportation offices. 
 
3. (SBU) Intense contract negotiations held earlier last 
week ceased as Global reported an inability to contact 
their counterparts.  Meetings planned for June 29-30 (last 
days of the Iraqi work week) between ITG lawyers and Global 
attorneys to discuss contract language did not occur. 
According to Global, their Iraqi counterparts did not 
return phone calls throughout the day.  Global's in-country 
management told us on July 1 that Global's Board of 
Directors believes that the ITG is deliberately deceiving 
them.  The company committed to providing U.S. military 
commanders at BIAP a 24-hour warning prior to "standing 
down" their operations. 
 
4. (SBU) EMINCOUNS alerted PM advisor Laith Kubba on July 2 
to the possible imminent closure of BIAP, and the 
possibility of a two to three week period in which it would 
remain closed until new procedures are in place.  Kubba was 
disturbed, saying that he thought the issue had been 
resolved.  He said he would look into it immediately and 
get back to us. 
 
5. (SBU) COMMENT: Global suspects, and we are inclined to 
believe, that senior levels of the ITG have been actively 
working to line up possible successors to the security 
contract at BIAP while keeping up the pretense of 
engagement with Global.  Now that mechanisms such as the 
emergency bid procedure are in place, Global's utility as 
an "interim measure" to keep the commercial side of BIAP 
open may have lost its appeal.  Regardless of what 
arrangements the ITG may have worked out, a two to three 
week closure of service is extremely likely.  If the ITG 
replaces Global at BIAP, the Embassy will require the 
immediate services of a TSA assessment team for 3-5 days to 
evaluate the replacement firm's security measures in order 
to get the airport up and running again as soon as 
possible.  We also strongly encourage the earliest possible 
deployment of the DHS attache to the Embassy and the 
agreed-upon TSA advisors to serve at BIAP for 90 days until 
Embassy is able to hire its own aviation security experts. 
END COMMENT. 
 
6. (SBU) REO Hillah, REO Mosul, REO Kirkuk, REO Basrah, 
minimize considered. 
 
SATTERFIELD