US embassy cable - 02KHARTOUM162

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 00162 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 08/22/12; 
 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, SU 
SUBJECT:    THE CHANGED FACE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN SUDAN 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE HAYWOOD RANKIN FOR REASON 1.5 (B-D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  THE REMOVAL OF TURABI IN 1999 EFFECTED A 
REVERSAL IN SUDAN'S POLITICAL APPROACH TOWARD ISLAM, EVEN THOUGH 
THE PERSONNEL OF THE REGIME OTHERWISE REMAINED LARGELY IN 
PLACE.  THE REGIME MAINTAINS RELATIVELY TIGHT CONTROL OVER THE 
MOSQUES, IN ORDER TO SUPPRESS RATHER THAN FOMENT ISLAMIC 
POLITICAL FERVOR.  THE EMPHASIS TODAY IS A RETURN TO A LESS 
INTOLERANT ISLAM WHICH STAYS OUT OF POLITICS, WHILE SHARI'A IS 
KEPT IN PLACE.  THE REGIME'S STALWARTS, WHO WERE SO PASSIONATELY 
ISLAMIST A HALF-DECADE AGO, NOW ARE SEIZED BY A WISH TO HOLD ON 
TO POWER AND PERSONAL WEALTH, AN OBJECTIVE WHICH THEY SEE AS 
ONLY ACHIEVABLE BY DISAVOWING THEIR FORMER ISLAMIC MILITANCY. 
THEY STILL FEAR TURABI, WHICH IS WHY HIS HOUSE ARREST HAS BEEN 
RECENTLY EXTENDED.  END SUMMARY 
 
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TURABI'S REMOVAL BRINGS A SEA CHANGE 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) THE WORDS AND ACTIONS OF THE RULING REGIME IN SUDAN ARE 
TODAY HUGELY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THEY WERE A FEW YEARS AGO.  THE 
TRANSFORMATION HAS BEEN RAPID ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. 
HOW PROFOUND AND LASTING IS THE TRANSFORMATION?  IS IT "REAL"? 
WILL SOME CABAL OF HARDLINERS WITHIN THE REGIME (FOR EXAMPLE, 
THE ARMY) REGAIN CONTROL AND SHIFT IT SUDDENLY BACK TO THE 
MILITANCY OF THE FIRST DECADE OF THE REGIME? 
 
3.  (C) NO ONE CAN ANSWER SUCH QUESTIONS WITH COMPLETE 
CONFIDENCE, BUT THERE HAS BEEN A LONG ENOUGH LAPSE OF TIME -- 
NEARLY THREE YEARS -- SINCE HASAN AL-TURABI'S REMOVAL AS 
SPRITIAL LEADER OF THE REGIME TO CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL HAD A 
MUCH MORE PROFOUND EFFECT THAN COULD BE GENERALLY IMAGINED. 
NOWHERE IS THIS MORE EVIDENT THAN IN THE MODERATION BEING 
INTEGRATED INTO THE PUBLIC GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED PROPAGATION OF 
ISLAM. 
 
4.  (C) DISCONTENT WITH THE DIRECTION TURABI WAS TAKING SUDAN -- 
DISCONTENT WITHIN THE REGIME ITSELF, NOT TO MENTION IN SUDANESE 
SOCIETY GENERALLY -- HAD BEEN MOUNTING FOR SOME YEARS.  INDEED, 
IT HAD BEEN LATENT FROM THE INCEPTION OF THE COUP THAT BROUGHT 
THE REGIME TO POWER.  BUT IT WAS TURABI'S REMOVAL AND EVENTUAL 
HOUSE ARREST THAT FREED THE REGIME TO REVERSE COURSE. 
 
5.  (C) TURABI WAS UNIQUE IN SUDANESE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL 
SOCIETY.  HIS UNIQUENESS LAY IN HIS COMBINATION OF PASSIONATE 
ISLAMIST IDEALISM AND EXTRAORDINARY ABILITY TO PERSUADE AND 
MOBILIZE FOLLOWERS.  INDEED, HE WAS UNIQUE IN ARAB SOCIETY WRIT 
LARGE.  HE NEVER OCCUPIED THE PRESIDENCY, THE OFFICE FROM WHICH 
MOST ARAB OR AFRICAN POTENTATES EXERCISE WIDE POWER, AND HE WAS 
ABLE NOT ONLY TO BRING THE REGIME UNDER HIS SPELL, BUT GIVE 
SUDAN -- AN IMPOVERISHED, PARTIALLY UNGOVERNABLE, ISOLATED,AND 
MARGINAL STATE -- A MALEFICENT INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE ARAB 
WORLD.  APPARENTLY, THERE IS NO ONE TO TAKE HIS PLACE, INSIDE OR 
OUTSIDE THE REGIME.  THE REGIME'S CONTINUED FEAR OF TURABI WAS 
DEMONSTRATED AUGUST 18 WHEN HIS HOUSE ARREST ON FLIMSY CHARGES 
(SIGNING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION 
MOVEMENT, OF ALL THINGS) WAS EXTENDED FOR ANOTHER YEAR.  THE 
ANNOUNCEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT THIS EXTENSION WAS INFINITELY 
RENEWABLE. 
 
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PRAGMATISM, OR CORRUPTION, PREVAILS 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) AS SOMEONE ONCE SAID, POWER CORRUPTS.  AS IN ALL AFRICAN 
AND ARAB SOCIETIES, GOVERNMENT IS THE MEANS BY WHICH WEALTH IS 
ACHIEVED AND DISTRIBUTED.  TURABI UNCEASINGLY SOUGHT TO 
CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL, TO MAXIMIZE HIS POLITICAL POWER, JUST 
AS MEMBERS OF THE REGIME WERE AMASSING WEALTH AND GETTING TO BE 
VERY FOND OF THEIR WEALTH AND STATUS.  THE WRITING WAS ON THE 
WALL FOR THE LEADER OF THE COUP HIMSELF, PRESIDENT BASHIR.  HE 
HAD TO ACT, AND HE FOUND IN TAKING ACTION AGAINST TURABI THAT 
THE TIDES WITHIN THE REGIME WERE RUNNING AGAINST TURABI AND NOT 
HIMSELF. 
 
7.  (C) TURABI WOULD HAVE WON THAT STRUGGLE IF HIS ERSTWHILE 
FOLLOWERS WITHIN THE REGIME HAD BELIEVED HIS VISION WOULD KEEP 
THEM IN POWER.  THEY KNEW PERFECTLY WELL THAT NO DEMOCRATIC 
ELECTION WOULD HAVE PUT HIM OR THEM IN POWER, BUT THEY ALSO KNEW 
THAT SUCH POPULARLITY OR ACCEPTANCE AS THE REGIME HAD HAD IN 
SUDANESE SOCIETY WAS DIMINISHING, NOT INCREASING.  AN IMPORTANT 
ELEMENT OF RISING DISCONTENT WAS THE REGIME'S ISLAMIC 
STRINGENCY, BY WHICH THE REGIME HAD NOT ONLY INTERJECTED 
RELIGIOUS RIGIDITY INTO DAILY LIFE BUT HAD ALSO DEEPENED CIVIL 
WAR AND BROUGHT THE COUNTRY INTO LOGGERHEADS WITH MOST OF ITS 
NEIGHBORS, NOT TO MENTION MUCH OF THE REST OF THE WORLD.  THE 
STRICTER AND MORE AGGRESSIVE APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC LAW 
CONFLICTED WITH SUDAN'S TRADITIONAL SUFISM, AND THE DEEPENING OF 
CIVIL WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION BROUGHT ECONOMIC DISASTER. 
 
8.  (C) TURABI BUCKED MANY OF HIS FOLLOWERS FROM THE UNIVERSITY 
OF KHARTOUM (WHERE TURABI CONTINUES TO HAVE A STRONG FOLLOWING) 
AND SENT THEM ABROAD TO THE WEST, ESPECIALLY THE UNITED STATES, 
FOR POLISHING.  THEY NOW FORM A KEY PART OF THE GOVERNMENT AND 
ECONOMIC ELITE, AND THEY OFTEN IMPRESS WESTERNERS WITH THEIR 
COMMAND OF ENGLISH, THEIR CIVILITY, AND THE EASE WITH WHICH THEY 
RELATE TO WESTERNERS.  TURABI APPARENTLY WAS NOT AFRAID THAT 
THEY WOULD BE CORRUPTED AND LOSE THEIR ISLAMIC FERVOR, BUT IN 
THIS HE WAS ONLY PARTIALLY RIGHT.  THEY MAY HAVE COME BACK 
WITHOUT HAVING LOST PERSONAL ISLAMIC DEVOUTNESS -- SOME WERE NO 
DOUBT MADE EVEN MORE DEVOUT BY WHAT THEY SAW IN THE WEST -- BUT 
THEY ALSO PICKED UP A LIKING OF THE GOOD LIFE AND A DOSE OF 
WESTERN PRAGMATISM, WHICH DULLED THE EDGE OF THEIR ENTHUSIASM 
FOR TURABI'S BRAND OF POLITICIZED ISLAM THAT HAD LED TO WAR, 
ISOLATION, AND ECONOMIC DOLDRUMS. 
 
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SHARI'A AND DEVOUTNESS 
---------------------- 
 
9.  (C) THE BASHIR REGIME WANTS TO HOLD ON TO SHARI'A LAW AND A 
CONSERVATIVE INTERNAL APPROACH TO ISLAM, AND IN THIS INSISTENCE 
IT PROBABLY IS NOT AT VARIANCE WITH A MAJORITY,OR AT LEAST A 
LARGE SEGMENT, OF THE NORTHERN SUDANESE POPULATION.  AFTER ALL, 
ARAB SOCIETY GENERALLY, FROM MOROCCO TO OMAN, HAS BECOME MORE 
CONSERVATIVE OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS -- MORE TURNED INWARD 
INTO ITSELF, LESS WILLING TO TRY WESTERN IDEAS.  THE SAUDI MODEL 
OF STRINGENT ISLAM WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO KEEP OUT OF POLITICS IS 
TO SOME EXTENT THE IDEA TO WHICH THE REGIME NOW ASPIRES TO 
FOLLOW.  MILLIONS OF SUDANESE HAVE WORKED IN SAUDI ARABIA OVER 
THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES, AND THE SAUDIS HAVE POURED MONEY INTO 
THE COUNTRY, IN THEIR INIMITABLE FASHION, TO BUILD HUNDREDS AND 
THOUSANDS OF MOSQUES (EMPHASIS BEING MOSQUES OVER SCHOOLS, 
HOSPITALS, AND THE LIKE).  YET THE SUDANESE PERSONALITY REMAINS 
PROFOUNDLY DIFFERENT FROM THE SAUDI, AS DIFFERENT AS SUFISM IS 
FROM WAHHABISM.  THE KEY TO THE DIFFERENCE -- OR AT LEAST ONE 
KEY -- IS THE SUFI EMPHASIS ON MINDING ONE'S OWN BUSINESS: 
SUFISM IS ALL ABOUT LOOKING INTO ONE'S OWN SOUL, 
SELF-PURIFICATION, LEADING BY EXAMPLE, AND NOT WORRYING TOO MUCH 
ABOUT ONE'S NEIGHBOR.  THUS ARE THE SUDANESE FAMOUS FOR THEIR 
HUMILITY, SIMILAR TO THE OMANIS, ANOTHER PEOPLE REPUGNED BY THE 
SAUDIS AND FAMOUS FOR THEIR ABILITY TO BE DEVOUT AND RELATIVELY 
TOLERANT AT THE SAME TIME.  IT WAS ALL THE MORE AMAZING THAT 
SUDAN SHOULD HAVE PRODUCED ONE OF THE ARAB WORLD'S MOST 
CHARISMATIC FIREBRANDS. 
 
9.  (C) IF THE REGIME RETAINS SHARI'A LAW AND KEEPS ITS 
CONSERVATIVE VISION OF ISLAM TO THE NONPOLITICAL REALM, IT WILL 
THUS ONLY BE FOLLOWING AN INCREASINGLY CONSERVATIVE COURSE THAT 
HAS BEEN WIDELY FOLLOWED THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD, AND ONE THAT 
IS LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE WITHIN SUDANESE SOCIETY, EVEN IF IT 
IS SOMEWHAT MORE INTRUSIVE THAN WAS TRADITIONAL SUDANESE SUFI 
ISLAM.  THE DIVERSITY OF SUDANESE SOCIETY AND THE PRESENCE OF 
MILLIONS OF NON-MUSLIM SUDANESE IN KHARTOUM, DISPLACED BY WAR 
AND FAMINE -- A PATTERN LIKELY TO BE ONLY PARTIALLY ABATED BY A 
PEACE AGREEMENT -- CUTS BOTH WAYS:  IT SEEMS TO MAKE SOME 
MUSLIMS MORE OPEN-MINDED BY EXPOSING THEM TO NON-MUSLIM 
APPROACHES TO LIFE (JUST AS OMANI SOCIETY WAS SOFTENED BY LONG 
EXPOSURE TO AFRICA AND ASIA), BUT FOR OTHERS, IT CAUSES A MORE 
STEADFAST WITHDRAWAL INTO THE CIRCLE OF ISLAM.  HOW TOLERANT THE 
FACE OF SUDANESE ISLAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE WILL DEPEND ON 
LEADERSHIP OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN THE POST-PEACE ERA, BUT 
THE INDICATORS ARE THAT THE PENDULUM IS SWINGING BACK IN THE 
DIRECTION OF LESS INTOLERANCE. 
 
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CONTROLLING THE MOSQUES 
----------------------- 
 
10.  (C) ONCE YOU OPEN PANDORA'S BOX, IT'S NOT SO EASY TO 
CLOSE.  TURABI USED A SERIES OF STRATEGIC MOSQUES IN KHARTOUM 
AND OTHER LARGE TOWNS TO CONVEY HIS MESSAGE.  HE POLITICIZED 
THEM.  THE BASHIR REGIME IS NOW FACED WITH THE CHALLENGE OF 
PUTTING THE GENIE WHICH TURABI RELEASED BACK INTO ITS BOX.  ON 
THIS ISSUE IT APPEARS TO BE PARTICULARLY DETERMINED -- ODD AS IT 
MAY SEEM THAT A REGIME ONCE RENOWNED FOR ITS ISLAMIC FERVOR NOW 
TAKES PARTICULAR PAINS TO CONTROL THE MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH 
ISLAM IS PRACTICED.  THE MOSQUES ARE THE KEY PLACES OF 
ASSEMBLAGE IN SUDANESE SOCIETY, THE FOCAL POINTS IN EVERY MUSLIM 
NEIGHBORHOOD AND VILLAGE.  THE MESSAGES OF THE IMAMS, DAY AFTER 
DAY, WEEK AFTER WEEK, HAVE PROFOUND INFLUENCE ONTHE MINDS OF THE 
POPULACE.  AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE, THOSE MESSAGES ARE RIGOROUSLY 
FOLLOWED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY -- AND ESPECIALLY IN THOSE KEY 
BUT RELATIVELY FEW MOSQUES POLITICIZED BY TURABI -- BY THE 
SECURITY SERVICES.  THE MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS HAS VETO 
OVER THE PLACEMENT OF IMAMS IN ALL MOSQUES, AND IT HAS INDEED 
REPLACED SEVERAL IMAMS.  THE RESULT APPARENTLY IS THAT RELIGIOUS 
MESSAGES WHICH THE POPULACE IS HEARING TODAY DIFFERER MARKEDLY 
FROM WHAT THEY WERE HEARING ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO, WHEN TURABI 
STILL HELD SWAY.  DOWN WITH AMERICA AND SPREAD THE GOSPEL, 
JIHAD, VICTORY, AND MARTYRDOM HAVE GIVEN WAY TO THE MORE 
TRADITIONAL STUFF OF LOOKING AFTER YOUR OWN SOUL AND DOING GOOD 
TO OTHERS.  THIS SUDANESE REGIME IS NO DIFFERENT FROM MOST OTHER 
REGIMES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD IN WANTING TO EXERCISE CAREFUL 
CONTROL OVER RELIGION, BUT -- PERHAPS IN PART FOR THE VERY 
REASON THAT IT STARTED OFF AS AN "ISLAMIC FRONT" AND KNOWS 
BETTER WHEREOF IT SPEAKS, AND KNOWS MORE INTIMATELY WHAT IT 
FEARS -- IT SEEMS TO BE SUCCEEDING BETTER THAN MOST. 
 
 
RANKIN