US embassy cable - 05BRATISLAVA511

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SLOVAKIA TO STAY THE COURSE IN IRAQ

Identifier: 05BRATISLAVA511
Wikileaks: View 05BRATISLAVA511 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bratislava
Created: 2005-07-01 09:00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR MOPS PREL IZ LO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 000511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR, PM/ISO, PM/RSAT, PM/PMAT, NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, IZ, LO 
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA TO STAY THE COURSE IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. STATE 111082 
     B. BRATISLAVA 352 
     C. BRATISLAVA 458 
     D. BRATISLAVA 469 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Scott N. Thayer for reasons 1.4b and d 
. 
 
1. (C) Summary: Slovak government interlocutors welcomed 
beginning dialogue on future planning for Iraq deployments, 
particularly in civlian channels.  The GOS is firmly 
committed to staying the course as long as the Iraqi 
government requests help, there is an international mandate, 
and the mandate issued by the Slovak parliament remains 
valid.  Nevertheless, Slovakia recognizes that its mission in 
Iraq is dependent on other coalition partners, particularly 
Poland, and is eager to discuss future requirements for 
Slovak troops in that context.  End summary. 
 
MOD Welcomes Civilian Dialogue on Iraq Plans 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Charge, accompanied by DATT and Polec Chief, presented 
ref A points June 16 to Vladimir Jakabcin, Director General 
for Defense Policy and International Relations at the 
Ministry of Defense.   Jackabcin was very pleased to begin a 
dialogue on future plans for Iraq in civilian channels; he 
had asked several weeks earlier for clarification on 
"rumblings" in military channels on redeployment plans (ref 
B).  Jakabcin explained that there had been widespread 
concern among members of the general staff that relocation of 
bases would make it impossible for the Slovak engineers to 
continue their specialized work in demining.  However, the 
civilian and military leadership had reached the conclusion 
that relocation may simply be a natural part of operations in 
Iraq.  Jakabcin's bottom line was that Slovakia will keep its 
engineers in Iraq "as long as the Iraqis need us, there is an 
international mandate in place, and the national mandate 
(issued by parliament) remains valid."  Jakabcin stressed the 
need for a valid UN Security Council resolution (or an 
international mandate in another form) as a necessary 
condition for Slovakia to stay the course. 
 
3. (C) Jakabcin briefed Charge on a recent visit to Iraq by 
Lt.Col. Panis, who will soon take over command of the Slovak 
troops there.  Panis expressed no concerns about the 
performace of Slovak troops and said that there were no plans 
for redeployments, but if a need arose, the Slovaks would 
meet it. 
 
4. (C) Jakabcin also discussed Slovak plans to contribute 
staff to MNF-I headquarters as requested by General Myers. 
Minister Liska approved a plan to ask parliament for an 
increase in the total number of troops in Iraq.  General 
Bulik had been tasked with identifying vacancies that Slovak 
officers could fill.  Jakabcin said General Myers' July 19 
visit would be a good opportunity for the U.S. to offer 
specific suggestions.  Currently there are 105 deminers in 
Iraq, and five slots in the NATO training mission, of which 
only 2 are filled.  Liska was prepared to request a number 
beyond this 110-man cap at the July 13 cabinet meeting.  If 
approved by the cabinet, the request would go to parliament 
for debate in its September session. 
 
5. (C) Jakabcin welcomed the upcoming visit by a Washington 
team to discuss plans for redeployments in Iraq in more 
detail with military and civilian players (ref A).  He 
suggested that any requests to change the Slovak mission 
should be coordinated this summer, so that the defense 
ministry would only need to go to parliament once with an 
entire package for Iraq. 
 
6. (C) Finally, Jakabcin emphasized the need for continuing 
political dialogue, saying, "The generals aren't in charge of 
policy; this office and the minister play the decisive role." 
 He explained that after the defense ministry reorganization, 
he will become the equivalent of the "Political Director" of 
the MOD. 
 
MFA: We're There to Stay Militarily... 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) PolEc Chief presented ref A demarche, in tandem with 
the DCM from the UK Embassy, on June 17 at the MFA to Lubomir 
Cano, Director of the Security Policy Department, and Oldrich 
Hlavacek, Director of the Fourth Territorial Department. 
 
Cano began by expressing the GOS commitment to Iraq as "We 
are not withdrawing.  No way."  He said the GOS recognized it 
needed to increase public diplomacy to generate more 
favorable public opinion on Slovakia's role in Iraq, because 
after parliamentary elections in September 2006 there were no 
guarantees.  He said he hoped Slovakia would not follow the 
Spain model, but of course anything could happen.  Slovakia 
is closely following Poland's plans, and a Polish withdrawal 
or downsizing could have a major effect on Slovakia's policy. 
 Cano emphasized that policy in Iraq required flexibility, 
should be based on conditions on the ground, and that no 
coalition member could afford to take unilateral action. 
Hlavacek added pointedly that he still had seen no statement 
from any coalition capital offering sympathy and solidarity 
after the June 11 suicide bomb attack on the Slovak embassy 
in Baghdad (ref C). 
 
8. (C) Cano and Hlavacek welcomed further consultations on 
redeployments, both from the Washington traveling team, and 
from the U.S. and UK embassies.  Cano pointed out that, as a 
practical matter, it is less expensive to move troops within 
Iraq than to bring them home.  He also mentioned the planned 
contribution to MNF-I, but was under the impression that 
Slovakia would not need to return to Parliament for 
permission to exceed the 110-man cap, because three slots 
designated for the NATO training mission were still vacant 
and could be used for MNF headquarters.  Cano and Hlavacek 
said the GOS was still waiting for an answer from Iraq on its 
offer to donate excess defense equipment. 
 
...and Diplomatically 
--------------------- 
 
9. (C) Charge and UK Ambassador presented ref A demarche on 
June 20 to Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan, and Charge followed 
up with MFA PolDir Miroslav Lajcak.  Both welcomed increased 
consultations about future coalition planning in Iraq, and 
were pleased that a Washington team would be coming with 
further details. 
 
10. (C) Charge asked about MFA State Secretary Magdalena 
Vasaryova's statement June 17 that the MFA was considering 
relocating its Baghdad embassy, possibly outside Iraq (ref 
D).  Kukan said that had been discussed, but was off the 
table, and the MFA was not considering leaving Baghdad. 
Nevertheless, there was extensive damage to the Slovak 
embassy from the bomb, and there were major financial issues. 
 Lajcak later suggested to Charge that Vasaryova had 
overreacted and that the MFA was committed to staying in 
Iraq.  The question was the best way to do it--whether to 
rebuild the rented embassy building or find a different 
location.  Another problem was that all the official vehicles 
were destroyed in the attack.  The Czechs were lending the 
Slovaks cars to move around the city.  As a longer-term 
measure, the Slovaks were negotiating with the Hungarians, 
who left their armored cars behind in Bahgdad when they 
relocated to Jordan. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
11. (C) All GOS interlocutors, privately and publically, 
express their current strong commitment to remaining in Iraq. 
 This position will come under increasing pressure in the 
campaign leading up to September 2006 parliamentary 
elections.  For example, opposition politician Robert Fico 
used the assertion that Prime Minister Dzurinda led Slovakia 
into an "illegal war" in Iraq in an attempt to recall 
Dzurinda the week of June 27.  There is a desire for more 
engagement, especially on the civilian side, on future 
planning for Iraq.  The GOS looks forward to productive talks 
during the upcoming visit. 
 
 
THAYER 
 
 
NNNN 

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