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| Identifier: | 05BOGOTA6237 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BOGOTA6237 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2005-06-30 22:35:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PTER PGOV MOPS EC CO FARC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 006237 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, MOPS, EC, CO, FARC SUBJECT: FARC PUTUMAYO ATTACK KILLS 21 SOLDIERS REF: BOGOTA 5802 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary: On June 25, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) carried out their deadliest one-day attack since President Uribe took office. The twelve simultaneous strikes killed 21 and wounded 11 soldiers in southeastern Putumayo Department. President Uribe, disturbed by the high-profile FARC success, the intelligence failures, and the COLMIL's inability to respond with adequate helicopter support, traveled to Putumayo to personally oversee the COLMIL's response. Saturday's attack was more politically troubling than militarily significant, but is the most successful offensive to date intended to decrease Uribe's public support before next year's elections. The GOC is working to reach out to the Ecuadorians to establish some constructive cooperation mechanisms. End summary. FARC Coordinated Attack Successful ---------------------------------- 2. (S) The FARC's 32nd and 48th Fronts attacked Colombian Military (COLMIL) forces on June 25 in the deadliest single-day attack since President Alvaro Uribe took office. An estimated 250 to 300 FARC insurgents launched a simultaneous twelve-point attack against Colombian Army platoon-sized groups, police stations and petroleum infrastructures in Putumayo Department killing 21 soldiers. Guerrilla sources indicate that at least five FARC were killed in the attack; COLMIL sources over 61 FARC killed. In addition to hitting Teteye, Cohembi, San Miguel, Puerto Asis, and Curiti military bases, the guerrillas hit the Curiquinga, Pinuna, Quillacina, and Pola oil wells near the Caqueta River. 3. (C) Uribe criticized the COLMIL for local and national intelligence failures. He also complained that the COLMIL was unable to respond quickly with helicopter response because their air assets are limited (reftel). The Army's 6th Division postponed "Operation Jaguar," aimed at the FARC,s 3rd Front in the Plan Patriota area of operation, to reinforce the Putumayo outposts, and Colombian Air Force's CACOM-6 provided air support over the weekend. A Special Forces Battalion was also sent to pursue FARC forces in the area. Chilly Relations with Ecuador Grow Colder ----------------------------------------- 4. (C) After the attacks, the mayor of Puerto Asis, Putumayo Department, Jorge Eliecer Coral, told influential daily El Tiempo that the FARC had found safe haven in Ecuador and mounted operations from there. President Uribe reportedly authorized the COLMIL to conduct cross-border operations if they could identify specific targets. While Ecuador has been recognized as a rest and relaxation spot for FARC members, this is the first time during Uribe's Administration that the guerrillas have coordinated a cross-border offensive of this scale. 5. (C) Ecuador's announcement of considering imposing visa requirements against Colombians reinforced fears that the GOE would passively accept the FARC presence on the border. In a private meeting with the Ambassador on June 28, FM Carolina Barco expressed her frustration with her Ecuadorian counterpart, who had canceled bilateral meetings three times. She emphasized that the GOC and GOE need to meet both to avoid "media diplomacy" and to stabilize the bilateral relationship. The Ambassador suggested that a MOD-to-MOD meeting would be a good starting point. Barco replied that she had been in contact with Colombian MOD Uribe (who is in the U.S.) and encouraged him to reach out to his Ecuadorian counterpart. 6. (C) On June 30, Colombian Commander of the Armed Forces General Ospina met with Ecuadorian Viceadmiral Manuel Zapater in Ecuador to discuss the military implications of the attack and formulate strategies to respond to the ongoing guerrilla presence in the area. President Uribe announced that he might raise the attacks with President Palacio at the Banana Summit, scheduled to take place on July 7 in Costa Rica. The Ambassador also recommended to FM Barco that the GOC consider raising this tension with President Zapatero during the upcoming Colombian state visit since the GOS could be a useful interlocutor with Ecuador. Political Ramifications ----------------------- 7. (C) President Uribe and the military leaders traveled to Putumayo on June 26 to review the damage and formulate the COLMIL response. Uribe and the high command are planning to dismiss several commanders in the affected area. Uribe also claimed in a public statement that the attack was an attempt to draw resources away from the Patriot Plan (Plan Patriota) offensive. (Note: Plan Patriota, the largest offensive in Colombian history, currently targets FARC across Caqueta, Meta, and Guaviare departments.) While the offensive has been successful, the concentration of forces in those departments leaves several remote outposts with smaller contingents of COLMIL forces. 8. (C) Comment: President Uribe is furious about the attacks and has the COLMIL high commanders visiting attack sites and scrambling to formulate the GOC response. In fact, so many commanders have traveled to Putumayo that other COLMIL operations have been without leadership since last weekend. While military officials are chagrined by the public success of the attack, Ecuador's cooperation will be necessary for the GOC to be able to stem future border incursions. End comment. WOOD
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