US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI626

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND DRL 
LONDON/PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, SCUL, KDEM, DJ 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION SEEKS USG ASSISTANCE IN PROMOTING 
DEMOCRACY IN DJIBOUTI 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE. 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  A delegation of heads of Djibouti's 
opposition met, at their request, with Ambassador on June 8. 
They expressed to her their concerns about what they 
described as a lack of cooperation of the Guelleh government 
with the opposition and the high level of frustration 
existing among the majority of the country's population.  The 
resulting atmosphere could lead to violence.  They wanted 
direct USG intervention in Djibouti to effectuate rapid 
democratic change.  Ambassador used the occasion to make 
clear the USG commitment to the advancement of democracy in 
the Middle East and Horn of Africa and also to advise 
opposition members of their own responsibilities, not just 
rights, within a democratic system.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Ismail Guedi, President of the Union for Democracy and 
Justice (UDJ), Ahmed Youssouf, President of the Republican 
Alliance for Democracy (ARD), and Souleiman Farah, Acting 
President of the Movement for Democratic Renewal (MRD) 
praised the recent commitment by President Bush to promote 
democracy and good governance on the African continent.  In a 
meeting with Ambassador, Pol/Econ officer, and Pol/Econ 
Assistant on June 8, the group, known as the Union for 
Democratic Alternates (UAD) coalition, said President Bush's 
words gave them hope and renewed their energy.  They said 
their numerous appeals to the Government of Djibouti for 
transparent and free presidential elections had been in vain. 
 The coalition wished to continue its fight for a democratic 
future for the country and warned that all their efforts to 
avoid violence could be useless in the face of "growing 
frustration" of the population at large.  The coalition 
accused the government of ignoring the opposition and, 
sometimes, "threatening their members." 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador pressed for specificity in the UAD 
claim of a genuine danger of violence or revolution in 
Djibouti.  The UAD used the example of Somalia, saying people 
there had taken to the streets to oust the corrupt Siad 
Barre.  As the population in Djibouti is being deceived 
similarly by "massive frauds," which happened during the 
recent presidential elections, the same could occur in 
Djibouti.  They continued that since President Guelleh had 
not been elected democratically, the danger of violence 
exists and once started, would be difficult to stop.  The 
world will blame the U.S. and France, Guedi said, for having 
failed to take action to prevent the violence. 
 
4. (C) The UAD continued that in their view, the Government 
of Djibouti lacked a political will for electoral reform. 
Giving no specific examples, Youssouf declared that the 
Government of Djibouti does not take the opposition seriously 
and continuously misleads the international community.  It 
uses force, fraud and public funds to stay in power.  While 
pluralism was legalized in 2002, the result is still single 
party rule since the remaining parties have no real power. 
Eleven years of civil war, group members went on to say, 
which resulted in more than a thousand deaths on both sides, 
were caused by the Government's refusal to embrace democracy 
and good governance.  Moreover, the government's 
unwillingness to change and its peace agreement with the 
Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in 
2001, signed in the presence of the international community, 
is still not implemented. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador told the representatives that both she 
and her interlocutors have expressed clearly to each other 
the importance of democracy and good governance.  So how 
would they suggest a government proceed, she asked?  She 
noted that the UAD is free to criticize government in a 
democracy but criticisms are best accompanied by constructive 
ways to solve perceived problems.  That is part of the 
responsibility of an opposition movement in a democratic 
system.  The UAD responded that it had put forward in 
October, 2004 nine government actions that were necessary for 
fair and transparent elections.  They included revising and 
updating lists of registered voters, making public this list, 
free and fair access of opposition parties to the local media 
and allowing independent TV and radio stations.  The 
Government of Djibouti ignored these propositions completely, 
they said, and by doing so ignored the will of the majority 
of the population.  Thus, only pressure from western nations 
will convince Djibouti's government to change. 
6. (C) The Ambassador stated that the U.S. wishes to promote 
dialogue between the Government of Djibouti and opposition 
members but cannot impose a system of government. UAD members 
said strong U.S. pressure must be applied.  France had, they 
said, helped Ivory Coast promote democracy.  The U.S. did a 
remarkable job on Ethiopia creating democracy and good 
governance.  The U.S. has also had great success in Iraq. 
Djibouti needs this kind of strong commitment from both the 
U.S. and the European Union (EU).  The EU has already started 
putting pressure on Djibouti for an all-inclusive parliament, 
Guedi said.  Guedi added that 45 percent of the population 
voted for the opposition in 2003 legislative elections but 
this number was not reflected in the make-up of Parliament. 
(Note: Djibouti subscribes to a winner take all system which 
leaves the winning party in control of all parliamentary 
seats regardless of volume of votes received by the 
opposition. End note.) 
 
7. (C) The Ambassador told coalition members that the 
Government of Djibouti has expressed publicly the need for 
political reform and especially for change in the 
representative system for the National Assembly.  Yet it had 
indicated that it wanted to effect change on a "step by step" 
basis.  The Ambassador asked about the feasibility of such an 
approach and about opposition priorities for democratic 
reform.  According to the UAD, an all-inclusive National 
Assembly is a top priority.  However, there are other 
important issues such as revision of voter lists.  Another 
important priority would be to organize local elections and 
create a structure at a lower level other than that of the 
National Assembly.  The U.S., they said, needs to persuade 
the Government of Djibouti to create democratic institutions 
at the village, town, and district levels.  This will give an 
opportunity for the opposition to develop at an early stage. 
The opposition said it also sees decentralization as a 
priority but the Government of Djibouti has continuously 
postponed decentralization since 2002. 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador inquired if the opposition had considered 
among its priorities satisfactory resolution of the divisive 
issue of tribalism in Djibouti, specifically apparent 
differences between Afars and Issas, which sometimes cloud 
the political landscape.  The government viewed tribalism, 
according to Guedi, as only an excuse  for non-action. Clan 
differences, he argued, could "easily" be overcome with local 
and regional elections.  If every region and town had its own 
representatives, tribalism will disappear because power will 
be equally shared.  Tribalism exists in many other countries 
in Africa, but it did not prevent the advent of democracy, 
they added.  Grassroots democratic institutions are key.  The 
Government of Djibouti does not want a solution to tribalism 
because it wishes to continue to divide people to more easily 
rule them, the group insisted. 
 
9. (C) Ambassador then raised the issue of leadership among 
opposition parties.  The death of Ahmed Dini, she said, has 
brought this issue to the forefront among those who support 
neither the current government nor the current opposition. 
These individuals question the capacity of opposition members 
to lead the population.  Ambassador also noted a continuing 
criticism that the opposition is composed of leaders who 
themselves were in government before Ismail Guelleh but who 
brought about no real democratic progress to Djibouti.  She 
sought the UAD's views on this perspective.  With some 
timidity, the UAD responded that the opposition won more than 
45 percent of the vote in 2003, so that must surely indicate 
a measure of confidence in leadership capacity.  (Comment: 
We note that the late Ahmed Dini headed the opposition in 
2003, at the time of legislative elections.  End comment.) 
Guedi conceded that it is true many in the opposition held 
government positions previously.  Yet he offered the view, 
lamely, that they did not succeed in bringing about change 
because "the single party system was the rule at that time in 
Africa generally, and Djibouti was young with fewer problems." 
 
10. (C) The Ambassador spoke of her desire to encourage a 
dialogue between the Government of Djibouti and the 
opposition but also urged the opposition to consider the tone 
of its frequently harsh and highly personal messages to 
government officials.  Confidence building measures were 
necessary to create an atmosphere that might permit a 
dialogue. The UAD agreed but insisted the U.S. needed to put 
considerable pressure, at the same time, on Djibouti's 
government.  They repeated that their "nine conditions" had 
to be met and that the peace agreement the government signed 
with the FRUD had to be honored. The UAD described the 
government as "not ready for a dialogue" but that the 
opposition was sincere in its willingness to contribute to 
democracy. 
 
11. (C) Comment:  Djibouti's Minister of Interior, subsequent 
to this meeting, sent an official letter to all opposition 
party heads requesting a dialogue.  Predictably, the 
opposition is dragging its feet on participating.  The 
government views the foot-dragging as clear evidence of the 
bankrupt nature of the opposition -- devoid of leadership, 
devoid of ideas, and devoid of a constituency.  The 
opposition, on the other hand, says it has in the past 
declined to participate in government-sponsored attempts at 
dialogue because of the "insincerity" of the government in 
the activity.  This is a weak argument that begs the issue. 
The opposition in Djibouti has been badly diminished by the 
death late last year, due to natural causes, of the 
charismatic Ahmed Dini.  Yet fault also can be found in other 
areas. There is a striking unwillingness of the old guard of 
opposition members, such as the three who met here with 
Ambassador, to share leadership with younger Djiboutians. 
There is also a paucity of not just forward-leaning ideas 
among them, but genuine ways to effectuate change.  In 
addition, personal animosity within the opposition for ruling 
party officials does not help.  The idea of regional 
elections was first broached by the government of Djibouti, 
not by the opposition.  In Embassy's democratization efforts, 
currently focused on dialogue and institution building, we 
are seeking ways to develop a more mature opposition that can 
be a constructive counterbalance to the current ruling party, 
but also a future political well source for government 
leadership, regardless of party, clan or tribal affiliation. 
End comment. 
RAGSDALE