US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO1151

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: WHAT COMES AFTER THE P-TOMS? 
 
REF: COLOMBO 01128 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) President Chandrika Kumaratunga's decision to sign 
the controversial Post-Tsunami Operational Management 
Structure (P-TOMS), also known as the "joint mechanism," has 
clearly surprised her political allies and enemies alike, 
leaving many of them scrambling to strategize next moves.  In 
the short term, alliance partners New Unity Alliance (NUA), 
Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and Mahajana Eksath 
Peramuna (MEP) have cast their lot with the President.  In 
the longer term, most parties anticipate some kind of 
election--whether provincial council, parliamentary or 
presidential--within the next six months or so, and are 
beginning to campaign accordingly.  Foreign Minister 
Kadirgamar, however, told the Ambassador on June 30 that the 
President has "strong legal backing" to defer presidential 
elections until November 2006.  Both the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP) and United National Party (UNP) are planning 
"mass movements" to canvas public support, while the Sri 
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) is continuing to hold strikes in 
the east against the joint mechanism.  Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) Deputy Minister of Ports Dilan Perera, a close 
ally of the President, sees the best possibility as a 
deal--hypothetically brokered by members of the international 
community--between the two major parties.   End summary. 
 
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POST P-TOMS SIGNING: 
SCRAMBLING AND STRATEGIZING 
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2.  (C) Since the Government's June 24 signing of the 
controversial Post-Tsunami Management Structure (P-TOMS) 
agreement, also known as the "joint mechanism," to coordinate 
tsunami relief with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
 
SIPDIS 
(LTTE), President Chandrika Kumaratunga's friends and foes 
alike have been weighing the political fall-out, scrambling 
to re-position themselves advantageously following the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP) June 16 defection from the 
government coalition.  Most interlocutors (on both sides of 
the aisle) expect some kind of election--whether provincial 
council, parliamentary or presidential--within the next six 
months or so.  Although no one has officially acknowledged 
beginning campaigning, various "mass movements" planned by 
individual parties seem to be thinly disguised efforts to 
rally public support and test popular sentiments. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Among such movements have been back-to-back 
"hartals," or general strikes, called by the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress (SLMC) to protest the P-TOMS (reftel).  In addition 
to the June 27 hartal in Ampara, a general strike was 
observed in the Muslim area of Muttur in Trincomalee district 
on June 29.  SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem has also continued his 
harsh public pronouncements against the agreement, charging 
that it shortchanges the Muslim community.  Former government 
alliance partner JVP held an anti-mechanism rally in front of 
City Hall in Colombo on June 29.  JVP Propaganda Secretary 
and MP Wimal Weerawansa had predicted a turnout of 20,000 at 
the protest; observers put attendance at less than half that 
number.  The United National Party (UNP), meanwhile, is 
organizing a "People's Power Movement," which the party is 
touting as a "million-man march" from the southern district 
of Matara to Colombo July 2-12.  According to UNP Matara MP 
Lakshman Yapa, the march will begin with 15,000 participants 
in his district, gradually adding steam (and, the party 
hopes, marchers) along the coastal road, culminating in 
Colombo July 12 with a massive rally of one million 
participants.  (Comment:  Although Yapa identified the theme 
as a protest against the cost of living, the aim is clearly 
something else--a pre-election test of the temperature of UNP 
support.  End comment.)  In separate meetings, Yapa and 
fellow UNP MP M.H. Mohamed each told poloffs that they expect 
the President to dissolve Parliament and call for general 
elections circa October/November--about the time she will 
need a (now non-existent) majority to pass the budget. 
 
4.  (C)  In a June 29 meeting, JVP MP (and former Minister of 
Culture) Vijitha Herath and JVP MP Piyasiri Wijenayake told 
POL FSN their party will continue to oppose the P-TOMS, which 
they depicted as a worse "sell-out" of national interests 
than the UNP-negotiated Ceasefire Agreement. They vowed to 
continue court challenges to the legality of the agreement. 
(Note:  In addition to the case cited reftel, the JVP-aligned 
National Bhikku (Monk) Front and the Patriotic National 
Movement each filed petitions against the P-TOMS in Colombo 
District Court on June 28.)  Both MPs speculated that 
President Kumaratunga, having lost the support of the JVP at 
the local level as well, will call for provincial council 
elections before August.  (Note:  Since the JVP walk-out, the 
opposition UNP now controls all seven provincial councils.) 
By doing so, her former allies suggested, the President can 
check the "pulse of the people" subsequent to signing the 
P-TOMS. 
 
5.  (SBU)  On June 28 government alliance partners New Unity 
Alliance (NUA) and the Sinhalese nationalist Mahajana Eksath 
Peramuna (MEP), which had considered leaving over the 
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) 
(Reftel), announced separate decisions to remain in the 
coalition.  Despite these decisions, however, both parties 
made plain their discomfort with the joint mechanism 
agreement.  In a press statement following its deliberations, 
the MEP Central Committee announced that the party "cannot 
agree with the (P-TOMS) document . . . because it is against 
the basic principles of our party."  The statement went on to 
cite "hand(ing) over the people of the Eastern province to 
the control of Wanni LTTE"; giving LTTE "control of large 
areas which are under Government control"; and "the high 
security risk" posed by giving LTTE control of the 2km 
stretch along the coastal belt in the north and east as 
reasons for its opposition. 
 
6.  (C)  NUA MP and Deputy Minister of Ports and Aviation 
Cegu Issadeen told poloff on June 29 that while his party 
sees the necessity for a joint mechanism with the LTTE in 
principle, it "cannot face" its Muslim constituents in the 
east and tell them that the P-TOMS is in their best interest. 
 The P-TOMS deck is stacked against the Muslims, he said, 
particularly at the regional level, at the LTTE's behest.  He 
believes that the President tried her best to convince the 
LTTE to allow a Muslim representative to sign the agreement 
and to reconfigure Muslim representation at the regional 
level, but the LTTE would not allow it.  "We don't want to be 
a hurdle to the joint mechanism," but at the same time cannot 
ask "our people" in good faith to support it, Issadeen said. 
He fears that most Eastern Muslims will be sympathetic to 
SLMC protests against the mechanism.  While NUA will not 
campaign against the mechanism as the SLMC is doing, Issadeen 
said, "we will ask people not to participate in it" either, 
since it does not accord the Muslim community any power or 
advantage.  He concluded by asking the U.S. to use its "good 
offices" to persuade the LTTE to allow the Muslims an 
equitable role in the committees. 
 
7.  (SBU)  In a June 30 meeting, Hindu Affairs Minister and 
anti-LTTE Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) Leader 
Douglas Devananda reconfirmed to poloffs his party's 
statement endorsing the joint mechanism, although he 
criticized the P-TOMS as "not specific enough" about the 
authority given various committees.  Asserting that the LTTE 
had never expected the President to sign the agreement, 
Devananda speculated that the Tigers would now seek to 
obstruct its smooth operation. 
 
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HOW THE SLFP SEES IT 
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8.  (C) In a June 30 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar said he does not expect the 
President to call snap general elections.  Not even the JVP 
wants parliamentary elections at this time, the Foreign 
Minister said, adding that the President will not dissolve 
Parliament unless the budget (which comes up for a vote in 
November) fails to pass twice.  He emphasized that he does 
not believe the JVP would try to engineer an early downfall 
of the government to trigger general elections.  With respect 
to Presidential elections, Kadirgamar asserted that the 
President has "strong legal backing" to remain as President 
until November 2006.  If the Election Commissioner calls for 
elections earlier than that, Kadirgamar said, Kumaratunga 
will ask the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on the 
matter. 
9.  (C)  The JVP will continue to play games to stir up 
nationalist sentiment against the P-TOMS, Kadirgamar 
predicted, using "the reaction in the street" to gauge public 
sentiment.  In an apparent reference to UNP MP Peiris' 
criticism of the P-TOMS as inadequately representing the 
Sinhalese (Reftel), Kadirgamar accused the UNP of also 
"trying to play the nationalist card."  He conceded, however, 
that there was "general disgust" at the Norwegians and 
Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) for 
failing to enforce the ceasefire or to call the LTTE on its 
frequent and severe violations of the accord.  Kadirgamar 
cited Norwegian/SLMM inaction after reports of an LTTE 
airstrip as the most egregious example. 
 
10.  (C)  SLFP MP and Deputy Minister of Ports Dilan Perera 
told poloff in a June 30 conversation that he views a 
compromise with the UNP as the best possible scenario. 
Losing the ever-fractious JVP as a coalition partner is a 
"bit of a relief," he confided, adding optimistically that 
many JVP-opposed initiatives, e.g., the restructuring of the 
state-owned electrical utility, could now proceed.  He 
dismissed the suggestion that the President would be forced 
to call for provincial council elections--the UNP and JVP 
cannot work together well enough to force such a 
decision--and said that he does not anticipate a fight over 
the budget--and thus early parliamentary elections--as long 
as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which commands 22 
seats, votes with the government. 
 
11.  (C)  The joint mechanism, ideally, should open up the 
possibility of unprecedented amity between the two largest 
parties, Perera said, although recent comments by UNP 
Spokesman G.L. Peiris (Reftel) seem to undercut that hope. 
Both party leaders have made bold decisions to advance the 
peace process; that common aim ought to bring them together, 
he continued.  He suggested that, in exchange for a guarantee 
of UNP support not to try to topple the government and an 
"agreement on a common program on the ethnic issue," the 
President could perhaps be persuaded to move the anticipated 
date for presidential elections somewhere between the UNP's 
demand (November 2005) her own, more expanded timeframe 
(November 2006).  The President and UNP Leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe do not necessarily trust each other, he 
conceded, but they can at least talk to each other and work 
with each other.  When asked how the two (mutually 
distrustful) leaders could be persuaded to come together, 
Perera responded, "They must be told to do so"--preferably by 
the international community. 
 
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COMMENT 
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12.  (C) Almost one week after the P-TOMS was signed, most 
parties still seem to be weighing the repercussions of the 
altered political landscape and attempting to reposition 
themselves accordingly.  Elections of some sort appear to be 
a common assumption; questions like when, what kind, and with 
which possible new alliance partners are still up in the air. 
 Most important, it remains unclear exactly where popular 
sentiment regarding the P-TOMS lies; the scramble among 
various parties to hold rallies and protests is an obvious 
effort to try to shape still-amorphous public opinion.  We 
have heard frequent discussion of the need for the SLFP and 
UNP to work together in the national interest (including from 
members of both parties) in the past, but we remain skeptical 
that the leaders of either party will determine it is in 
their personal and political interest to do so. 
LUNSTEAD