US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI4996

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004996 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, RS, CH, IN, India-China, India-Russia 
SUBJECT: INDIA TESTS TRILATERAL TALKS WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 3973 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's June 2 
meeting with the Foreign Ministers of China and Russia in 
Vladivostok reflects India's desire for greater cooperation 
on areas of mutual interest such as energy, terrorism, and 
business, but Delhi-based analysts contend that any results 
for India will be limited.  While there is room for 
cooperation, especially in the energy sector, this trilateral 
concept is a trial balloon and has no institutional 
arrangements.  Aside from anti-American groups who still long 
for such a trilateral alternative alliance to balance the US, 
our contacts downplayed the potential for expanded 
cooperation now and doubted it would have much impact on 
India's approach to the United States.  End Summary. 
 
Talking Up The Triangle 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (C) India's leadership was initially wary about prospects 
for a China-India-Russia trilogue when former Russian PM 
Primakov first floated the idea for a "strategic triangle" in 
New Delhi in 1998.  The GOI only recently warmed to the idea 
after improving bilateral relations with China and increasing 
energy cooperation with Russia became a major priority.  The 
leaders of the three countries held meetings on the sidelines 
of three gatherings they attended together, most recently 
during the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures in Asia (CICA) Summit in Almaty in October 2004, but 
June 2 was the first planned three-way summit of the foreign 
ministers.  Previous meetings yielded joint statements on 
common views towards Iraq, drug trafficking and terrorism and 
the need for the three countries to exchange views to 
"strengthen a collective approach to world affairs." 
 
3.  (C) The Joint Communiqu issued at the end of the summit 
downplayed its import by calling it an "informal meeting," 
but Indian media carried promising statements from all three 
leaders.  In a press briefing on his return from Moscow on 
May 10, PM Singh called the foreign ministers' meeting "an 
essay in mutual comprehension, adding that "there are immense 
possibilities for cooperation" to "work together with 
like-minded countries" to "take advantage of the forces 
unleashed by globalization."  During Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao's visit to New Delhi on April 12, he told journalists 
that "China, India and Russia are countries with influence" 
that have "similar positions" on "promoting the 
democratization of international relations."  In a recent 
"Hindustan Times" interview, Russian Ambassador to India 
Vyacheslav Trubnikov optimistically contended that this 
"triangle has undoubtedly emerged as one of the most 
promising regional arrangements." 
 
Progress Towards Multipolarity? 
------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The Joint Communiqu also listed the twin goals of 
"democratization of international relations" and "progress 
towards multipolarity."  While anti-American elements in 
India may hope that this grouping will work towards a 
multipolar world order, Delhi-based analysts are quick to 
point out that India will be sensitive to protect its growing 
relationship with the US.  Amit Baruah, the Diplomatic Editor 
of "The Hindu," stressed that "each of these countries values 
their relationship with the US too highly to face risking it 
by antagonizing the Americans."  JNU Professor Gulshan 
Sachdeva explained that wishing for a multipolar world was 
"fine in theory," but the government has been "very clear to 
say that the trilateral forum was not created against the US" 
because they "realize the limitations."  Although each 
country would like to invest in "an insurance policy of 
multipolarity," Sujit Dutta, a Sino-Indian expert at the 
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, observed that 
neither leader can risk upsetting stable relationships with 
the US.  C. Raja Mohan, an influential writer on strategic 
affairs for the "Indian Express," commented to Poloff that 
this group was politically "going nowhere."  Ruling out 
significant political cooperation, Indian pundits stressed 
that India should look towards economic cooperation for the 
trilateral's long term success. 
 
Issues For Trilateral Cooperation 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Noting that China, India and Russia account for 40% 
of the world's population and have "similar viewpoints on 
several issues of regional and international concern," Indian 
FM Natwar Singh's statement in Vladivostok emphasized the 
need for "mutually beneficial cooperation" in areas such as 
terrorism, business, and energy.  According to MEA Russian 
specialist Dr. T. Suresh Babu, these countries compose the 
world's largest economic region, and will focus on "possible 
trilateral economic cooperation."  The only tangible result 
of the summit was a plan for a three-way business meeting in 
India before the end of March 2006 to strengthen direct 
business-to-business contacts.  "The Hindu's" Baruah observed 
that from India's standpoint, the most significant outcome of 
this first stand-alone meeting was "that they've met." 
Although there is potential for cooperation in energy and 
defense, Baruah noted that "there were no other substantial 
dimensions" to the trilateral relationship and that it was 
"not like the US-Indian relationship, with a variety of 
issues for discussion." 
 
6.  (C) In a May 23 interview, Russian ambassador Vyacheslav 
Trubnikov commented on the Russia-China-India triangle, 
saying simply that "China and India need energy and fuel. 
Russia has both to offer."  In this blunt statement, he 
summarized why many Delhi-based analysts believe that India 
finally agreed to the trilateral meetings: energy.  With New 
Delhi's foreign policy increasingly dependent on gaining 
access to energy and sensitive to Chinese competition for 
influence, New Delhi must turn its historically friendly ties 
with Russia into energy to meet the demand of its growing 
economy.  India has invested more than one billion USD in the 
Sakhalin 1 and 3 oil fields, and increasingly competes with 
China over energy deals around the world.  Professor Sachdeva 
called energy cooperation "still in the idea stage," but 
contended that India could gain by "working together instead 
of competing for access to energy reserves in Russia and 
Central Asia." 
 
7.  (C) India also relies on Russia for defense purchases, 
which could be an area for future collaboration with China. 
In a paper entitled "Trilateral Economic Cooperation," 
Professor Sachdeva writes that "Russia's annual military 
sales to India and China amount to some 80 percent of 
Moscow's overall arms exports, which reached $4.5 billion in 
2001."  He suggests that by pooling Russia's cash and defense 
history, China's manufacturing knowledge and India's 
expertise in software upgrades, the three countries could 
together become a major defense supplier for third country 
markets. 
 
8.  (C) To prepare for Indian involvement in long-term 
cooperation, Sujit Dutta from the Delhi-based Institute for 
Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) observed that the most 
important thing that the trilateral summit could do was to 
help "keep all the bilateral relationships stable."  True 
cooperation of any type requires a stable relationship 
between all three players.  In an article in the 
Calcutta-based "Statesman," Dmitry Kosyrev recently suggested 
that Moscow could help both countries by playing a "role as a 
mediator promoting rapprochement between its two allies" as 
they increasingly compete in Central and South Asia.  Looking 
at the summit as a type of international architecture for 
stability, Sujit Dutta noted that it was in India and the 
world's interest for China, India and Russia to keep these 
power relationships stable.  The day after the summit, India 
was recommended to join China, Russia and four Central Asian 
republics in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 
observer status, allowing it access to and increasing 
influence in this resource rich area. 
Limits To Cooperation: The China Factor 
--------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) India's relations with China will complicate 
substantial cooperation in the near term, V. Sudarshan, a 
Senior Analyst for India's weekly "Outlook" magazine, 
commented to Poloff recently.  He suggested that from New 
Delhi's point of view, China is the limiting factor on 
political and economic cooperation.  He contended that that 
there are "too many unresolved issues" for immediate 
cooperation and that China is not interested in any type of 
political alliance with India.  Before India can hope for a 
more symbiotic trilateral relationship, it needs to "set its 
relationship with China in better order."  New Delhi's 
frustration with Beijing's moves behind the scenes to stall 
Security Council expansion proposals after publicly agreeing 
to India's candidacy is a recent example of the political 
obstacles to coordinating this trilateral group (Ref A). 
Sujit Dutta from IDSA dismissed defense cooperation, saying 
that India is too suspicious of China's military intentions. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C) This is arguably the first time since India's 
independence that bilateral relations among all three 
countries are positive enough for a stand-alone meeting, yet 
their dynamic nature and unresolved issues between New Delhi 
and Beijing will likely prevent India from engaging in 
substantial trilateral cooperation in the short term. 
Competition over energy and influence in Central and South 
Asia are likely to be future bilateral irritants for India 
and China, and this trilateral arrangement may provide at 
best a limited stabilizing role in these areas.  In the short 
term, the growing US-India relationship will limit the 
potential negative implications from the triangle for the 
United States, and move the "strategic" content towards 
economic rather than overt political cooperation. 
BLAKE