US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2782

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IRAQI OFFICILAS INCLINED TO TAKE A WAIT AND SEE APPROACH TO NEW IRANIAN PRESIDENT

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2782
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2782 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-30 11:56:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 301156Z JUN 05
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8166
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE
REO BASRAH 1525
REO HILLAH 1499
REO KIRKUK 1496
REO MOSUL 1496
C O N F I D E N T I A L  BAGHDAD 002782 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IZ 
SUBJECT: IRAQI OFFICILAS INCLINED TO TAKE A WAIT AND SEE 
APPROACH TO NEW IRANIAN PRESIDENT 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Our Iraqi interlocutors appear to 
know little about new Iranian President Ahmadinejad 
and are taking a "wait-and-see" approach to their 
dealings with him.  Undersecretary Bayati believes the 
vote for Ahmadinejad was a vote of no confidence 
against Iran's religious establishment, not a jab at 
the United States.  Bayati thinks the crucial item to 
watch is Ahmadinejad's cabinet choices for a signal of 
his true intent.  Bayati believes most Iranians like 
Americans and are eager to improve relations with 
them, and that Ahmadinejad's statements that he sees 
no need to work with the Americans may be bluff. 
Interior Minister Bayan Jabr expressed disappointment 
that Hashemi Rafsanjani lost the election.  The Iraqi 
leadership, including the Shia Islamists, do not know 
Ahmadinejad and Jabr thinks that his SCIRI Shia 
political party should dispatch a delegation quietly 
to meet the new Iranian President.  Looking over the 
longer term, MFA Undersecretary Abbawi suggests 
Ahmadinejad's election could set the stage for 
political change in Iran if in the end he fails to 
deliver on his campaign promises.  Kurdish 
interlocutors are disappointed that a man they 
perceive to be a hardliner came to power.   Above all, 
our Shia and Kurdish contacts fear that Ahmadinejad 
might seek to destabilize the emerging, but shaky, 
political structure in Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
NOT AN ANTI-USA VOTE 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Foreign Ministry Undersecretary for Bilateral 
Affairs Hamid Al-Bayati (SCIRI) told Poloffs June 29 
that he knew little about Iran's new President, the 
conservative former Tehran major Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
To get a sense of where Ahmadinejad is headed, Bayati 
said one should pay close attention to the composition 
of his new cabinet.  Bayati did not think that the 
vote for Ahmadinejad and against Hashemi Rafsanjani 
was a vote of no confidence against Iran's religious 
establishment.  Besides not wanting a religious man 
for their President, Bayati said that Iranians voted 
against Rafsanjani because he represented an 
entrenched, and seemingly corrupt, establishment. 
Even though Ahmadinejad has stated that there is no 
need for relations with the United States, Biayati 
opined that most Iranians are pro-American and would 
like to improve relations with Americans. 
 
3.  (C) Over dinner June 28, Interior Minister Bayan 
Jabr told PolCouns he was disappointed that Hashemi 
Rafsanjani had lost the election.  Jabr sighed that 
the Iraqi leadership, including the Shia Islamists, do 
not know Ahmadinejad.  As a result, he said, no one 
can predict what Ahmadinejad will want from its 
relations with Iraq.  The new president could 
complicate Iraq's security problems if he chose, Jabr 
observed, and the result would be doubly bad for Iraqi 
Shi'a.  Therefore, Jabr concluded, his SCIRI Shia 
political party should dispatch a delegation quietly 
to meet the new Iranian President.  PolCouns noted 
that normally a Foreign Ministry opens such quiet 
contacts, but Jabr brushed this aside.  First SCIRI 
could lead with contacts, and if positive, then the 
Foreign Ministry could follow up, he opined. 
 
----------------------- 
SOCIAL CONFLICT COMING? 
----------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Foreign Ministry Undersecretary for Policy 
Planning Labeed Abbawi noted in a separate meeting on 
June 29 that with the Iranian government dominated 
entirely by conservatives, conditions are set for 
political change through social conflict.  Iranians 
now enjoy greater social freedoms -- such as looser 
dress codes and more mixing between the sexes -- and 
new government efforts to reign in these freedoms 
would raise the resentment against the Islamic rule, 
opined Labeed.  The loser in the Iranian presidential 
election, Rafsanjani, is a opportunistic and corrupt 
"snake", continued Labeed.  Though Labeed knew little 
about the new Iranian president, he predicted that he 
would be unable to fulfill his campaign promise to 
fight corruption.  The United States, Labeed advised, 
should not antagonize Alamdinejad, and give him no 
opportunity to blame the US for his eventual failures. 
 
--------------------- 
KURDS DO NOT KNOW HIM 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
representative to the Iraqi Transitional Government 
(ITG) Dilshad Miran told us June 29 that the Kurds 
have never met the new Iranian president and do not 
have an official position yet on him. They are 
disappointed, however, that such a perceived hardliner 
came to power -- especially one who is supported by 
the Iran Revolutionary Governing Council (IRGC). 
Miran said they are eager to visit the new President 
and so be able to make better judgments about his 
positions on Kurds and the KRG. 
 
6.  (C) Comment:  Our Baghdad Iraqi contacts, 
including those in Da'wa and SCIRI were certain that 
Rafsanjani - whom they knew well - would win.  There 
has been a pause in Baghdad this week as the Iraqi 
political class weighs the implications of 
Ahmadinejad's victory.  It is entirely possible that 
some of Iraq's Kurdish and Shia parties will make the 
first quiet trips to Teheran to establish contact with 
the Iranian president.  Above all, what both our Shia 
and Kurdish contacts fear that Ahmadinejad might seek 
to destabilize the emerging, but shaky, political 
structure in Iraq. 
 
7.  (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield 

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