US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE1853

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ROME PLEASE PASS VATICAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EPET, NL, EUN, VELS 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/VENEZUELA: SEEKING ALLIES TO CONTAIN 
CHAVEZ 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 117165 
     B. THE HAGUE 1556(NOTAL) 
     C. ROME 2164 
     D. CARACAS 1865 
     E. BRUSSELS USEU 2481 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The Dutch remain concerned about Chavez's 
intentions and are seeking allies to contain and moderate his 
regional and domestic policies.  The Dutch hope Venezuela's 
social and political traditions will limit his ability to 
become a "new Castro," but they are worried about his 
interest in the Dutch Antilles.  FM Bot plans to visit 
Caracas at some point this fall to deliver a "strong message" 
against Venezuelan meddling; at this point the Dutch are not 
prepared to do much more, but are considering options 
(including those outlined in ref d).  The Venezuelan desk 
officer said the MFA is also considering inviting Chavez to 
visit The Hague at some point.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DUTCH SEEK ALLIES TO COUNTER CHAVEZ: U.S., BRAZIL, HOLY SEE 
 
2.  (C)  Poloff discussed ref a demarche points with Dimitri 
Vogelaar (MFA, Venezuela Deskoff) on June 24.  Noting that 
the Dutch enjoyed good relations with Venezuela before Chavez 
came to power, Vogelaar regretted that the Dutch now share 
the U.S. view that Chavez's influence must be contained, 
especially with regard to the Netherlands Antilles (ref b). 
In addition to the U.S., the Dutch believe the Holy See (with 
whom they have already begun to engage through their missions 
in Caracas and Brussels), Brazil, and others could play 
useful roles in helping to moderate Chavez's behavior. 
 
CHAVEZ A PROBLEM, BUT NO CASTRO NUEVO 
 
2.  (C)  The Dutch have reluctantly concluded that Chavez is 
here to stay, according to Vogelaar, but doubt he can become 
"a new Castro" due to the "checks and balances" inherent in 
the Venezuelan system.  Vogelaar argued that NGO's, a free 
media, and freedom of speech are all deeply embedded in 
Venezuela society, and suggested that indigenous opposition 
could be more effective "if it were more focused."  The Dutch 
Embassy in Caracas reports growing dissatisfaction, including 
in Chavez's own party, resulting from the obvious failures of 
his reform agenda. 
 
3.  (C) At the same time, the Dutch are "worried about the 
internationalization of the Bolivarian revolution and the 
unrest Chavez foments in the entire Andean region," Vogelaar 
said.  Through contacts with an umbrella organization for 
indigenous people, the Dutch have learned of Venezuelan 
meddling in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador.  Closer to home, 
the Dutch DCM in Caracas has reported increased presence of 
the national guard in places where they have not been seen 
before, especially in the Venezuelan country side.  The Dutch 
are concerned about harassment of the NGO Sumate.  Finally, 
the Dutch have protested to the Venezuelan Ambassador to The 
Hague about comments that the Venezuelan Consul General made 
recently in Curacao criticizing the U.S. and the GoNL. 
 
BOT PLANNING FALL VISIT TO CARACAS 
 
4.  (C)  Prompted by Dutch concerns over Venezuelan 
intentions toward the Netherlands Antilles (ref b), Vogelaar 
said his office was encouraging FM Bot to visit Venezuela 
this fall to clear the air.  (The 1992 visit of the Dutch 
Minister of Defense was the last cabinet visit to Venezuela.) 
 Although a date has not been set, Vogelaar said Bot planned 
to tell Chavez "in clear terms" that the Netherlands "will 
not tolerate Venezuelan meddling in the Dutch Antilles." 
"Chavez does not understand subtle," he noted pointedly. 
Vogelaar said Bot would also deliver a strong message 
concerning "EU Human Rights Norms" in their meeting. 
Vogelaar was aware that Chavez planned to visit Rome in 
August (ref c).  After initially saying he could neither 
confirm nor deny a Chavez visit to the Hague, Vogelaar called 
June 29 to say the MFA was actively considering inviting 
Chavez to the Hague but was still deciding how and when.  At 
the Embassy Fourth of July reception on June 28, however, the 
Venezuelan DCM denied knowing any plans for Chavez to visit 
here. 
 
5.  (C)  Pressed on what exactly the Dutch were prepared to 
do to prevent "Venezuelan meddling" in the Dutch Antilles. 
Vogelaar suggested not much, at this point, beyond engaging 
with Chavez.  Referring to Dutch Ambassador den Haas' report 
following his meeting with Ambassador Brownfield (ref d), 
which outlined some concrete steps the Dutch and U.S. might 
take, Vogelaar said it is now "going up the chain" at the 
MFA.  He noted that the Dutch already maintain a coast guard 
and navy presence in the Dutch Antilles. 
 
AT THE EU, SPAIN CANNOT EXPECT TO LEAD ALONE 
 
6.  (C) With regard to EU action, Vogelaar disputed the view 
that Spain would dominate policy discussions (ref e).  He 
noted Dutch Ambassador den Haas had very actively represented 
the current EU Presidency in Caracas and after July 1, when 
the UK takes over that job, he expects the Ambassador to 
continue defending the significant GoNL interests.  Back in 
Brussels, the GoNL has kept a relatively low profile in EU 
councils relative to Spain, such as COLAT.  That would 
certainly change if Venezuela's threats to GoNL interests 
sharpened, Vogelaar concluded. 
SOBEL