US embassy cable - 05QUITO1534

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001534 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SNAR, PTER, EC, CO 
SUBJECT: FARC ATTACKS FURTHER ALIENATE QUITO, BOGOTA 
 
REF: A. QUITO 1478 
     B. QUITO 1480 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  News of the FARC's lethal attacks in 
southern Putumayo June 25 spawned a counterproductive but 
oh-so-Ecuadorian response from politicians in Quito.  Rather 
than condemning the narcoterrorists and acknowledging that 
border security requires bilateral cooperation, Palacio 
administration officials blamed Plan Patriota for endangering 
Ecuadorian lives.  High-level GoE officials threaten to 
impose a visa regime on Colombian nationals, reacting to 
allegations that one FARC offensive originated in Ecuador. 
Their policies earned kudos from media and elites, grateful 
Palacio's team has refocused on protecting Ecuadorian 
sovereignty (physical security be damned).  On the ground, 
the GoE military reacted reasonably to the upswing in 
violence, dispatching troops to block FARC retreats south; 
their willingness to engage the enemy is untested, however. 
A short-term outcome from the Putumayo clashes is that 
Ecuador-Colombia relations, backsliding since Palacio assumed 
power, likely will worsen.  Post's action plan to reverse the 
trend depends heavily on improving bilateral communications, 
military and civilian.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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FARC Not a Spent Force 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Embassy Bogota counterparts reveal the FARC's 48th 
and 32nd Fronts initiated 12 simultaneous attacks in Putumayo 
June 25 near the frontier hamlet of Teteye.  Twenty-one 
Colombian troops perished in action, the highest single-day 
death toll recorded during the Uribe administration. 
Ecuadorian press reported the firefights June 26, offering 
basic facts (gleaned from Colombian media) but little 
commentary.  The tone changed the following day, however, 
with reporting turning almost pro-FARC.  "Things got worse," 
Quito's El Comercio wrote, quoting a community leader in San 
Miguel, "when Colombian aircraft entered Ecuadorian territory 
in order to attack the guerrillas from an improved position." 
 Another local official told media that Colombian refugees 
were pouring over the frontier, an assertion that Embassy 
contacts within the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) refuted. 
 
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Anti-Colombia Sentiment Strong Here 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The timing could not have been worse.  Last week 
saw Quito's pre-eminent sovereignty protectors -- Minister of 
Government Mauricio Gandara and Foreign Minister Antonio 
Parra -- engaged in serious Colombia bashing.   The mercurial 
and staunchly anti-Plan Colombia Gandara argued that, in the 
north, Ecuador bordered not Colombia but the FARC.  GoC 
forces were rare sights along the frontier, leaving its care 
solely to the Ecuadorian military.  At the same time he 
disparaged Colombian neglect, he rejected suggestions for 
greater bilateral cooperation.  "It is impossible to share 
all information," Gandara claimed, referring to a proposed 
info-sharing agreement between national police forces.  And 
cross-border operations, with or without permission, were 
verboten; there would be no more Simon Trinidad-like captures. 
 
4.  (SBU) Parra's commentary hewed closely to Gandara's in 
its anti-Colombia bent.  Between assuring Ecuador the GoE 
would never sign Article 98 and insisting Ecuador's relations 
with Venezuela remained top-notch, the Foreign Ministry 
managed to bash GoC aerial coca eradication, Colombia's 
growing bilateral trade surplus, and increasing southbound 
refugee flows.  Ecuador no longer would be a weak negotiating 
partner to its northern neighbor, Parra concluded. 
 
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Attacks Fan Flames Further 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) The Putumayo offensive and President Uribe 
reportedly stating the FARC had abused the territory of a 
neighboring, friendly nation in staging it, spurred even 
stronger GoE diatribe.  Gandara's office June 27 issued a 
press bulletin in which Ecuador lamented the growing numbers 
of Colombians entering Ecuador, fleeing FARC-GoC 
confrontations.  Referring subsequently to a Colombian 
mayor's claim that some rebels retreated to Ecuador after 
concluding their operations, the missive noted the GoE had 
not discarded implementing a visa requirement for Colombian 
nationals.  Media here, generally nationalistic and rarely 
thinking long-term, praised the visa initiative, although 
they did give coverage to Colombian Foreign Minister Carolina 
Barco blasting it. 
 
6.  (C) Ecuadorian military reacted swiftly to the rumored 
FARC incursion.  Joint Forces chief Admiral Manuel Zapater 
overflew the border June 27, focusing on zones of reported 
conflict.  Media report greater patrolling in central 
Sucumbios province.  Ecuadorian military contacts claim the 
24th Special Forces battalion is elaborating a plan to block 
FARC elements from crossing south into Ecuador as they 
retreat from a GoC counter-attack.  And we understand that 
brigade commanders in the north have requested Quito approval 
to re-initiate across-the-board military contacts with 
Colombian counterparts. 
 
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Improvement Seems a Way Off 
--------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) While we applaud the military's initiative, we wonder 
if much is just for show.  Despite active patrolling, for 
example, we are unaware of any armed confrontations between 
GoE forces and FARC since mid-2002, if not earlier. 
Ecuadorian military have uncovered numerous narcoterrorist 
camps in recent years, but all were vacated, some only hours 
before (cooking fires still warm, rice in pots, etc.), 
pointing to tipoffs.  The high command likely would undergo 
withering Congressional and media criticism were Ecuadorian 
forces to take casualties, prompting a re-look at their 
border force posture.  Similarly, their desires for bilateral 
meetings at the brigade, HQ, and ministerial levels, while 
praiseworthy, likely won't fly in the Gandara/Parra-dominated 
political environment.  We therefore believe that 
Colombia-Ecuador relations will worsen before they improve, 
if left alone... 
 
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Getting Them Back to the Table 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Ecuador President Alfredo Palacio inherited the 
office after Quito protesters -- the famed "forajidos" -- 
deposed predecessor Lucio Gutierrez.  While the 
then-president's "dictatorial" domestic decisions fueled 
their ire, left-leaning opportunists capitalized, planting 
anti-U.S., anti-Colombia planks into the "street's" platform. 
 Palacio thus was obliged to alter GoE foreign policy, 
breaking the mythical Washington-Bogota-Quito axis.  While he 
has since walked back early, gringo-bashing comments, we 
cannot see security cooperation returning to year-ago levels. 
 
9.  (C) We cannot remain passive and watch the 
Ecuador-Colombia spat escalate into outright hostility, 
however (especially since Chavez considers Ecuador a 
potential recruit for his Bolivarian army).  Loathe to call 
our brainstorming an action plan -- the health of EC-CO 
relations depends on the countries involved, after all, not 
us -- we nevertheless consider the following measures useful 
to bridge the growing gap.  First, considering productive the 
Ecuadorian tactical commanders' request for all-ranks 
meetings with Colombian counterparts, DAO and Milgroup 
personnel will support the measure wholeheartedly, to include 
requesting a concurrent lobbying effort (toward GoC military) 
by Embassy Bogota peers. 
 
10. (C) We also will utilize upcoming VIP visits.  A slew of 
Codels and Staffdels arrive in early July, three visiting 
both Ecuador and Colombia.  Featuring high in our briefings 
will be the decaying EC-CO relationship, and our desires they 
raise with their GoE interlocutors the need to reverse the 
trend.  Last, while we believe the Palacio Administration, 
not Uribe's, merits "credit" for the relations hiccup, we 
would hope Colombia takes the high ground and reaches out. 
We were aghast, for example, when FM Parra informed the 
Ambassador last month he had yet to contact Barco.  Yet she 
had not phoned him either, we surmised.  We thus request 
Department and Embassy Bogota support in lobbying Colombia to 
extend an olive branch (press reported June 29 that Uribe 
phoned Palacio June 27; according to a WHA/AND readout of GoC 
MOD Uribe's recent meeting with WHA A/S Noriega, it was the 
presidents' first conversation). 
Kenney