US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV4110

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR WELCH, CHENEY/DIBBLE, E. 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2010 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PGOV, KPAL, KWBG, GZ, EG, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: GILAD AND EILAND ON DISENGAGEMENT COORDINATION AND 
THE WEAKNESS OF THE PA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In separate June 17 meetings with NEA A/S 
Welch, DNSA Abrams, and the Ambassador, Israeli NSC Director 
Eiland and MoD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad both 
blamed PA failure to act against rocket and mortar attacks on 
Israel and Israeli settlements on the PA's overall weakness 
and the weakness of Nasir Yusif in particular.  Eiland said 
that PA president Abbas does not take advantage of positive 
developments, such as his successful visit to the White House 
in May, in order to build momentum and support among 
Palestinians.  Eiland was skeptical of -- but did not rule 
out -- possible U.S. involvement in an ongoing series of 
regular meetings between Israelis and Palestinians to help 
resolve security and disengagement-related issues.  Gilad 
painted a grim picture of betrayal by Preventive Security 
Chief Rashid Abu Shbak at the partial instigation of former 
PSO Chief and current PA Minister for Civil Affairs Muhammad 
Dahlan, saying that Abu Shbak in particular is working to 
undermine the authority of PA Minister of Interior Nasir 
Yusif.  Both Eiland and Gilad support continued GOI reliance 
on Dahlan as an interlocutor in the short term to achieve 
disengagement-related goals, despite the almost certain 
negative effects this reliance will have on longer term 
stability and reform goals.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) In separate meetings with visiting NEA A/S David 
Welch, Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, and 
the Ambassador June 17, Israeli National Security Advisor 
Giora Eiland and MoD Chief of Political-Military Affairs MG 
(ret) Amos Gilad outlined the state of play on aspects of 
disengagement and its coordination with what they termed a 
weak Palestinian Authority.  Gilad was accompanied by COGAT 
Chief Yosef Mishlev; Eiland was accompanied by Einat Wilf, 
Foreign Policy Advisor to Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 
and NSC Legal Advisor Gaby Blum. 
 
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"The PA is Weak" 
---------------- 
 
3.  (C) When asked why President Abbas does not take action 
against smaller militant organizations that, theoretically, 
could be confronted, Israeli National Security Advisor Giora 
Eiland stated flatly: "The PA is weak."  Minister of Interior 
Nasir Yusif was a compromise, Eiland said, and, as long as 
Yusif is responsible for security, PA security forces will 
not carry out even "simple activities, consistent with their 
authority."  Furthermore, unscrupulous types seeking personal 
gain are constantly taking advantage of Yusif's weakness, 
compounding the problem. 
 
4.  (C) Nothing will solve the Palestinians' problems if they 
refuse to take advantage of opportunities, Eiland said, 
referring to the (then) ongoing full closure of the Gaza 
Strip due to PA security forces refusal to act on IDF 
intelligence that an Islamic Jihad terrorist was planning to 
attack imminently one of the crossing points (septel).  "They 
could have done something, but they didn't," Eiland said. 
Citing another example, Eiland said that Hamas ultimately 
accepted President Abbas' decision to postpone the 
Legislative Council elections, proving that Abbas does indeed 
have some room to maneuver.  Eiland said that Abbas simply 
does not use the room he has.  Even if Israel becomes "much 
more generous" to the Palestinians than in the past, Eiland 
maintained that the impact on the PA will be small. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Building and Maintaining Momentum 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) A/S Welch said that the Palestinians are optimistic 
about the (then) upcoming summit meeting with PM Sharon, 
noting that the GOI appears to have decided to be more openly 
supportive of President Abbas.  Eiland said that there was no 
guarantee that President Abbas will take advantage of the 
momentum offered by his upcoming summit meeting with Israeli 
PM Sharon, especially since he failed to capitalize on the 
positive developments resulting from his recent visit to the 
U.S.  Eiland said he thought that three to four days of more 
substantive talks, including PA Minister for Civil Affairs 
Muhammad Dahlan, would be more useful.  "We are running out 
of time," Eiland said, musing that more regular meetings 
might be a way to keep up the momentum, rather than a one-off 
meeting at the highest level. 
 
6.  (C) Asked if direct American involvement, such as 
participation by General Ward in this type of meeting, would 
help, Eiland was skeptical.  Hearkening back to the Wolf 
mission in 2003, Eiland said that then the GOI and 
Palestinians spent so much time trying to explain and justify 
their positions to Wolf that they made little actual headway 
in resolving issues.  "We thought in this new (post-Arafat) 
era, that we would be able to negotiate things directly (with 
the PA), if they were at all solvable," Eiland said.  A/S 
Welch said that having LTG Ward in the room, even for only a 
part of the meeting, might give the Palestinians some 
political cover by blaming "American pressure," making it 
somewhat easier for them to agree to things they might 
otherwise evade. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Short-Term Needs Undermine Long-Term Goals: Part I 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
7.  (C) Eiland said that the GOI has chosen to avoid engaging 
the Palestinian political leadership of President Abbas and 
Minister of Interior Nasir Yusif and has chosen instead to 
coordinate essential security elements of disengagement with 
local commanders, a policy he said is having some success. 
Eiland agreed with the Ambassador that, while meeting the 
immediate need, this might undermine the long-term reform 
Yusif and the Ward Mission are trying to achieve, but 
stressed that the GOI needs to solve issues now -- 
disengagement is only weeks away. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Speaking a Different Language at Sharm 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Eiland said that the GOI is frustrated by the 
Palestinians' failure to fully control the list of wanted men 
agreed upon at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit in February.  The 
GOI, Eiland maintained, is unable to hand over security 
control of more West Bank cities until the PA delivers on the 
list, although the GOI is anxious to do so, according to 
Eiland.  When pressed, Eiland admitted that the GOI could 
interpret the Sharm language (which he called "sloppy" and 
"prepared in haste") more liberally, but was adamant that 
simply refraining from killing Israelis is insufficient -- 
the listed men had to cease all activities, including the 
manufacture of weapons.  When asked what could be done to 
break the impasse, Eiland said it is important to "solve what 
can be solved, and leave what can't alone." 
 
----------------------- 
MoD Takes Over Passages 
----------------------- 
 
9.  (C) MoD Political-Military Director MG (ret) Amos Gilad 
told A/S Welch, DNSA Abrams, and the Ambassador that MoD is 
taking over responsibility for passages, including the 
airport and ports.  Gilad asserted that this would be more 
organized and that the military better understands security 
concerns.  Technology will replace soldiers, Gilad said, 
increasing speed and efficiency, as well as improving the 
overall atmosphere at the crossing points.  The fewer 
soldiers the Palestinians see, the better. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Dahlan Agrees $60 Million Contract to Haul Rubble 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
10.  (C) Gilad said that he had agreed with Civil Affairs 
Minister and disengagement guru Muhammad Dahlan to an 
arrangement whereby the GOI will destroy all private 
dwellings in the Gaza settlements and the PA will cart away 
the rubble based on a contract valued at $60 million that 
Gilad had negotiated with Dahlan.  Gilad had few details and 
warned that the PA might ultimately reject the arrangement, 
but stressed that Dahlan had given his approval of the scheme 
directly to DefMin Mofaz. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Abu Shbak "A Big Disappointment" 
-------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) According to Gilad, Dahlan said that there are some 
50,000-60,000 men under arms in the Gaza security forces and 
that still PSO Chief Rashid Abu Shbak "is doing nothing." 
The GOI, Gilad continued, only agreed to allow Abu Shbak's 
appointment on the strength of his reputation for 
effectiveness.  Abu Shbak has "lots of weapons and money" 
from smuggling, Gilad said, but claims, among other excuses, 
that he is not getting orders from Nasir Yusif to take 
definitive actions to control the militants.  Abu Shbak could 
stop the rocket and mortar fire, in Gilad's estimation, but 
he chooses not to.  Instead, Dahlan and Abu Shbak blame Nasir 
Yusif for not acting, when the blame should in reality fall 
on Abu Shbak alone.  The GOI made a mistake with Abu Shbak, 
Gilad concluded, with even Dahlan admitting that Abu Shbak is 
undercutting Nasir Yusif, whose orders no one follows. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Short-Term Needs Undermine Long-Term Goals: Part II 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
12.  (C) The Ambassador asked why the GOI is then working so 
closely with Dahlan, when it is widely known that Abu Shbak 
is loyal to Dahlan, and Dahlan is also loyal to Dahlan -- 
vice Nasir Yusif or the PA.  The GOI continues to deny 
weapons to Nasir Yusif to arm the security forces, the 
Ambassador said, essentially sending him home empty handed, 
and yet rewards Dahlan with access to a $60 million contract. 
 Gilad asserted that Abu Shbak was not completely under 
Dahlan's control, but evaded the larger question. 
 
----------------------------- 
Progress on Border Deployment 
----------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Gilad said that he had succeeded in negotiating 
language governing the deployment of 750 Egyptian border 
police along the Gaza-Egyptian border, brokering the 
difference between the Egyptian desire for a commitment to a 
larger, staged deployment with Israel's insistence that the 
750-man deployment be viewed as a pilot project, with further 
border coverage remaining TBD.  It was further agreed that 
Mowafi (FNU) from Egyptian Military Intelligence would be the 
Egyptian primary liaison.  The GOE has identified the number, 
units and equipment for the troops, and has also agreed with 
the GOI that there will be no change in the MFO role, beyond 
what is covered in their existing mission statement.  The 
terms of the existing peace treaty with Egypt will not 
change, Gilad said, and the new agreement will be signed by 
active duty military personnel.  Gilad said that a letter 
outlining the agreement would be sent to the GOE "in the next 
few days," the GOE having indicated that they are "ready to 
sign now." 
 
14.  (U) A/S Welch and DNSA Abrams have cleared this message. 
 
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KURTZER