Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 05MUSCAT1027 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05MUSCAT1027 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Muscat |
| Created: | 2005-06-29 12:52:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | EWWT PARM PHSA PREL MU Ports Export Control and Border Security |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 001027 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI (TROBERTS), NP/ECC (TGROEN), DS/IP/NEA ABU DHABI FOR W. WALLRAPP USCBP FOR T. HORTON AMMAN FOR J. IRVINE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EWWT, PARM, PHSA, PREL, MU, Ports, Export Control and Border Security SUBJECT: CSI TARGETS PORT SALALAH FOR EXPANSION ------- SUMMARY ------- 1. (U) On June 17, at the request of Omani Minister of Commerce and Industry Maqbool bin Ali Sultan, an assessment team for the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program arrived in Oman to meet with government contacts and officials from Salalah Port Services (SPS) to discuss Oman's potential participation in the expanding CSI program. 2. (SBU) The CBP delegates were warmly received, having gone to great lengths to reassure SPS management of the commercial benefits of the CSI program and allaying SPS fears that scanning high-risk containers at the transshipment hub will harm productivity. To begin moving forward, however, the CBP team will need to negotiate the use and modification of identified workspace at SPS, while the government will need to commit to procuring new inspection equipment for Port Salalah. 3. (U) The CSI team visit also helped lay the foundation for an upcoming visit by the Department of Energy's Megaports assessment team. Working in close coordination with the CSI program, Megaports aims to outfit strategic ports with free radiation portal monitoring equipment. End Summary. --------------------------------------------- -- CSI TEAM ARRIVES AT REQUEST OF OMANI GOVERNMENT --------------------------------------------- -- 4. (U) Following successful discussions in Washington, D.C. with Omani Minister of Commerce and Industry Maqbool bin Ali Sultan, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) followed through on its commitment to send a Container Security Initiative (CSI) assessment team to Oman. The team members, including officials from CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Energy, and U.S. Coast Guard, arrived in Muscat on June 17 to meet with counterparts at the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MTC), Royal Oman Police Coast Guard and Customs, and senior management at Salalah Port Services (SPS) to discuss Oman's potential participation in the expanding CSI program. 5. (U) Currently operational in 37 international ports, the purpose of the CSI program is to protect the global trading system and trade lanes between CSI ports and the United States. Although CSI partners must procure their own non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment, CBP deploys its own team of 5 officers to identified CSI ports to work with customs counterparts to identify and coordinate exams of high-risk containers bound for the United States. While the wait time for screening targeted cargo at U.S. ports may be up to 10 days or more, screening at the port of transit or origin can be accomplished during a container's "down" time and significantly expedites the shipment's processing through CBP upon arrival to the United States. ------------------------ CSI TARGETS PORT SALALAH ------------------------ 6. (U) Although the government of Oman has been actively pursuing participation in the CSI program and is eager to receive a CBP team straightaway, officials at Salalah Port Services were less impressed by the promised commercial benefits of CSI and assert that scanning high-risk containers at the transshipment hub will harm productivity. Senior SPS management also expressed more pressing operational concerns, such as who will absorb the additional cargo handling costs and how will SPS officials liaise with ROP Customs counterparts with whom they currently have little interaction. 7. (U) In rather contentious meetings with SPS operators, the CBP team expounded on the strategic importance of Port Salalah, highlighting the fact that since the transshipment hub often represents the last port of lading before reaching the U.S., it is the first viable opportunity for CPB officers to analyze and target shipments bound for the U.S. Moreover, pre-screening targeted shipments has proved successful in facilitating faster cargo flow into U.S. ports, attracting the interest and support of the international business community. 8. (SBU) In highlighting the significance of Salalah's location and traffic flow, CBP officials reminded SPS management that Port Salalah currently ranks 35th in containerized cargo flow to the U.S. Although this represents less than 1 percent of all traffic into the U.S., it is nonetheless significant. To demonstrate how CSI would impact Salalah's container traffic, CBP officials conducted an analysis of the 74,234 containers shipped from Salalah to the U.S. in 2004. Of those 74,234 containers, approximately 2,000 would have been identified as high-risk through the automated targeting system. While the average scan of imports at U.S. ports is approximately 6 percent, this would have represented just 3% of Salalah's U.S.-bound cargo. 9. (U) A CBP team at Port Salalah would significantly increase the flow of Salalah's U.S.-bound cargo through U.S. ports. The team in Salalah would identify high-risk containers through an automated targeting system that filters information from the bill of lading. Although there are a minimum of 15 data points required for an accurate analysis, there are a multitude of rules that are used to immediately sort and identify high-risk shipments. According to CBP officials, rules may include anything from first-time shippers to low-volume exporters. If a container is identified as a high-risk shipment, through the points-based targeting system, it would be referred to Omani Customs for scanning. Should ROP Customs disagree with the team's findings and choose not to scan an identified high-risk container, the CBP officials may issue a "do not load" certificate to the carrier, advising the carrier that the container will not be unloaded in the U.S. and, moreover, may affect that carrier's ability to call at a U.S. port. ------------------------------------------ MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE OFFERS FREE EQUIPMENT ------------------------------------------ 10. (U) In a related initiative, a representative from the Department of Energy's Megaports program accompanied the CSI team to official ministry meetings and visits at Port Salalah. The Megaports initiative works in conjunction with the CSI program by providing radiation portal monitors at selected ports. Should the Omani government be amenable, an assessment team from the Department of Energy would travel to view Port Salalah in late September and determine optimal locations for radiation scanning equipment. The equipment is free of charge and is managed by host-nation personnel after a brief period of training conducted both in the U.S. and locally. 11. (U) The monitors are passive measurement equipment that would be placed in normal thru-fares within the port. If radiation is detected, an alarm would simultaneously alert ROP Customs and the CSI staff. As part of the agreement, however, all seizures of radiation material must be reported to the Embassy; there can be no taxation on associated services; and there must be a commitment by the Omani government to maintain the equipment beyond the three-year warranty and maintenance period. ---------- NEXT STEPS ---------- 12. (SBU) In a de-brief with Embassy personnel, CBP officials outlined the next steps, clarifying that before a team will be deployed to Salalah, Oman must first sign a Declaration of Principles (DOP) and agree to utilize newly purchased NII equipment for Salalah. In the interim, CBP officials confirmed that they can deploy their own equipment in order to prevent any delays in implementing the program. However, equipment will only be deployed up to one year and will require CBP personnel to oversee the use of the equipment at all times. (Note: According to one official at the MTC, the government has already budgeted for new NII equipment and will guarantee procurement within the one year timeframe. End Note.) 13. (SBU) Moving forward, office space will need to be negotiated with SPS and then remodeled. However, the MTC confirmed that, according to its concession agreement with SPS, it alone is responsible for allocating space and will make the necessary arrangements directly with SPS. The Embassy will work in coordination with the ICE Attache in Abu Dhabi to secure construction of the office space, assess local housing, and work with the Omani government in determining the country status of CBP personnel. (Note: Operating under Chief of Mission authority, the personnel will seek Administrative and Technical status for purposes of immunity. End Note.) BALTIMORE
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04