US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1066

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, KPKO, CG 
SUBJECT: TRANSITION ASSESSMENT COMPLETE -- NOW WHAT? 
 
REF: KINSHASA 964 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C)  Summary:  The government officially ended its 
assessment of the transition's accomplishments and failings 
June 28.  The assessment, heralded in President Kabila's May 
16 public remarks, has been officially billed as designed to 
provide a blueprint for improvement in the last year of the 
transition.  The process -- which took much longer than 
originally foreseen -- has been excruciating for those 
involved and its actual usefulness, vice potentially 
politically advantegous PPRD tool, remains to be seen.  End 
Summary. 
 
A Valid Concept 
--------------- 
 
2. (C)  As described by both the Ministers of Interior and 
Defense, the transitional assessment was actually a 
surprisingly useful process, at least internally.  All 
Ministers were required to provide a summary of the 
transition goals which fell within their area of 
responsibility; identify resources they had been given with 
which to accomplish those goals (whether domestic or 
international funds, international training and equipment, 
etc); account for how they had used those resources; 
delineate areas undone or needing further effort, with 
associated resource demands; provide recommendations on how 
they intend to address the outstanding tasks; and respond to 
questions following their presentations.  For instance, both 
the above-mentioned Ministers are part of the Security 
Commission chaired by Vice President Ruberwa.  Therefore, 
both had to prepare and present their reports to the 
assembled membership of that commission.  The ministers of 
Economy and Finance, for instance, went through a similar 
process for Vice President Bemba's Finance Commission.  The 
unexpectedly complex but apparently well-conceived definition 
of the individual reports seems largely to explain why the 
entire process took as long as it did, particularly given the 
number of questions posed following the reports (38 in the 
case of the Minister of Interior, 32 in the case of the 
Minister of Defense).  In most cases, lack of appropriate 
resources seems to have been identified as among major 
obstacles to fully meeting the original transition goals, 
although the Defense Minister also highlighted political 
roadblocks to military integration. 
 
What Now? 
--------- 
 
3. (C)  If the process itself was potentially useful, the big 
question remains what the government -- and particularly 
President Kabila, whose initiative this was -- intends to do 
with the results.  Before the assessment actually began, 
senior presidential advisor Augustin Katumba described it to 
PolCouns as a political win-win for Kabila.  The results will 
give the President the opportunity to replace some PPRD 
cabinet ministers should he decide to do so (a useful gesture 
to appease public sentiment that no one in the government 
does anything), while also putting other components of the 
government such as the RCD and MLC under pressure to do 
likewise or risk appearing indifferent to apparent public 
desire for change.  National Security Advisor Samba Kaputo 
echoed this sentiment June 27, hinting that Kabila might 
include some sort of announcement about a PPRD cabinet 
shuffle in his anticipated June 30 remarks.  VP Ruberwa told 
Ambassador during a June 11 meeting that it would be 
difficult for him to replace RCD cabinet ministers at this 
time, given that he has only recently survived, with 
difficulty, his internal party political evaluation.  The 
same essentially holds true for VP Bemba, who is increasingly 
alienated from his MLC party base and is unlikely to want to 
provoke an internal confrontation. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
4. (C)  While some presidential advisors may be taking the 
view that this is a no-lose proposition for Kabila, that is 
not necessarily the case.  Changing key ministers (such as 
interior or defense) at this point could actually slow 
progress on major elections-related issues while new 
appointees try to learn the ropes, and also risks playing 
into UDPS leader Tshishekedi's hands by "acknowledging" that 
some ministers should go.  A better strategy could be to keep 
most of the incumbents and instead actually demand that they 
address the shortcomings they themselves have identified. 
Judging from the official remarks June 28 at the closing of 
the assessment process, however, little real change may 
result from the evaluation, since the message at yesterday's 
meeting was mainly that more resources (mostly from the 
international community) are what is needed to address most 
issues.  While true that obviously more resources could, in 
an ideal world, mean more progress, much could be done, 
especially in the crucial social arena, with what already is 
available. 
MEECE