US embassy cable - 05MANILA2972

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002972 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP, USIP-SOLOMON 
EAP/PMBS FOR PWICKBERG 
NSC FOR GREEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015 
TAGS: PINS, PTER, PREL, MY, RP 
SUBJECT: GRP-MILF PEACE TALKS: A SLOW AND INCREMENTAL 
PROCESS 
 
REF: WICKBERG-BELLARD EMAIL:JUNE 28 2005 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Joseph Saus 
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo's 
recent assessment that the GRP and MILF will reach a peace 
accord in six months is highly optimistic, although other GRP 
figures have made similar predictions.  We expect the process 
to slow down as the parties delve further into specifics on 
proprietary land rights.  The ongoing political scandals in 
Manila and the contentious ARMM Gubernatorial election could 
also serve as obstacles to progress in the negotiations.  The 
three parties (GRP, MILF, and third party facilitator 
Malaysia) have consistently resisted direct USIP engagement 
in the peace talks, although USIP's involvement on the 
margins (through workshops and conflict resolution training) 
has proven useful.  End Summary. 
 
Overly Optimistic Forecasts 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Many GRP officials have predicted the successful 
conclusion of the GRP-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
peace talks soon, earlier this year citing June as a target 
and more recently looking toward year-end.  Foreign Secretary 
Romulo's recent assessment to D echoes the public GRP stance, 
which has been strengthened by two recent rounds of positive 
talks and the existing ceasefire overseen by the 
International Monitoring Team.  However, many tough, 
unresolved issues remain on the table.  The GRP and MILF have 
so far discussed the issue of proprietary land rights (i.e., 
ancestral domain) in general terms, but the process likely 
will slow down as the parties delve further into the 
contentious specifics.  The GRP continues to insist that no 
legal or Constitutional changes will be necessary, and that 
existing legislation on Indigenous Peoples is sufficient to 
address MILF concerns, while MILF leaders have called at the 
very least for a new Federal system that would give greater 
autonomy than now possible even under the Indigenous People's 
Rights Act.  The MILF leadership approaches these 
negotiations very cautiously to avoid the same perceived 
mistakes of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), whose 
1996 Peace Agreement with the GRP centered on what many now 
view as the discredited and dysfunctional Autonomous Region 
In Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), as well as failing to provide for 
true economic autonomy and control over resources. 
 
Challenges Ahead 
---------------- 
 
3.  (C) In addition to the complexity of the issues under 
negotiation, the distractions of the current political 
situation in Manila and possible weakening of President 
Arroyo's political base may have a negative impact on the 
GRP's ability to deliver on any commitments to the MILF in 
the negotiations or an eventual agreement.  In addition, the 
ARMM elections on August 8 could further impede the 
negotiations; MNLF leaders have called for a boycott, citing 
failure of the GRP to live up to provisions of the 1996 
agreement. 
 
4.  (C) The decision of the President's political party to 
anoint a candidate also belied earlier Malacanang assertions 
that it would stay out of the ARMM leadership stakes and 
allow a genuine autonomous choice by ARMM residents.  In 
particular, many view the choice of Zaldy Ampatuan as 
anti-MILF.  Some in the MILF have also suggested that its 
membership not participate in the election on the basis that 
the group does not recognize the ARMM. 
 
USIP's Role 
----------- 
 
5.  (SBU) All parties have consistently been reluctant (to 
varying degrees) to accept the good offices of the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP) regarding the ongoing 
negotiations, although GRP and MILF working-level officials 
found useful in particular a recent USIP workshop on 
ancestral domain.  USIP could conceivably help bolster the 
existing ceasefire through sustainable training courses for 
the adjudicators of localized clan or family-based feuds 
(a.k.a., "rido"), which often escalate and draw in opposing 
GRP and MILF forces.  Other possible USIP projects might 
include inter-religious or inter-tribal reconciliation, or a 
comprehensive conflict resolution training program for 
military and police officers deployed to central Mindanao 
where the conflict is focused. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/ 
MUSSOMELI