US embassy cable - 05SANAA1790

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001790 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PARMS, MARR, KDEM, KMCA, KMPI, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: PRIORITIES FOR WASHINGTON VISIT: SALEH NEEDS TO BE 
PART OF THE SOLUTION 
 
REF: SANAA 564 
 
Classified By: CDA Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
1.  (S) Summary:  Significant progress has been made in our 
relationship with Yemen in the past four years.  The ROYG has 
arrested and tried perpetrators of the USS Cole and VM 
Limburg attacks, shared GWOT-related information, 
collaborated in the capture of AQ suspects and helped uncover 
plots against U.S. and other western interests in Yemen.  On 
the economic and political reform front, Yemen has conducted 
reasonably free and fair Parliamentary and local council 
elections, taken an active role in regional and international 
democratic reform efforts, including BMENA and the Community 
of Democracies; backed IMF/WB sponsored economic reforms, and 
committed to seeking MCC membership.  Despite this progress, 
dealing with the ROYG can be frustrating and difficult.  This 
is all the more true with regard to the crucial issues of 
fighting corruption and stopping the dangerous trade small 
arms and light weapons (SA/LW).  Solidifying our relationship 
with Yemen requires progress on both fronts through firm 
demands and tangible inducements. 
 
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SA/LW: Live Up To Your Commitments 
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2. (S/NF) On March 12 President Saleh committed to 
discontinue issuing end-user certificates (EUCs) to Yemeni 
arms dealers and declared all old EUCs back to 1990 null and 
void.  Interior Minister Alimi and Military Chief of Staff 
Qassemi confirmed receipt of written orders from the 
Presidency canceling old EUCs and directing MOD and MOI that 
all arms purchases henceforth were to be through ROYG 
procurement officials only.  We have some indications that 
Saleh is moving to reign in top Yemeni arms brokers.  Other 
reports, however, reveal attempts by Yemeni dealers to 
conduct business as usual with supplier nations.  We got 
Saleh's attention when we stopped a Serbian arms shipment 
procured by a notorious arms dealer via an MOD issued EUC. 
We need to continue in this vein. (ref A). 
3. (S/NF) Saleh has indicated to top advisors in the past 
that he believes he can pull the wool over the eyes of the 
USG.  In the time leading up to his November trip, we must 
convince him that this is not the case by making clear that 
we are monitoring Yemeni SA/LW orders and shipments closely, 
and that a breach of the President's promise will affect the 
tone of the visit and, ultimately, the nature of bilateral 
relations.  Specific steps we can take on SA/LW in the months 
leading up to the visit include: Stopping any illicit sales 
and shipments; continuing pressure on supplier nations not to 
sell SA/LW to Yemen; linking future USG military assistance 
to inventory controls and end-user monitoring; calling on 
Saleh to enforce UN restrictions on weapons trade to Somalia 
and Sudan; and, conducting joint Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIOs) with the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). 
 
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Deliverables: Expanding Yemen Coast Guard and CSF-CTU 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
4. (S) In return for Saleh's compliance, we should promise 
expanded military aid and cooperation.  Our most successful 
CT programs to date, the training and equipping of the Yemen 
Coast Guard (YCG) and the Central Security Forces Counter 
Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU), have been conducted in cooperation 
with the MOI.  Among our deliverables should be continued and 
enhanced USG assistance to YCG and CSF-CTU via a long-term, 
sustainable training program funded though FMF.  NAVCENT and 
CJTF HOA are prepared to conduct joint exercises and/or 
smuggling interdiction operations with the YCG.  A joint ops 
center to monitor movements in the Arabia Sea and the Bab 
al-Mandab should be part of that process. 
 
5. (S) We have made clear to MOI USG intentions to link 
further equipment assistance for CSF-CTU with an inventory 
system designed to prevent the leakage of SA/LW to the gray 
market.  A modern inventory system for all MOD stocks should 
be both a condition for and a promise of further cooperation 
and assistance. 
 
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Enhanced GWOT Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
6. (S) President Saleh has logged some major CT gains and 
significantly improved security in Yemen since the post-9/11 
forging of the U.S-Yemen GWOT partnership.  Recent successes 
include: the round-up of an emerging al-Qa'ida cell with 
plans to target the U.S. Ambassador, prosecution and 
conviction of the USS Cole and M/V Limburg terrorists, and 
participating in the largest MANPADs destruction program in 
the region. However, there continue to be frequent and 
troubling lapses in the ROYG's CT performance, including the 
release of extremists and failure to share information. 
 
7. (S) Former regime elements tied to the insurgency in Iraq 
have operational freedom in Yemen.  The ROYG must honor legal 
Iraqi arrest warrants and deny sanctuary to all Iraqi 
fugitives.  For Yemen to be a reliable GWOT partner, it must: 
provide USG access to detained known or suspected terrorists; 
participating in the deportation of fugitives; and, enforcing 
anti-terrorist facilitation to close off the Jihadist 
pipeline.  The U.S. has programs active in Yemen that can 
assist the ROYG to improve its abilities to monitor its 
borders and track known or suspected terrorists.  In addition 
to enhancements to the EXBS and PISCES programs, we are 
looking at providing fingerprinting and national identity 
card equipment and training to the MOI, and anti-terrorist 
financing training to the Yemen Central Bank. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Yemen: Leader in Regional Reform? 
--------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The Yemen's economy is flailing and serious reforms 
are needed to attract foreign investment.  With dwindling oil 
reserves, a rapidly depleting water supply, and 3.5 percent 
anual population growth, Yemen is well behind the curve on 
crucial economic reforms.  The USG is ready to help with MCC, 
MEPI and USAID assistance but Saleh has to show the political 
will necessary to move forward.  Saleh has asked repeatedly 
for U.S. aid to compensate his losses in Saada.  An 
anticipated/hoped for increase in ESP can be director to 
reconstruction efforts in the north. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Government By the Government, For the Government 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9. (C) Rampant official corruption impedes foreign 
investment, economic growth, and comprehensive development. 
Corruption and greed are also closely related to Yemen,s 
dangerous SA/LW proliferation.  MCC provides the opportunity 
to commit the ROYG to a serious plan to combat endemic 
corruption.  Saleh's feet must be held to the fire on what 
has thus far been mere lip service.  MCC membership serves as 
both a carrot and stick in this regard. 
 
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Democratic Elections 
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10. (C) Saleh touts Yemen as a leader in regional reform and 
has committed to democratization.  Domestically, however, he 
has run-out of reforms he can implement at no political cost 
to himself.  Increasingly anxious about upcoming Presidential 
elections, and already preoccupied with succession, it is 
unlikely Saleh will allow a viable opposition candidate to 
challenge him in 2006.  The visit is an opportunity to 
pressure Saleh not to amend the constitution so he may run 
again in 2013 by praising him for bringingt Yemen to the 
point where he can rely on the system in place to produce a 
legitimate successor.  The inducement here might be a public 
show of support via a greater role in public fora such as the 
G-8. 
 
11. (C) Comment: Progress on SA/LW, information and 
intelligence sharing, fighting corruption, and democratic 
reform is essential, even crucial, for U.S. and Yemeni 
interests.  Saleh must be reassured of the tangible benefits 
from his partnership with the U.S., but must not be allowed 
to leave Washington thinking that he can maintain U.S. 
friendship with a business as usual approach to the above 
issues.  End Comment. 
Khoury