US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1056

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30 JUNE: PPRD CONFIDENT IN POLICE, LESS SO IN MILITARY

Identifier: 05KINSHASA1056
Wikileaks: View 05KINSHASA1056 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2005-06-28 14:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV MARR KPKO CG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001056 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, KPKO, CG 
SUBJECT: 30 JUNE: PPRD CONFIDENT IN POLICE, LESS SO IN 
MILITARY 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C)  National Security Advisor Samba Kaputo told PolCouns 
June 27 that the government (i.e., the president's party, the 
PPRD) is confident that the police (controlled by the PPRD 
Minister of Interior) will support the government June 30, 
but that there are some doubts that all the military will be 
as dependable. Kaputo said that they estimate they have about 
5,000 "solid" military, including Angolan-trained special 
forces, the Angolan-trained troops recently graduated from 
Kitona, and some regular army elements.  These reliable 
elements will be pre-positioned around the city June 29 with 
instructions to break up attempts by more than about 25 
people to assemble, since the government's concern is that, 
if a large group (several thousand) come together, the police 
and secure military might not be able to contain them.  The 
thrust of the government's policy is containment -- keeping 
problematic elements from coming together, and isolating 
trouble in certain parts of the city while "sealing off" 
areas such as Gombe where government offices, diplomatic 
missions and MONUC compounds are located.  In a related 
effort, the government could preemptively arrest known 
troublemakers beginning the evening of June 29, hoping to 
head-off efforts to incite violence. 
 
2. (C)  Minister of Defense Onasumba (from the RCD party) 
told PolCouns June 28 that he is confident in the support of 
the military.  With the exception of a few units already well 
identified, he said that salary payments (which began June 
28) and unspecified "other incentives" will help ensure that 
the military fully supports the police, who have the lead on 
maintaining security in all DRC cities June 30. 
 
3. (C)  Onasumba, Vice President Ruberwa and other officials 
also described June 30 security plans, albeit in less detail, 
to members of the Security Sector Joint Commission in a June 
28 meeting.  In that meeting, the Vice Minister of the 
Interior confirmed that all police units have been paid, 
while Onasumba reported that military salary payments are 
underway and will be completed by the 30th. 
 
4. (C)  Comment:  The central theme of the government's 
security plan for responding to the UDPS threats of violence 
on June 30 has always been avoidance/containment.  For the 
last month several ministers and opinion leaders have been 
working in the most problematic parts of the city to 
counteract the UDPS messages, both by force of moral suasion 
as well as liberal distribution of cash.  The Minister of 
Interior, for instance, was charged with working with 
musicians and well-known local athletes to develop 
community-based leadership networks that would urge people to 
stay home and stay calm on the 30th.  Recognizing that such 
efforts alone, however, may not avert violence, particularly 
given the oft-expressed determination of the UDPS to incite 
demonstrations, the government is putting in place measures 
to contain and/or respond to potential situations in a 
measured and reasonable way -- which, given the history here, 
will be a challenge in and of itself. It is also worth 
keeping in mind that Kaputo, a hardline PPRD member, has a 
confirmed distrust of any non-PPRD controlled military units, 
and this bias probably underlies his pessimistic evaluation 
of the number of "loyal" military troops, particularly given 
the confident assessments of Onasumba and Ruberwa, both from 
the RCD-G. 
MEECE 

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