US embassy cable - 05LJUBLJANA438

C O N F I D E N T I A L  LJUBLJANA 000438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR: HEATHER CONLEY; BOB BRADTKE 
NSC FOR DAMON WILSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SI 
SUBJECT: COM LUNCH WITH SLOVENIAN PRIME MINISTER JANSA: 
GETTING SLOVENES INTO IRAQ 
 
REF: (A) STATE 118655 (B) LJUBLJANA 61 
 
Classified By: Amb.Thomas Robertson for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Prime Minister Jansa told COM at lunch, 
June 28, that next week the GOS planned to review options for 
sending a team of trainers to Iraq .  Jansa made clear his 
preference to go forward with a training contingent in Iraq, 
but noted that there was resistance from his coalition 
partner, the Slovenian People,s Party (SLS), towards such a 
proposal.  If the government decides to do this, he 
indicated, it will need to work on a public affairs strategy, 
although he said that, despite strong media and opposition 
hostility to going into Iraq, public polling showed almost 
half the Slovenian population was supportive.  Other subjects 
discussed will be covered septel.  End summary. 
 
Thanks for your help so far 
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2.     (C)  At the end of a two hour one-on-one lunch at 
COM,s residence with Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa, 
COM raised the Slovenian contribution to NATO operations in 
Iraq.  Thanking him for the GOS contribution to NTM-1 of EUR 
100 thousand, and the USD 5 million of equipment to Iraq, and 
noting the GOS offer to train Iraqis outside of Iraq, COM 
indicated that NATO and Iraqis were most interested in seeing 
trainers on the ground in Iraq, emphasizing that many of the 
billets for Iraqis for training outside of Iraq remained 
unfilled.  COM highlighted in particular the proposal to send 
five mentors to the National Command Center (NCC) in Baghdad, 
noting that there were already US and UK mentors working 
there with Iraqi Ministry of Interior officers, and that the 
NCC compound was secure.  COM provided Ref A talking points 
to the PM as a non-paper. 
 
Jansa:  Providing trainers to Iraq is the right thing to do 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
3.    (C)  In response to COM,s comment that the U.S. 
appreciated the political seriousness of such a decision, 
given Slovenian reluctance back in 2003 to support our 
actions in Iraq, Jansa said that his government had never 
said it would not participate in Iraq.  He reminded COM of 
the resistance in the press and opposition when he had said 
in Brussels in January that his government would reevaluate 
its policy, including the idea of sending troops to Iraq (see 
ref B).  Despite this, Jansa made clear that he thought 
sending trainers to Iraq was the right thing to do, and he 
noted that his government had this on its agenda for 
disposition in the coming week.  He volunteered to contact 
COM after the government meeting with the outcome. 
 
Resistance in the junior coalition party 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4.    (C)  The problem he had, Jansa continued, was that 
there was resistance within the party of his coalition 
partner, the Slovenian People,s Party (SLS), to sending any 
Slovenians into Iraq.  Granted, he said, since this was a 
NATO operation, he would not have to go to the entire 
Parliament for approval for an Iraq-based operation.  His 
government would, however, have to brief the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, and the committee would vote.  If the committee 
voted against the motion, Jansa would have a much more 
serious political problem on his hands. 
 
Polls show almost 50 per cent favor support for Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5.    (C)  That said, Jansa did not think that this was an 
insurmountable problem.  Although media and opposition 
hostility to the idea was strong, separate public polling the 
government had done showed that there was almost 50 percent 
support for such an engagement.  Jansa repeated that as a 
former Defense Minister he understood well that being a 
member of NATO meant being a provider of security to the 
alliance, and he repeated that he was fully on board with the 
need to provide the Iraqis whatever assistance we could so 
that they could provide their own security. 
 
6.    (C)  Jansa said that if he could get his government to 
move forward with this proposal, it would have to work hard 
on putting together a public relations strategy.  COM noted 
that of course this was in support of a NATO and Iraqi 
initiative, but that the U.S. would clearly be ready to 
assist where it can.  Jansa agreed that COM should provide FM 
 
 
Rupel with the same demarche as it would help to feed the 
discussion the cabinet would have later. 
 
7.    (C)  Comment:  We provided reftel proposal to MFA later 
the same day, and COM will discuss with FM Rupel at dinner 
the evening of June 28, before Rupel's departure June 30 for 
Washington.  Jansa did not hesitate to make clear that he 
felt helping Iraq in Iraq was the right thing to do.  He did 
not hint how he might be able to deliver the SLS to support a 
proposal to send Slovenian trainers/mentors to Iraq, but this 
did not seem to concern him particularly.  Earlier in the 
lunch he had spoken favorably of British PM Tony Blair,s 
leadership in supporting the war in Iraq even when it was 
very unpopular at home.  COM got the sense that that is the 
model Jansa would like to follow, showing leadership and 
working to convince his fellow citizens that helping Iraq in 
Iraq is the right thing to do. 
ROBERTSON 
 
 
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 2005LJUBLJ00438 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


 
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