US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2464

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, ETRD, CMGT, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: THE EU AT 25: DOES IT WORK? 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reason 1.4 B/D 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Despite arguments in some quarters that an EU of 25 
members could not work without the streamlined Council 
decision-making procedures of the proposed EU Constitutional 
Treaty, we do not believe that EU enlargement has led to EU 
gridlock.  Over one year after enlargement, the expansion of 
the EU to 25 members has not produced the decision-making 
paralysis some feared.  The new ten members have influenced 
the outcome of some EU debates, such as policy on Russia, by 
shifting the balance between pre-existing divisions among the 
EU-15, but this has not blocked decisions. Enlargement has 
aggravated divisions within the EU in only a very few 
specific examples, such as policy toward northern Cyprus. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) One of the key rationales given by partisans of the 
EU's Constitutional Treaty has been that, in order for the EU 
to avoid institutional paralysis as it grew to 25 members, it 
needed to streamline its decision-making procedures.  In 
particular, the draft constitutional treaty moved away from 
unanimity decisions to more use of super-majority voting 
(which in Eurojargon is known as "qualified majority voting" 
or QMV).  With the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in 
both the Dutch and French referenda, the EU is going to have 
to live with its current decision-making rules for some time 
to come.  Based on just over one year's experience with the 
EU functioning at 25, this message examines whether the EU's 
enlargement is contributing to gridlock in EU decision-making 
or not, and the implications for the U.S. 
 
3. (C) In this Mission's view, fears of gridlock were 
overblown.  Over the course of the past year, there are few 
instances where the presence of the ten new members appears 
to have blocked or delayed the EU in taking a decision on a 
general policy issue.  Enlargement has sometimes been blamed 
as a complicating factor even when it was not the case.  As 
an example, Luxembourg PM Juncker claimed that revision of 
the Stability and Growth Pact earlier this year would have 
been easier among just the eurozone group, but other EU 
officials have acknowledged that this was a case of Juncker 
scapegoating the new members for divisions that were already 
present among the EU-15, where the Dutch were as dogmatic as 
any member state in opposition to relaxing the Pact.  Perhaps 
the only cases that we are aware of where a new member has 
significantly delayed a general EU policy decision were 
Polish objection and delay to a directive on patenting of 
computer software, and Cyprus' foot-dragging on opening trade 
and aid with Northern Cyprus. 
 
4. (C) EU enlargement has complicated decision-making on some 
policy issues that the new members view as of vital national 
interest, however.  The most prominent of these, as noted 
above, is the EU's ongoing struggle to approve measures 
intended to end the isolation of northern Cyprus.  Because 
the Cypriot government has been willing to treat this issue 
as its most important priority in all its dealings within the 
EU, its exercise of its veto regarding trade liberalization 
measures with the north of the island has meant the entire EU 
has been unable to act. 
 
5. (C) While not contributing much to EU paralysis, the new 
ten have had important influence on some EU policies, 
particularly those of keen national interest to them.  The 
attitudes of the eight central and eastern European members, 
especially the Balts and the Poles, had a significant impact 
on EU policy toward Russia and Ukraine.  Members such as 
Slovenia and Hungary have been vocal in joining Austria and 
some others to urge a faster accession path for Balkan 
states, even if it could involve a weakening of the EU's ICTY 
conditionality.  And a number of the new member states have 
added their support to the camp within the EU supporting more 
liberal economic reforms, liberalization of labor markets and 
flexible tax regimes (or blocking pressure from some member 
states to take EU economic regulation in the other direction). 
 
6. (C) But, as these examples demonstrate, the new member 
states have not fallen outside the pre-existing range of 
policy opinions among the EU-15.  What their presence has 
done is shift the balance in the Council (and to a far lesser 
degree it appears in the European Parliament) toward one camp 
or another among the EU-15.  In part, this reflects the new 
members' desire for credibility within the EU, which they 
obtain by seeking coalitions with like-minded members among 
the EU-15 on issues of concern to them.  For example, the 
Czechs, Poles and Balts work closely with the Nordic members 
and, more generally, with Protestant, northern European 
countries on issues such as EU relations toward Russia, 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. 
 
7. (C) The on-going debates over the EU's budget for 
2007-2013, which the June 16-17 European Council failed to 
resolve, showed once again how pre-existing divisions among 
the EU-15 define the real fault lines within the EU.  The new 
EU members, who include the seven poorest countries in the 
EU, are keen to ensure they will benefit from continued 
subsidies in the next EU budget.  But they were ready to make 
a deal on June 17, even giving up a portion of the assistance 
money they expected.  It was the old EU members, particularly 
France and Britain, but others as well, who proved the most 
intractable. 
 
MCKINLEY 
.