US embassy cable - 05RANGOON763

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SPDC GETS SERIOUS ABOUT A NEW CAPITAL

Identifier: 05RANGOON763
Wikileaks: View 05RANGOON763 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2005-06-28 07:06:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINS MCAP BM Pyinmana
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000763 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, MCAP, BM, Pyinmana 
SUBJECT: SPDC GETS SERIOUS ABOUT A NEW CAPITAL 
 
Classified By: CDA a.i. Ron McMullen for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Amidst a swirl of rumors, evidence is 
emerging that the SPDC truly plans to move at least some 
portion of the government 250 miles northward to Pyinmana. 
The GOB has not publicized the decision or the alleged order 
that will have several ministries on the move by July 1st. 
Similarly, the reasons for the apparent choice of Pyinmana 
are mysterious.  However, we've no doubt that they are 
somehow tied in with Than Shwe's megalomania and 
single-minded pursuit of power for himself and his cronies. 
End summary. 
 
Who and When? 
 
2. (C) Rumors are rampant in Rangoon about SPDC earnestness 
in moving some or all of Burma's national administration to 
the rural town of Pyinmana -- in southern Mandalay Division, 
about 250 miles north of Rangoon.  For months there has been 
speculation about this move, including wispy tales of massive 
communication and construction projects in the area -- much 
to the benefit of the SPDC leader's closest business 
associates.  However, apparently the SPDC leadership finally 
approved the relocation of the first tranche of ministries 
beginning July 1st. 
 
3. (C) Details are very hazy.  However, according to a GOB 
source the first group of ministries being sent northward 
are: Information, Forestry, Agriculture and Irrigation, Posts 
and Telecom, and Defense.  Other unverified information 
includes the Ministries of Energy, Livestock and Fisheries, 
and Industry (1) among this first group.  Already the chosen 
ministries have started shipping equipment, files, and some 
personnel.  The source told us that total relocation of these 
pioneers should be complete by the end of this year.  Rumor 
has it that the entire military and civil apparatus will be 
in place in Pyinmana by the end of 2006.  There is no 
definitive information on what will be expected of foreign 
embassies. 
 
4. (C) Burmese exile press outlets report serious 
disenchantment among civil servants who will be expected to 
uproot family and homes and move to the custom-built capital. 
 Pyinmana is not a large town and has none of the services or 
amenities that can be found in Rangoon.  Currently there is 
no civilian airfield near Pyinmana and it is far from the sea 
(though the Rangoon-Mandalay rail line and a fine new road 
pass through it).  Even worse, the planned location of the 
new ministries and military headquarters are not in Pyinmana 
itself, but 20 or 30 miles outside the town in the foothills 
of the Pegu Yoma. 
 
Why? 
 
5. (C) The GOB has not made public its order to the first 
ministries to move or even its intention to shift the capital 
from Rangoon.  Thus, we can only speculate on the SPDC's 
apparent choice of Pyinmana.  The town has not always been a 
backwater.  During and after World War II, Pyinmana (as a 
central location in the Burman-dominated central portion of 
the country) was used as a military headquarters by the 
Japanese and Burmese army.  For many years it was a hub of 
Communist anti-government activities.  Today the area around 
Pyinmana has some large military installations, but the town 
itself is best known for the government agricultural research 
school located there. 
 
6. (C) From a larger historical perspective, the move is not 
as arbitrary as it seems.  It was customary for Burmese kings 
to shift their capital periodically for political, economic, 
or supernatural reasons.  Though Rangoon has been Burma's 
capital city since colonial days, it has been administered by 
Burmese only since 1948.  It is clear that SPDC Senior 
General Than Shwe increasingly views himself as the inheritor 
of the mantle passed down the centuries by Burma's great 
builder kings.  Thus through monarchical glasses, a move to 
Pyinmana after nearly 60 years in Rangoon is a logical and 
consistent step to take. 
 
7. (C) Another, related, school of thought is that the SPDC 
leader wants to build a second capital as part of a strategy 
to assert more direct control over the country.  Currently 
the nation is "ruled" by 12 regional commanders who report to 
distant Rangoon and who may or may not offer their primary 
allegiances to Than Shwe.  With a northern capital at 
Pyinmana, and a southern commercial capital in Rangoon, the 
Senior General could appoint two politically reliable "super 
commanders" who would in turn oversee the regional commanders 
in their zone.  (Note: one oft-heard rumor is that regime 
number three and Than Shwe apostle Gen. Thura Shwe Mann has 
already been posted to Pyinmana. End note.)  Such a system 
prevailed in Burma until the late 1950s, and for some years 
now regional civil administration officials have been 
appointed according to this north-south system (with the 
northern "capital" in Mandalay). 
 
Comment: Strange Doings 
 
8. (C) The real size of and motivation behind this apparently 
genuine move of the capital will become clearer as time goes 
on.  There could be linkages to the SPDC's strong-arm 
constitutional convention and election expected in the next 
year or two.  There could even be truth to ideas that 
paranoia and fear of a sea invasion are driving the 
decisionmaking -- though we are doubtful of this.  In any 
case the Senior General's secretive, but apparently 
comprehensive, plan offers further evidence of his growing 
megalomania and of the lengths to which he will go to ensure 
power remains with him and his hand-picked followers.  End 
comment. 
McMullen 

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