US embassy cable - 05SINGAPORE1986

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 001986 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, SOCI, SN 
SUBJECT: PROMOTING MAINSTREAM ISLAM: THE SINGAPORE MODEL 
 
REF: A. SINGAPORE 1835 
     B. SINGAPORE 887 
 
Classified By: E/P Counselor Laurent Charbonnet, Reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Concerned about the potential threat of 
Islamic extremism to Singapore's multi-religious, secular 
society, the government of Singapore (GOS) is promoting its 
brand of "mainstream" Islam and a Singaporean Muslim 
identity.  Using its standard tools of incentives, 
co-optation, and control, the GOS seeks to ensure Singapore's 
social cohesion and security by providing an ideological 
alternative to Islamic extremism.  Working primarily through 
the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), a 
government statutory board, the GOS aims to convince Muslims 
that Islam is compatible with modernity, and to harness 
religion to ensure their support for (or at least 
acquiescence to) its policies.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
A Nation that Feels at Risk 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Flanked by two Malay/Muslim-majority nations, and 
having experienced race riots in the 1960s, the GOS has long 
been obsessed with promoting racial harmony and winning the 
loyalty of the city-state's indigenous Malay/Muslim minority 
(15 percent of the population).  These efforts have taken on 
new urgency since 9/11, the subsequent discovery in December 
2001 of a bombing plot by Singaporean Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
terrorists, and multiple bombings in nearby Indonesia. 
Singapore's Chinese-dominated leadership worries about the 
impact of a global Islamic resurgence on its Muslim citizens, 
be it social fissures, independent political movements, or 
acts of terrorism. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Creating a Singapore Muslim Identity 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) To counter this perceived threat, the GOS, working 
through modernist Muslim political and religious leaders, is 
promoting what it calls "mainstream" ("sederhana") Islam in 
Malay and working to create a unique Singapore Muslim 
identity.  MUIS has articulated ten attributes of the ideal 
Singapore Muslim, most of which emphasize acceptance of the 
existing social and political order, such as "Well-adjusted 
in living as full members of secular society," and "Believes 
that a good Muslim is also a good citizen."  Other attributes 
support the government's goal of maintaining racial harmony 
in Singapore's diverse society, such as "Inclusive and 
practices pluralism," is "a blessing to other communities," 
and "appreciates the richness of other civilizations."  (The 
full list is available at the MUIS website, www.muis.gov.sg.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Broadcasting "Progressive" Ideas 
-------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) MUIS is promulgating "progressive" Islamic views 
rather than allowing a vacuum to develop that could be filled 
by radical Islamic ideas.  The official weekly sermons issued 
by MUIS for use in all the city-state's mosques urge Muslims 
to work towards improving themselves and their community, and 
to avoid violent extremism.  Singapore's government-appointed 
Mufti (supreme Islamic religious authority), in consultation 
with a committee of religious scholars, issues fatwas 
(religious opinions) that support the government's goals. 
MUIS is also reforming Singapore's Islamic education system 
to provide Muslims with "proper" religious knowledge (ref A), 
the absence of which, it believes, allowed terrorist 
ringleaders to lead astray the local JI plotters. 
 
5. (C) MUIS and other government-linked organizations also 
are bringing in well-known Muslim speakers to challenge--on a 
religious basis--radical Islamist arguments on issues such as 
jihad and the creation of a pan-Islamic state.  MUIS is 
especially trying to bring in modernist Arabic-speaking 
scholars to meet with more traditional Muslim clerics, who 
are uncomfortable with English.  Singapore's modernist Muslim 
leaders, including the Minister in charge of Muslim affairs, 
typically attended national schools (in English) rather than 
Islamic religious schools (where classes are in Arabic and 
Malay), and have degrees in secular subjects.  As a result, 
they told us they do not feel they have the religious 
knowledge or language skills to successfully counter the 
theological views of Singapore's more traditional Islamic 
leaders.  This approach of importing experts is not 
completely successful; these modernist scholars are often 
challenged by traditional clerics, either directly at the 
talks or in articles on the website (www.pergas.org.sg) of 
the most conservative Muslim group, the Muslim Religious 
Teachers Association of Singapore (PERGAS). 
 
------------------------------------- 
Excluding Extremist or Critical Views 
------------------------------------- 
6. (C) The GOS tries to exclude voices that might foment 
religious divisions or encourage Muslims to challenge the 
government.  Speeches on religion still require a permit, and 
can only be made in one of the four official languages 
(English, Mandarin, Malay, or Tamil), effectively preventing 
speeches in Arabic about Islam or politics.  The GOS monitors 
visiting Muslim clerics and denies visas to those it deems a 
threat.  It particularly restricts those from Saudi Arabia. 
While more open to their visits, the GOS also is concerned 
that clerics from Indonesia and Malaysia have been coming to 
Singapore and meeting with local religious leaders, according 
to the head of the GOS Political Islam Study Group.  The GOS 
bans satellite dishes and controls which foreign channels are 
included in the cable TV lineup; Al Jazeera is one of the 
many channels not available in Singapore. 
7. (C) The GOS tries to downplay news that might enflame its 
Muslim minority and to publish stories that support 
"progressive" Islamic views in the local media.  The 
Malay-language newspaper's coverage of the allegations of 
Koran desecration at Guantanamo, for example, was 
considerably less critical than in the English-language 
newspapers.  The editor of Singapore's Malay-language 
newspaper told us he was reprimanded by government officials 
for publishing an article that allegedly threatened racial 
harmony. 
 
------------------------------- 
Monitoring Potential Critics... 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The GOS monitors the Muslim community to squelch 
extremist or critical views.  The GOS relies not just on the 
police and intelligence services, but also on religious and 
community leaders for self-policing.  Muslims MPs told us 
members of the community will report to them when Islamic 
clerics deviate from the official Friday sermon, and MUIS 
officials will then remind the imam to deliver the prepared 
text.  MUIS monitors the views and activities of other Muslim 
groups.  For example, a few years ago the Deputy Mufti 
publicly resigned his post--because of differences with the 
MUIS leadership, according to newspaper accounts--and went to 
work for PERGAS, from whence he provided MUIS with 
information about the group's views and tried to influence 
the traditional clerics to become less insular. 
 
9. (C) Many Muslim journalists and community leaders have 
told us that this monitoring makes them reluctant to 
criticize the government.  They fear government reprisals, 
such as a defamation suit or detention under Singapore's 
Internal Security Act (ISA) for fomenting racial tension. 
The immediate past-president of MUIS told us that he feared 
being "blacklisted" after he argued at a closed-door session 
that the GOS deters Muslim challenges to the government by 
keeping the Muslim elite busy with social welfare work; a 
listener reported his comments to the GOS, which then 
"requested" a written text of his presentation. 
 
------------------------------ 
...And Co-opting Them, As Well 
------------------------------ 
 
10. (C) The GOS tries to co-opt Muslims critical of its 
policies through incentives.  MUIS, for example, now provides 
cash-strapped PERGAS with office space.  The Association of 
Muslim Professionals (AMP), which was initially critical of 
the GOS and PAP Muslim leaders, now receives part of the 
mandatory payroll deductions from Muslims' salaries (the 
government-administered "zakat") to fund its social service 
programs.  AMP's president told us this has had made AMP more 
reluctant to publicly challenge government policies. 
 
11. (U) The GOS seems so far to have earned the tacit 
acceptance of most Singaporean Muslims by accommodating their 
religious practices and beliefs.  Singapore allows Muslim 
family law (Syariah), for example, and has a system of 
Syariah courts to administer it.  According to a judge on the 
Syariah court, secular lawyers who are Muslims work with the 
Muslim religious judges to craft opinions that harmonize the 
religious ruling with Singapore's civil code.  Singapore's 
Muslims can easily find MUIS-certified halal food (including 
at McDonalds), wear Islamic or traditional Malay clothing 
(except for students in the national schools, who must wear 
the school uniform), and invest in Islamic financial 
products.  Muslim holidays such as Idul Fitri are national 
holidays.  Even PERGAS concedes that while an Islamic state 
is the ideal, it is acceptable to live under a secular 
government such as Singapore's that allows Muslims to live in 
accordance with Islamic teachings. 
 
12. (U) The GOS hinders the development of Muslim opposition 
through its conciliatory actions on foreign policy and 
security issues.  The GOS carefully explained the arrests of 
the suspected Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists to the Muslim 
community.  It is treating the JI detainees well, focusing on 
reeducating them with "proper Islamic knowledge" (provided by 
volunteer Islamic religious teachers) and is co-operating 
with the Muslim community to ensure the detainees' families 
are well-treated, according to both GOS officials and Muslim 
leaders.  The GOS is also accommodating the foreign policy 
priorities of its Muslim minority by reaching out to the 
Middle East (ref B) and by urging the United States to deal 
evenly with the Palestinians. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insulating Politics from Religion and Race 
------------------------------------------ 
 
13. (C) The GOS tries to separate politics from race and 
religion.  Parliamentary districts are drawn so that Muslims 
are a minority in every district, but, in partial 
compensation, electoral rules require parties to have a 
minority candidate on the election slate of most 
constituencies.  Race and religion are two topics that remain 
"out of bounds" for political discussion.  The GOS typically 
reprimands religious groups who intrude in the political 
sphere, although it did allow them to publicly express their 
views on the question of whether to allow a casino to be 
built in Singapore.  Singapore's Malay political party 
(PKMS), which is informally affiliated with UMNO in Malaysia 
and seems to have some allies on the governing board of 
PERGAS, occasionally tries to use religion and race for 
political purposes, such as calling for the next president of 
Singapore to be Malay. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Promoting Social Cohesion and Religious Harmony 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
14. (U) The GOS is concerned about Muslims segregating 
themselves from the larger society.  It is trying to "enlarge 
the common space" in which Singaporeans of all races and 
religions interact through voluntary activities such as 
sports, and mandatory regulations such as racial quotas for 
public housing (home to 85% of Singaporeans).  Since 9/11 and 
the arrests of the suspected Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists, the 
GOS has stepped up its efforts to promote social cohesion. 
It is encouraging interactions among members of different 
faiths through newly formed groups like the Inter-Religious 
Organization (IRO) and inter-racial confidence circles.  The 
GOS has also written a declaration of religious harmony, 
which is recited annually on Racial Harmony Day. 
 
15. (C) Comment:  This GOS effort to promote its version of 
"progressive" Islam that supports the existing social and 
political order is an example of the PAP government's 
top-down social engineering.  This approach seeks to ensure 
the PAP's continued dominance, while simultaneously providing 
for a stable society and preventing the incursion of 
radicalized views from Muslim communities abroad.  By 
promoting an Islamic ideology that is compatible with 
economic development, commerce, and modernity, the PAP hopes 
to convince Singapore's Muslim community to accept its vision 
of Singapore as a diverse, secular state. End Comment. 
LAVIN