US embassy cable - 05PARIS4466

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004466 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE-SBALL, JLEVIN, EB/TRA: ARADETSKY, 
DS-JHAWLEY 
DHS FOR TSA-INTL AFFAIRS-DTIEDGE AND AVIATION OPS 
FBI HQ FOR COUNTERRORISM DIVISION 
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR TSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2015 
TAGS: EAIR, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: FRANCE: GOF READY TO ADVANCE SELECTEE EMERGENCY 
AMENDMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
 
REF: A) 04 PARIS 9137 B) 04 PARIS 7092 C) 04 PARIS 
     4556 D) 04 PARIS 1016 
 
Classified By: CHARGE ALEX WOLFF FOR REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (D) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 22 meeting with GOF officials, 
Emboffs received assurances that the GOF would work to 
resolve the remaining issues in Selectee Emergency Amendment 
(EA) implementation. After a review of prior progress and 
outstanding issues on the range of aviation EAs, the Embassy 
agreed to present a formal proposal in writing for action by 
the GOF. The GOF also indicated that it was aware of upcoming 
EAs on overflight and Secure Flight, and was attempting to 
prepare in advance for them. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, 
Transportation Security Administration Representative, and 
Econoff met with officials from the General Secretariat for 
National Defense (SGDN) June 22 to discuss EA implementation. 
Prefect Bernard Boub, SGDN Director of Protection and State 
Security, Colonel Henri Schlienger, SGDN Aviation Security, 
and Captain Jean-Louis Vichot, Assistant Director of European 
and Strategic Affairs participated for the French. 
 
3. (C) Emboffs began by reviewing the progress made on 
implementation of No-Fly and Master Crew List EAs (reftels), 
noting that since the GOF agreed to begin implementing them 
in December 2004 occasional no-fly notification problems have 
occurred and needed to be avoided. The USG understood the 
French insistence on dealing with aviation security matters 
on a government to government basis, and believed that the 
modifications in procedures for implementing the EAs that we 
had agreed to previously met the needs of both governments. 
 
4. (C) Emboffs noted that Air France appears to be attempting 
to follow No-Fly procedures closely, and that errors are 
possibly due to airline inexperience with the system. The 
more serious issue was systematic lack of notification on 
possible Selectee List matches, which we understood was being 
held back due to lack of instruction from the GOF. Air France 
was successfully implementing the EA in the US, and was 
technically capable of doing so in France.  We believed we 
had a written committment dating from last year from the GOF 
to do this. 
 
5. (C) Prefect Boub underlined that the GOF was committed to 
implementation of the No-Fly and Selectee EAs, and wanted to 
do all it could to avoid airplane diversions, which were 
costly and potentially embarrassing. He promised to consult 
with Air France about potential issues with Selectee EA 
implementation.  On No-Fly, he understood that the problem in 
the most recent diversion was the way Air France's software 
evaluated names for possible matches; Air France had modified 
it to bring it closer to the U.S. system. 
 
6. (C) TSA Rep pointed out technical issues with the Master 
Crew list which the GOF furnishes to the USG on CD-ROM every 
six months.  Formatting incompatibilities and incomplete data 
fields prevented its effective use in the U.S. data base.  A 
more effective approach would be direct transmission of 
APIS-formatted data electronically to DHS. TSA Rep offered to 
arrange for technical assistance to help Air France personnel 
resolve these issues if needed.  Prefect Boub promised to 
consult with Air France about this, and appeared inclined to 
accept the offer. 
 
7. (C)  Boub noted that to implement the Selectee List EA it 
would be necessary to present the issue to the new government 
for a decision, and agreed that the best way to begin would 
be for the Embassy to draft a letter from the Charge to MFA 
Cabinet Director Pierre Vimont outlining what we 
proposed--the same procedure we used to successfully 
implement the No-Fly EA. He also remarked on French concerns 
about the quality of information on both the No-Fly and 
Selectee lists, and said that the French privacy authority, 
the National Commission for Computerization and Liberty 
(CNIL) had been "very negative" about the lists. Judicial 
problems in France remained a possibility. 
 
8. (C) On a more positive note, Boub said the GOF was aware 
of potential EAs on overflights and advance transmission of 
PNR data (Secure Flight).  On the latter the French were 
working to be able to respond quickly if and when it is 
issued, but would like prior consultation. They also 
suggested further cooperation in adopting agreed-upon 
measures for designated flights of interest (Ref D), and on 
maintaining a vigorous program of airport inspections. 
COMMENT: GOF officials have previously raised with Embassy 
and TSA officials their interest in drawing up joint "flight 
of interest" criteria and procedures, similar to what they 
understand has been done in the US-UK context.  Post would 
appreciate Washington guidance on how to respond. END COMMENT 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: The meeting indicated French willingness to 
work with us to implement fully our agreement on the No-Fly, 
Selectee and Master Crew List EAs.  Embassy Paris intends to 
propose the same procedure we have adopted for the No-Fly EA: 
Air France will notify the Air and Border Police (PAF) of 
potential matches, and the PAF will inform the Legatt. This 
approach stands the best chance of quick adoption. Given the 
GOF's choice to deal with aviation security on a government 
to government basis, we will need to continue to consult with 
them both formally and informally on the implementation of 
these and future EAs. Post urges Washington Agencies to use 
prior consultation with European partners before implementing 
new EAs on overflights and Secure Flight. END COMMENT 
WOLFF