US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA1902

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 OTTAWA 001902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C-043-05 
 
FOR CSAF, CDR USNORTHCOM, COMUSAFE, COMAFSPC, COMACC, HQ USAF/XO, HQ US 
AF/XI, CMSAF. 
 
TAGS: PARM, Scenesetter, Canadian Military 
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR AIRMEN TALKS NORTH, OTTAWA, 
CANADA, 28-29 JUN 2005 (U) 
 
1. (C) CANADA-U.S. POL-MIL RELATIONS.  PRIME MINISTER MARTIN 
LEADS A MINORITY GOVERNMENT THAT OPERATES WITH EXTREME 
CAUTION AND LACKS STABILITY. MARTIN,S OVERRIDING CONCERN IS 
POLITICAL SURVIVAL AS HE FACES A POTENTIAL  NO-CONFIDENCE, 
VOTE 18 OR 19 MAY WHICH MANY BELIEVE WILL LEAD TO ELECTIONS 
BEING CALLED AT THE END OF JUNE 2005.  THE PRESSURE ON THE 
LIBERALS COMES FROM THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF A CHRETIEN-ERA 
SCANDAL INVOLVING QUEBEC. SEALED EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
BY THE LIBERAL PARTY, LIKELY TO COME OUT IN THE JUNE TRIAL OF 
A KEY PLAYER IN THE SPONSORSHIP SCANDAL, HAS RATCHETED 
POLITICAL TENSIONS TO A FEVER PITCH AND FORCED THE LIBERAL 
AGENDA INTO NEAR-GRIDLOCK. 
 
A. (C) PM MARTIN HAS WAFFLED BETWEEN SENDING STRONG SIGNALS 
THAT HE WISHES TO IMPROVES CANUS RELATIONS AND CAMPAIGN 
RHETORIC THAT FOCUSED ON CANUS  DIFFERENTIATION, TO BUILD 
ROOM BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE CONSERVATIVES WHO SUPPORT MUCH 
STRONGER TIES TO THE U.S. AND A MORE PROGRESSIVE DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. MARTIN ESTABLISHED AND CHAIRS A NEW 
CABINET COMMITTEE ON CANUS RELATIONS, CREATED A DHS-LIKE 
HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT (DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA) HEADED BY THE DEPUTY PRIME 
MINISTER, AND HAS DEVOTED MORE RESOURCES FOR BORDER AND 
MARITIME SECURITY AND TIGHTER IMMIGRATION SCREENING. STILL, 
AN AUDITOR GENERAL,S REPORT RELEASED 5 APRIL 05 CRITICIZES 
CANADIAN BORDER SECURITY EFFORTS AND COORDINATION. 
 
B. (U) IN APRIL, 2004 MARTIN PUBLISHED CANADA,S FIRST-EVER 
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WHICH FOCUSES ON: 
 
(1) (U) PROTECTING CANADA AND CANADIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD; 
(2) (U) ENSURING CANADA IS NOT A BASE FOR THREATS TO ITS 
ALLIES; 
(3) (U) CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
 
MARTIN ALSO PUSHED THROUGH THE AMENDMENT TO THE NORAD 
AGREEMENT, ALLOWING NORAD TO PERFORM THREAT WARNING 
(INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARNING/ATTACK ASSESSMENT) FOR THE 
MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION. 
 
2. (C) PRO-U.S. DEFENSE MINISTER WILLIAM ((GRAHAM)), 
PREVIOUSLY FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF CANADA 
JOINING MISSILE DEFENSE, BUT HAD TO BACK AWAY FROM HIS 
POSITION WHEN PM MARTIN MADE THE POLITICAL DECISION IN 
FEBRUARY 2005 NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN MISSILE DEFENSE.  THOSE 
IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE CIRCLES WERE ALMOST UNIFORMLY IN 
FAVOR OF JOINING BMD AND THEY ARE STILL SMARTING AND 
DEFENSIVE OVER THE DECISION.  MANY ARE LOOKING FOR 
DELIVERABLES TO APPEASE THE U.S. IN THE WAKE OF WHAT THEY SEE 
AS A DAMAGING STEP TO CANUS SECURITY COOPERATION AND 
RELATIONS OVERALL.  PUSHED BY INDUSTRY AND LOCAL POLITICIANS 
LOOKING FOR A NEW MISSION FOR A BASE IN DECLINE, MINDEF 
GRAHAM IS IN FAVOR OF INSTALLING AN X-BAND RADAR AT CFB GOOSE 
BAY, LABRADOR TO CONTRIBUTE TO NORAD ITW/AA. (MDA SEES 
LIMITED UTILITY IN BASING AN X-BAND RADAR AT GOOSE BAY). 
 
3. (C)  ON 1 APRIL 05, GEN HILLIER UNVEILED HIS VISION IN THE 
TANK FOR THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE JOINT STAFF.   SINCE 
BECOMING CDS IN FEB 05, HE REWROTE MOST OF THE DEFENCE 
REVIEW, REALIGNED SENIOR CANADIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND 
FORMED FULL-TIME ACTION GROUPS TO ENSURE HIS VISION IS 
ARTICULATED AND IMPLEMENTED.  CHARGED WITH REGAINING RESPECT 
FOR THE CF, HE MUST SMARTLY INCREASE CF CAPABILITY AND 
CAPACITY WITH ONLY MINOR BUDGET INCREASES, ALL WHILE 
APPEASING THE CANADIAN PUBLIC,S PENCHANT FOR THE CF TO 
REMAIN A DOMESTIC FORCE WITH THE ABILITY TO SUPPORT 
MULTINATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND STABILITY OPERATIONS ABROAD. 
THE KEY THEMES OF GEN HILLIER,S VISION: 
A. (U)  INCREASE CANADA,S INFLUENCE WITH DEPLOYMENTS IN 
SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS IN ONE FOOTPRINT AND MAKING CANADIAN 
FORCES MORE RESPONSIVE TO MODERN CONTINGENCIES WHERE 
ASYMMETRIC THREATS ARE THE NORM. 
B. (C/RELCAN)  CREATE A COMMAND-CENTRIC, KNOWLEDGE-BASED AND 
TACTICALLY DECISIVE ARMY USING KEY ENABLERS LIKE C4ISR 
(CALLED ISTAR IN CANADA:  INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET 
ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE).  THE PROGRESS IN C4ISR 
TRANSFORMATION IS NOW UNDER CRITICISM AS FRAGMENTED AND 
LACKING VISION IN A 5 APRIL 05 AUDITOR GENERAL REPORT. 
C. (C/RELCAN) FOCUS ON CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT A  3-BLOCK 
WAR, (CONCURRENT COMBAT, STABILIZATION, AND HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE). 
D. (C/RELCAN) PACKAGE DISPARATE CF DEPLOYMENTS INTO ONE JOINT 
FOOTPRINT AND COMMAND STRUCTURE.  THIS IS TO BUILD CANADIAN 
INFLUENCE VIA LARGER IMPACT DEPLOYMENTS, RATHER THAN GETTING 
ONLY FLEETING CREDIT FOR PIECEMEAL EFFORTS DONE IN MULTIPLE 
LOCATIONS.  CANADA,S AFGHANISTAN PRT IN AUG 05 WILL USE SUCH 
A STRUCTURE AND THE PLAN WAS TO BUILD TO A MAJOR BATTLE GROUP 
DEPLOYMENT OF 1,300, PROBABLY WITH 6 CF-18S IN EARLY CY2006. 
THIS PLAN IS ON HOLD FOR THE TIME BEING AS THE GOVERNMENT IS 
MARTIN GOVERNMENT IS FRANTICALLY TRYING TO GAIN POLITICAL 
TRACTION WITH IMMEDIATE FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH ARE 
POPULAR WITH THE PUBLIC AND WITH FENCE-SITTING POLITICIANS 
WHOSE VOTE COULD KEEP THE GOVERNMENT FROM BEING BROUGHT DOWN. 
CHIEF AMONG THESE IS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DARFUR REGION OF 
SUDAN.  CDS GENERAL HILLIER WAS IN DARFUR 26-28 APR 05 AND PM 
MARTIN AND OTHER SENIOR CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE 
VISITED THE REGION AS WELL.  WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE 
CANADA MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NATO AND TO NOT DILUTE 
THEIR COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN THEY ARE LOOKING FOR THE MOST 
EXPEDIENT WAY TO CONTRIBUTE (DUE TO THE POLITICAL 
CLIMATE/SCHEDULE) AND THAT SEEMS LIKELY TO BE BILATERALLY 
WITH THE AFRICAN UNION (AU).  PM MARTIN HAS ORDERED A DELAY 
ON PLANNING FOR AFGHANISTAN UNTIL 30 MAY WHILE A DECISION IS 
MADE ON DARFUR CONTRIBUTIONS (WIDELY THOUGHT TO BE 150-180 
TROOPS IN A TRAINING AND LOGISITICS SUPPORT ROLE).  WE EXPECT 
GENERAL HILLIER WILL GIVE YOU THE GOVERNMENT POSITION DURING 
YOUR MEETINGS.  WE BELIEVE HE IS ADAMANT ON MAKING THE 
PLANNED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN AND IS LOATHE TO DILUTE 
THE AFGHANISTAN PLAN BY PLACING A LARGE FOOTPRINT IN SUDAN. 
E. (U) DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE EXPEDITIONARY SCHEDULE, 
INCLUDING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE (E.G., CF-18S). 
F. (C/RELCAN)  FOCUS ON MISSIONS IN FAILED/FAILING STATES AND 
MOVE AWAY FROM CAPABILITIES NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THIS MISSION 
 BUBBLE., 
G. (C/NF) IMPROVING CANADA,S JTF-2 SOF, TO INCLUDE NEW 
TIER-2 CAPABILITIES.  FORM A SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP 
INTEGRATING SOF AIR, NAVAL, AND ENABLER ASSETS UNDER ONE 
COMMANDER. 
H. (C/RELCAN)  DESIGNATE CANADA AS AN AREA OF OPERATIONS AND 
MAKING CONTINENTAL SECURITY JOB ONE, IMPROVING MARITIME 
SURVEILLANCE, HLD C2 AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY. 
4. (C/RELCAN) GEN HILLIER WANTS TO RAPIDLY CREATE CANADA 
COMMAND (CANCOM) AS A CONTINENTAL COUNTERPART TO USNORTHCOM 
WITH CANADA AS AN AOO.  GEN HILLIER WILL DESIGNATE A CANCOM 
COMMANDER AND ESTABLISH A HEADQUARTERS ON 1 JUL 05, BUT THE 
COMMAND WILL TAKE TWO TO THREE YEARS TO BECOME FULLY 
OPERATIONAL. CANCOM WILL HAVE SIX REGIONAL JOINT HEADQUARTERS 
(MOST LIKELY HALIFAX; QUEBEC/MONTREAL; KINGSTON; WINNIPEG; 
ESQUIMALT/VICTORIA; YELLOWKNIFE).  UNDER HIS PLAN, CANCOM 
WILL BE THE SINGLE DEFENSE POC FOR: 
A.(C/RELCAN) DOMESTIC OPERATIONS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 
IN CANADA AND FOR OTHER CANADIAN SECURITY PARTNERS. 
B.(C/RELCAN) NATIONAL COORDINATION FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC, THE CANADIAN EQUIVALENT 
TO DHS). 
C.(C/RELCAN) ALL MIL-TO-MIL PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF 
DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA). 
5. (C) GEN HILLIER,S NEW VISION IS REFRESHING AND MARKS A 
SIGNIFICANT NEW DIRECTION FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
CANADIAN FORCES, BUT IT FACES MANY CHALLENGES IN 
IMPLEMENTATION: 
 
A. (C)  THE CANADIAN ACQUISITION CYCLE IS NOT POSTURED TO 
FIELD THE SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE VISION IN THE TIMEFRAME GEN 
HILLIER WANTS.  THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM IS HYPER-POLITICIZED, 
HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND MANUFACTURING 
COUNTRY LOBBYING, AND HAS AVERAGED 10 YEARS TO MAKE 
ACQUISITIONS.  EVEN THE NON-CONTROVERSIAL ACQUISITION OF A 
NEW FIXED-WING SEARCH-AND-RESCUE (SAR) AIRCRAFT WHICH WAS 
SUPPOSED TO BE OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND FAST-TRACKED 
FOR DELIVERIES IN 18 MONTHS (BY SEPT 2005) IS MIRED IN 
INTERNAL REVIEW AND THE REQUIREMENTS ARE YET TO BE FIRMLY 
DEFINED.  A MORE TROUBLING EXAMPLE IS THE CASE OF THE 
MARITIME HELICOPTER PROJECT WHICH, AFTER 15 YEARS, FINALLY 
WENT TO CONTRACT IN 2004.  ON 6 APRIL 05, A FEDERAL JUDGE 
OPENED THE SELECTION TO LITIGATION BY THE LOSING COMPETITOR 
AND THAT ACQUISITION PROGRAM MAY BE REOPENED AND DELAY 
FIELDING OF A NEW HELICOPTER UNTIL AFTER THE POINT WHERE 
CURRENT SEA-KINGS WILL HAVE TO BE GROUNDED FOR SAFETY REASONS. 
 
B. (C) CANADA FACES A MAJOR SHORTFALL IN STRATEGIC LIFT ) 
BOTH STRAT AIRLIFT (THEY HAVE NONE) AND SEALIFT (THEY HAVE 
VERY LITTLE).  COSTS OF RENTING STRATAIR ARE INCREASING AT 
THE SAME TIME AVAILABILITY IS DECREASING.  CANADIAN TACTICAL 
AIRLIFT IS ON LIFE SUPPORT WITH ONLY 6 OF 32 C-130S NORMALLY 
AVAILABLE.  CANADA IS ALREADY RENTING CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT TO 
FILL C-130 MISSIONS SUCH AS NORTHERN BASE RESUPPLY, OFFICIAL 
DELEGATION TRAVEL IN CANADA, AND PARACHUTE TRAINING.  CANADA 
DESPERATELY NEEDS AIRLIFT BOTH TO DEPLOY FOR NATO AND 
COALITION OPERATIONS AND TO SUPPORT DOMESTIC OPERATIONS SUCH 
AS MOVEMENT OF SPECIAL FORCES, DISASTER RELIEF, AND 
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED.  GEN HILLIER,S 
VISION OF AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP WITH A BATTALION ON CALL 
IS YEARS AWAY AND MANY DOUBT CANADA CAN EVEN AFFORD THE 
LPD-CLASS SHIP REQUIRED, EVEN IF ONLY ONE IS PURCHASED AND 
BASED FOR OPERATIONS JUST ON THE EAST COAST 
(HALIFAX/SHEARWATER). 
 
C. (C) EVEN GIVEN THE BUDGET PLUS-UP BEGINNING IN FY07, IT 
WILL BE DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO 
CAPITALIZE GEN HILLIER,S VISION.  USED EQUIPMENT MAY SEEM 
ATTRACTIVE FROM A TIMING AND FINANCIAL STANDPOINT, BUT ANY 
USED EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS WILL FACE EXTRAORDINARY SCRUTINY, 
AND LIKELY NOT GAIN POLITICAL APPROVAL, IN THE WAKE OF THE 
SUB FIRE FIASCO WITH A USED UK SUBMARINE (HMCS CHICOUTIMI). 
CANADIANS ARE ADAMANT ABOUT GIVING THEIR TROOPS THE BEST 
EQUIPMENT ) THEY JUST DON,T WANT TO HAVE TO PAY FOR IT. 
 
D. (C) WHILE CANADA DOES WHAT IT NEEDS TO FOR HOMELAND AND 
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE THEY ARE FAR BEHIND THE U.S. IN PREPARING 
FOR ASYMMETRIC THREATS, WORKING DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES (DSCA) CHALLENGES, AND WORKING THE INTERAGENCY 
PROBLEM.  GEN HILLIER WILL WANT TO BENCHMARK FROM NORTHCOM,S 
EXPERIENCE WITH THE IACG.  CANADA DOES ALSO NOT HAVE THE SAME 
PERCEPTION OF NOR SENSE OF URGENCY TO DEAL WITH POTENTIAL 
THREATS.  THEY ARE JUST NOW REACHING IOC WITH A CBRNE 
REACTION TEAM (ONE). 
 
E. (C) CANADIANS EXPECT THE CANADIAN FORCES TO DEFEND CANADA 
AND WILL SEVERELY CRITICIZE THEM IF THE TIME COMES WHEN THEY 
CANNOT, BUT CANADIANS LIKE TO SEE THEIR FORCES ABROAD HELPING 
IN FAILED/FAILING STATES --  AND THE POLITICAL MASTERS DEMAND 
IT.  CANADA HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REFUSE A MISSION ABROAD 
BECAUSE OF HLD, FOR EXAMPLE.  THIS IS WHY GEN HILLIER IS 
FOCUSED ON THE 3-BLOCK WAR  BUBBLE, AND 
PROGRAMS/CAPABILITIES THAT DO NOT CONTRIBUTE WILL BE 
DISCONTINUED.  FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF GEN HILLIER,S FIRST 
ORDERS WAS THE CANCELLATION OF THE ADVANCED SHORT-RANGE 
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE (ASRAAM) TO SAVE USD 150 MILLION FOR OTHER 
PROJECTS.  THIS FLIES IN THE FACE OF THE 
 HOMELAND/CONTINENTAL DEFENSE FIRST, MANTRA AND COULD HAVE 
A SUBSTANTIAL HLD/NORAD IMPACT.  CF-18S WILL BE UNABLE TO 
ATTACK (EXCEPT WITH GUN) IN THE EVENT OF RADAR/AMRAAM FAILURE 
ONCE THEIR AIM-9MS ARE RETIRED.  AMAZINGLY, THE 
HELMET-MOUNTED SIGHT (JHMCS) TO SUPPORT THE NEW ALL-ASPECT IR 
MISSILE IS STILL FUNDED, ALTHOUGH DELIVERIES MAY BE DELAYED 
BECAUSE THE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON MISSED THE 
CONTRACT SUSPENSE.  SAO CANADA AND INDUSTRY (RAYTHEON) ARE 
WORKING ON A PROPOSAL TO EQUIP CF-18S WITH AIM-9X WHICH WOULD 
BE INTEROPERABLE WITH U.S. NORAD FIGHTERS.  A SMALL NUMBER OF 
MISSILES FOR ALERT AIRCRAFT (40-50) COUPLED WITH CAPTIVE 
TRAINING MISSILES (CATM) FOR THE ENTIRE CF-18 FLEET COULD BE 
ACQUIRED FOR USD 10-20 MILLION DEPENDING UPON THE COSTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH REMANUFACTURING RETIRING AIM-9M MISSILES. 
AIM-120 AMRAAM BEDDOWN IS OVER A YEAR BEHIND BECAUSE THE 
CANADIANS DID NOT UPGRADE THEIR WEAPONS STORAGE AREAS (WSA) 
TO THE REQUIRED SECURITY STANDARD FOR THE STORAGE OF AMRAAM. 
CANADIAN MISSILES ARE BEING STORED AT THE RAYTHEON FACTORY IN 
TUCSON, AND THEY WILL LIKELY NOT BE IOC IN CANADA UNTIL MID- 
CY2006.  THE NEW RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (ALR-67V3) HAS YET TO 
BE FUNDED AND IS ALSO AT RISK IN THE CONTEXT THAT IT DOES NOT 
CONTRIBUTE TO DEPLOYED OPERATIONS IN THE 3-BLOCK WAR 
 BUBBLE, WHERE GEN HILLIER ENVISIONS A BENIGN AIR THREAT 
ENVIRONMENT. 
 
F. (C) GEN HILLIER IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER BOTH POLITICAL AND 
BUREAUCRATIC PUSHBACK ON MANY OF HIS INITIATIVES.  THE 
SENATE, AN APPOINTED BODY WITH LIMITED  REAL, POWERS, HAS 
ALREADY SAID ITS DEFENSE COMMITTEES WILL TAKE UP TO A YEAR TO 
DO THEIR OWN REVIEW OF THE DEFENCE REVIEW AND TRAVEL AROUND 
CANADA PULSING THE POPULATION ON THE STRATEGY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION.  THE BUREAUCRATIC CHALLENGES WILL BE TO 
PREVENT THE RETURN OF INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY (LARGELY STAMPED 
OUT IN RECENT YEARS) OVER BUDGET AND ACQUISITIONS AND TO GET 
THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM TO BE RESPONSIVE TO MILITARY 
TIMETABLES. 
 
6. (C) AS YOU KNOW, AS PART OF CANADA,S CAMPAIGN TO CONVEY 
THAT IT IS SERIOUS ABOUT THE DEFENSE REVIEW AND INCREASING 
MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND IN HOPES OF SOFTENING THE BLOW ON 
MISSILE DEFENSE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTED TO BOOSTING 
THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY USD 10 BILLION OVER FIVE YEARS.  OF 
THIS, 90 PERCENT IS IN THE OUTYEARS (FY07-09) AND 35 PERCENT 
OF THE FY05 AND 45 PERCENT OF THE FY06 INCREASES ARE ALREADY 
SLATED FOR RETURN TO THE GOVERNMENT AS PART OF A 
GOVERNMENT-WIDE EFFICIENCY  CLAWBACK.,   WITH THE 
INSTABLITY OF A MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND THE POTENTIAL FOR AN 
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IN THE OUTYEARS, NO ONE IS BETTING THAT 
DEFENSE WILL SEE ALL THE PROMISED RESOURCES.  STILL, IT IS A 
HUGE STEP FORWARD AND FOR THE TIME BEING GEN HILLIER HAS A 
COMMITMENT FROM THE TREASURY BOARD THAT THE USD 10 BILLION 
INCREASE IS A  BASELINE., 
7. (C)  CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES CAPABILITIES:  WHAT LIES 
AHEAD.  THE CANADIAN FORCES, AND THE CANADIAN AIR FORCE IN 
PARTICULAR, ARE STRETCHED AND OVER-TASKED, SURVIVING 
PRIMARILY ON THE QUALITY OF THEIR PEOPLE.  INSIDERS INVOLVED 
WITH DEFENSE ISSUES BELIEVE THAT CANADA IS STILL UNABLE TO 
COME TO GRIPS WITH THE KINDS OF CHOICES IT MUST MAKE IN ORDER 
TO PREVENT ITS MILITARY FROM BECOMING IRRELEVANT.  WHILE 
SMALL NUMBERS OF HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES EXIST, SUCH AS JTF-2 
TIER-1 SOF COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCES (LESS THAN 300 TRIGGER 
PULLERS), CANADA IS UNWILLING TO MOVE INTO THE NICHE AREAS 
WHICH THE BUDGET CAN SUPPORT.  FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, 
CANADIAN FORCES WILL REMAIN AROUND 50,000 - CERTAINLY NOT 
EXCEEDING 60,000.  EVEN WITH A DOUBLING OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
CANADA COULD NOT RECAPITALIZE ITS EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE 
FOR PERHAPS 15 YEARS, AND NO ONE PREDICTS THOSE SORT OF 
FUNDING LEVELS (UNLESS PERHAPS IN THE UNFORTUNATE EVENT 
CANADA WERE TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR 9-11 TYPE ATTACK).  GIVING 
UP ON MAJOR MISSION AREAS, SUCH AS AN OPERATIONAL BLUE WATER 
NAVY (AND MOVING TO SUPPORT/TRANSPORT AND 200 MILE SECURITY 
MISSIONS), IS THE ONLY WAY CANADA CAN FULLY FUND AND SUPPORT 
OPERATIONS WITH EXISTING (OR FORECAST) BUDGETS.  CANADA SEEMS 
DESTINED TO HOBBLE ALONG WITH ONE OF THE SMALLEST MILITARIES 
IN THE WORLD TO FIELD A COMPLETE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. 
THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS CANADIAN FORCES AND THE DEFENSE 
BUDGET HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED SO LONG THERE IS NO WAY WITHIN THE 
CURRENT CANADIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT AND WITH COMPETING 
BUDGETARY PRESSURES FOR THEM TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS 
CAPABILITIES.  THE STRATEGIC TREND IS THAT THE CANADIAN AIR 
FORCE (REDUCING TO 49 AVAILABLE CF-18S WHICH HAVE NOT 
DEPLOYED OUTSIDE AMERICA SINCE 1999) AND THE CANADIAN NAVY 
(THREE READY SHIPS) WILL EVOLVE INTO A HOMELAND/CONTINENTAL 
DEFENSE FORCE.  THE SAME FATE AWAITS THE CANADIAN ARMY UNLESS 
CANADA ACQUIRES STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TO PROVIDE THE MOBILITY 
REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT GEN HILLIER,S VISION. 
 
8. (U) CURRENT ISSUES: 
 
A. (C) HOMELAND DEFENSE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS INAUGURATION, 
THE PM CREATED A NEW MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS CANADA (PSEPC), AN INSTITUTION ANALOGOUS TO THE 
U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.  THE AGENCY'S GOAL IS TO 
PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND COORDINATE EMERGENCY 
RESPONSES. ALTHOUGH THE LINES OF AUTHORITY OF THIS MINISTRY 
ARE STILL BEING DRAWN AND THEY ARE MORE FOCUSED ON INTERNAL 
ORGANIZATION THAN STANDING UP A WORKING ORGANIZATION, IT 
ALREADY HAS ESTABLISHED LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH 
COUNTERPART USG AGENCIES, ALBEIT WITHOUT THE SAME SENSE OF 
URGENCY. 
 
B. (C) MARITIME SECURITY.  ALTHOUGH THIS IS SLOWLY CHANGING, 
CANADA'S MARITIME SECURITY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED IN 
AN UNCOORDINATED FASHION BETWEEN A PLETHORA OF GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES. IN TERMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE (RCMP) IS 
THE ONLY NATIONAL AGENCY WITH A DAY-TO-DAY, LEGISLATED 
MANDATE TO POLICE ALL CANADIAN WATERS.  IN SOME 
CIRCUMSTANCES, CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES (NAVY) CAN AND HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS AND BECOME INVOLVED IN 
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS IF SPECIAL AUTHORITY IS GRANTED 
BY GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD, A 
SUB-AGENCY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS (DFO), 
IS TASKED WITH A COLLECTION OF MARINE PROGRAMS AND SERVICE 
MISSIONS AND DOES NOT FULFILL A LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION. 
 
C. (C/RELCAN) NORAD RENEWAL. THE CREATION OF CANCOM AND THE 
SHORT NEGOTIATING TIMELINE FOR NORAD RENEWAL ARE LIKELY TO 
LIMIT PROGRESS IN EXPANDING NORAD.  ALTHOUGH THE CANADIAN 
GOVERNMENT HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS NORAD EXPANSION INTO 
OTHER DOMAINS, THE SENSITIVE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH MARITIME 
CONTROL (AND THE FACT THAT THE MARITIME OPERATORS DO NOT 
THINK IT NEEDS TO BE CHANGED) WILL LIKELY MEAN LIMITED 
PROGRESS IN NORAD EXPANSION/TRANSFORMATION.  THERE SEEMS TO 
BE CONSENSUS THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EXTENDED AS  GOOD 
UNTIL CANCELLED, AND MOVED AWAY FROM THE REQUIREMENT FOR 
5-YEAR RENEWALS.  THERE IS ALSO WIDE SUPPORT FOR MAKING IT 
EASIER TO INCORPORATE ANY OTHER REQUIRED TASKS ONCE THOSE ARE 
DETERMINED AND TO CONTINUE A BINATIONAL/BILATERAL PLANNING 
FUNCTION TO REPLACE THE BINATIONAL PLANNING GROUP (BPG) WHEN 
ITS MANDATE EXPIRES IN MAY 2006. 
 
9. (U) RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS: 
 
A. (C/RELCAN) WE CONTINUE TO TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE WE CAN 
ASSIST THE CANADIAN FORCES WITH LIFT WHEN NECESSARY.  OUR 
INTEGRATED LOGISTICS OPERATIONS CONCEPT (ILOC) ALLOWS 
CANADIAN MOVEMENTS TO SEAMLESSLY INTEGRATE INTO THE U.S. 
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM WHEN REQUIRED.  OUR ACQUISITION 
CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENT GIVES THE CANADIAN FORCES ACCESS TO 
U.S. LOGISTICS AND LIFT AT THE SAME PRICE WE CHARGE OUR OWN 
FORCES.  WE ARE GLAD YOUR EXPERTS ARE TRAVELING TO SCOTT AFB 
TODAY (29 JUN 05) TO BENCHMARK THEIR REQUIREMENTS OFF OF OUR 
MODELS AT AIR MOBILITY COMMAND AND TRANSCOM.  AFTER ALL WE 
ARE MOVING FROM THE SAME CONTINENT, CROSSING THE SAME OCEANS, 
MOVING MOSTLY THE SAME TYPES OF THINGS TO MOSTLY THE SAME 
PLACES. 
 
B. (C/RELCAN)  NORAD NEEDS TO MAINTAIN FULL-SPECTRUM AIR 
INTERCEPT AND ATTACK CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE 
CRUISE MISSILE THREAT OUTLINED IN THE CANUS THREAT 
ASSESSMENT.  WE UNDERSTAND YOUR PRIORITIES HAVE RESULTED IN 
NOT FIELDING AN IMPROVED INFRARED MISSILE FOR THE CF-18 AT 
THIS TIME.  WE WOULD LIKE TO HELP YOU LOOK FOR AFFORDABLE 
ALTERNATIVES TO FIELD THIS IMPORTANT CAPABILITY AT LEAST FOR 
NORAD ALERT FIGHTERS AND KEEP CANADIAN FIGHTERS INTEROPERABLE 
AND CAPABLE WITH THE LATEST MUNITIONS TO MATCH THEIR IMPROVED 
AVIONICS CAPABILITIES. 
 
C. (C/RELCAN) WE THINK THE SAME CAPABILITIES THAT MAKE US 
STRONG IN THE  HOME, GAME ARE ESSENTIAL TO MAKING OUR 
FORCES CREDIBLE, CAPABLE, AND USABLE FOR THE  AWAY, GAME. 
 
E. (C/RELCAN) MAKING THE NORAD AGREEMENT AN ENDURING 
ARRANGEMENT NOT SUBJECT TO FIVE YEAR RENEWALS WILL SHOW A 
STRONG COMMITMENT BY BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES TO NORAD AS AN 
INSTITUTION, AND REDUCE NORAD,S EXPOSURE TO POLITICALLY 
 OPPORTUNE, CRITICISM. 
 
F. (C/RELCAN) NORAD,S RENEWAL IS A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR 
ADDRESSING GAPS AND SEAMS IN OUR MUTUAL HOMELAND DEFENSE 
EFFORTS.  WHETHER WE INVEST FUTURE COOPERATION BINATIONALLY 
IN NORAD, BI-LATERALLY BETWEEN CANCOM AND NORTHCOM, OR BOTH, 
WE NEED TO ENSURE WE COOPERATE IN A VERY DELIBERATE AND 
COMPREHENSIVE MANNER. 
10. (U) POC FOR THIS MESSAGE IS COL DAVE BRACKETT, DEFENSE 
AND AIR ATTACHE, USDAO OTTAWA. UNCLAS 613-688-5401. STU-III 
613-688-3123.  SIPRNET: DIBRADS(AT)NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL.