US embassy cable - 05HARARE868

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000868 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/Z NEWMAN/DAS WOODS 
OVP FOR NULAND 
NSC FOR ABRAMS, COURVILLE 
USAID FOR M. COPSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC HEAD PREVIEWS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR FRAZER 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1.  MDC President Morgan Tsavngirai met with CDA June 21 to 
discuss his June 22-24 trip to South Africa and his meeting 
with Ambassador Frazier.  Tsvangirai said the purpose of the 
trip was to meet with IRI,s communications expert and 
discuss the party,s message in the wake of another stolen 
election.  He had decided to take advantage of the trip to 
meet the Ambassador and make an appeal for continued U.S. 
support.  He planned to outline the MDC,s plans to confront 
the regime with non-violent acts of disobedience, beginning 
in July.  Tsvangirai said he had no plans to meet with SAG 
representatives while in South Africa, but would meet with 
COSATU and SACP.  End Summary. 
 
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Pretoria Trip 
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2. (C) Tsvangirai said he was going to Pretoria to meet with 
IRI,s communications expert to discuss the party,s message 
and communications strategy in the wake of the stolen March 
31 parliamentary elections and Operation Restore Order.  He 
had decided to take advantage of the trip to meet Ambassador 
Frazier, given the published reports that she would be 
returning to Washington later this year in a senior AF 
position.  He felt it was important to justify continued U.S. 
support, without which the political opposition in Zimbabwe 
would be severely hampered.  He also said he planned to 
emphasize that despite recent setbacks, democracy in Zimbabwe 
remained attainable in the near-term. 
 
3. (C) The CDA said that Tsvangirai should be prepared to 
explain to the Ambassador and other USG interlocutors what 
the MDC was preparing to do and why it had delayed taking 
action for so long following the elections and especially 
following the onset of Operation Restore Order.  He added 
that U.S. support remained firm for the restoration of 
democracy in Zimbabwe, especially given the recent heinous 
behavior of the GOZ toward its own citizens.  That said, the 
MDC would receive a more favorable U.S. reception in 
Washington D.C. and elsewhere once it had concrete actions it 
could point to. 
 
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MDC &Ready to Act8 
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4. (C) Tsvangirai said the &delay8 in the MDC response had 
allowed the party to regroup and plot the way forward.  The 
MDC,s &false subservience8 of the past three months would 
work to the party,s advantage by having lulled the 
government into a sense of complacency.  Moreover, any loss 
of credibility with the populace would be quickly made up 
once the party was seen to be taking action.  That said, he 
did acknowledge that the MDC had initially misunderstood the 
scope and severity of Operation Restore Order, believing it 
would be confined to attacks on the informal economy, and had 
failed to respond to it appropriately. 
 
5. (C) Tsvangirai said the MDC had now settled on an initial 
six-month plan of action, to begin in early July and modeled 
on the successful revolutions in Serbia and Ukraine.  The MDC 
would gradually raise the pressure on the regime through 
non-violent acts of civil disobedience.  Should this be met 
with violence, the MDC would nonetheless continue non-violent 
protests.  This plan would put into effect the &paradigm 
shift8 -- to a democratic resistance movement -- that the 
party had decided was needed following the election.  The MDC 
would continue to openly contest elections but would use 
covert acts to force the GOZ to allow the elections to be 
free and fair.  These actions would focus on the food and 
fuel shortages and would also seek to spark opposition to the 
government over other &trigger8 issues such as the proposed 
changes to the constitution. 
 
6. (C) Tsvangirai said the MDC would lead the &Broad 
Alliance8 of democratic forces in these actions.  The MDC 
had been debating internally how to respond to the elections. 
 The debate had been largely over what role the MDC should 
play within the alliance.  However, the failure of the recent 
stay-away had underscored the central role the MDC had to 
play if the populace were to respond.  Tsavngirai 
acknowledged that not everyone in the party,s leadership was 
prepared to sacrifice on the people,s behalf, courting 
arrest and torture or worse.  However, for this campaign to 
succeed the party,s leaders would have to be seen to be 
taking risks upfront. 
 
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International Role 
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7. (C) The CDA asked what role the MDC saw for the 
international community in its plans.  Tsvangirai responded 
that U.S. support was critical not just in providing 
resources but in maintaining the government,s continued 
isolation.  He feared that many countries were in favor of a 
softer approach toward the GOZ and ZANU-PF and were prepared 
to reengage.  The CDA said that may have been the case 
immediately after the election but was no longer the case 
with Operation Restore Order having done serious damage to 
the GOZ,s international reputation. 
 
8. (C) In response to the CDA,s question, Tsvangirai said he 
had no plans to meet with SAG representatives while in 
Pretoria but would meet with COSATU and SACP representatives. 
 The CDA noted that the outgoing SAG Ambassador had 
criticized Operation Restore Order (septel) and that 
Tsvangirai and the MDC might at least find parts of the SAG 
 
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receptive to a renewed MDC approach. 
 
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Comment 
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9. (C) Beyond a start date, there was little new in 
Tsvangirai,s description of the MDC,s plans for civil 
 
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disobedience, most of which he had briefed us on during our 
last meeting in late May.  However, what was new was a 
growing realization on his part that the lack of MDC 
activity, and especially its preoccupation with its internal 
politics, had cost the party credibility not just with 
Zimbabweans, but with the international community as well and 
with us in particular.  In addition, we would note that in 
citing Serbia and Ukraine as examples, Tsvangirai overlooks 
that in both cases flawed elections were the key trigger 
event.  We would argue that Operation Restore Order might 
also have served such a purpose in Zimbabwe.  By contrast, we 
find it difficult to imagine tens of thousands taking to the 
streets in protest over constitutional changes.  The MDC may 
very well have already missed their best chances to inspire 
widespread popular discontent. 
SCHULTZ