US embassy cable - 02HARARE1872

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STATUS OF FOOD RELIEF IN ZIMBABWE

Identifier: 02HARARE1872
Wikileaks: View 02HARARE1872 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2002-08-16 09:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PHUM EAID ASEC ZI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001872 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, EAID, ASEC, ZI 
SUBJECT: STATUS OF FOOD RELIEF IN ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: A. HARARE 1802 
     B. HARARE 1812 
     C. HARARE 1820 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer for reasons 1.5 b/d 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (C) The Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ), WFP, U.S, UK, EU and 
other NGOs are undertaking separate food relief efforts in 
Zimbabwe.  The targets of the WFP, U.S., UK, EU and NGO 
programs are the most vulnerable Zimbabweans.  We have heard 
numerous reports that the GOZ distributes food to Zanu-PF 
supporters, but there is no evidence that political 
affiliation has influenced who gets U.S. food.  A range of 
impediments, however, have hindered distribution of U.S. food 
through the WFP program, including false press reports, 
politicians' media statements implying they are involved in 
the NGO distribution process, and limited NGO capacity.  An 
independent monitoring system is required to investigate and 
prevent abuse, and we are working actively with other donors 
in Harare to develop such a mechanism.  USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
coordination with OCHA and provision of funds for monitoring 
are also critical.  Observers agree that even with planned 
increases in the coming months, demand for food will outstrip 
supply of food assistance.  End Summary. 
 
Who's Distributing Food Here? 
----------------------------- 
2. (U) The GOZ, WFP, U.S, UK, EU and other NGOs are 
undertaking separate food relief efforts in various areas of 
the country.  Though we are unclear on all of the precise 
sites, the GOZ is selling, exchanging for work, and handing 
out maize meal through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
selectively in areas where it appears that Zanu-PF has done 
well in recent elections.  The U.S. is currently contributing 
about 40 percent of the WFP program which contracts four NGOs 
for distribution: Care International (southeastern 
provinces), Christian Care (north and eastern provinces), 
World Vision (southwest, southeast, and northeast provinces) 
and the Zimbabwean NGO ORAP (southern and western provinces). 
 The U.S. also has a bilateral program with World Vision (see 
areas above).  The UK and EU have their own bilateral 
programs.  In addition, there are other NGOs operating 
independently of these efforts: Save the Children Fund UK 
(western provinces), Oxfam (central provinces), Plan (eastern 
provinces), and HelpAge (central provinces). 
 
Distribution Process and Criteria 
--------------------------------- 
3. (U) The fundamental criterion of all non-GOZ efforts is 
targeting the most vulnerable Zimbabweans.  NGOs work with 
local government officials (councilors etc.) traditional 
leaders, church groups, and local NGOs to identify recipients 
and reach a consensus list of beneficiaries.  Some basic 
criteria are: lack of livestock, lack of income, single 
mothers, non-working parents, orphans, HIV affected, elderly, 
chronically ill, and disabled.  Once a list is developed, it 
is discussed at a town meeting where any local resident can 
comment, or appeal his case for inclusion.  Stocks may run 
out before all eligible people are served, and the 
identification process is subject to error or abuse, but it 
is community based, and incorporates checks and balances that 
allow for reconsideration and appeal. 
 
U.S. Food 
--------- 
4. (C) There have been numerous reports in the local press, 
and some Embassy election observers witnessed first hand the 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB) distributing food primarily or 
entirely to ruling party supporters.  However, there is no 
evidence that political affiliation has influenced who gets 
U.S.-donated food.  There is, furthermore, no indication that 
so-called war vets have taken over feeding sites, or 
padlocked any warehouses with U.S. food, or hijacked trucks 
carrying U.S. food.  However, food assistance is becoming a 
significant element in a rhetorical tug-of-war between 
Zanu-PF and the MDC, which hampers the ability of contracting 
NGOs to distribute U.S. food, and occasionally has delayed 
distribution. 
 
Political Rhetoric and the Impact on Food Distribution 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
5. (U) On August 6, Poloff met with Reverend Matonga, 
Director of Christian Care in Zimbabwe, to discuss a recent 
press report that war vets had skewed the list of Christian 
Care food recipients in Muzarabani (Mashonaland Central 
province) in favor of Zanu-PF supporters.  Christian Care 
distributed 48 metric tons of WFP food in Muzarabani in July. 
 According to Matonga, the story was a complete fabrication 
by the MDC, and he has been trying unsuccessfully to get a 
meeting with MDC officials to set the record straight. 
Christian Care has not had any difficulties with Zanu-PF 
supporters since February 2000 when two of its employees were 
beaten by war vets.  The organization subsequently received 
an apology from the provincial governor. 
 
6. (U) Political statements from officials of both political 
parties--although ZANU-PF is the worst culprit--illustrate 
the charged environment in which food distribution is taking 
place, and how politicians from both sides have fueled 
allegations of politicization.  In May, for instance, the 
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and MP Abednico Ncube 
reportedly told villagers in Gwanda that "everyone will 
receive food".  World Vision halted their Gwanda program, and 
was forced to re-explain the beneficiary criteria to excluded 
angry villagers who thought they would receive food.  Ncube 
subsequently corrected that statement publicly, but told 
villagers in Matabeleland in July that maize "will be 
available only to those who dump the opposition and work with 
ZANU-PF", and the party would "start feeding its children 
before turning to those of the MDC".  On July 20, ZANU-PF MP 
for Beitbridge, Kembo Mohadi, warned NGOs distributing food 
in Gwanda that they would have to follow government 
directives, and their equipment would soon be taken over by 
local GOZ officials.  In an August 2 BBC article, Didymus 
Mutasa, ZANU-PF Secretary for External Relations, complained 
that Western influence comes along with donor food 
distribution, and suggested that any food aid should be 
distributed through government mechanisms.  See Ref. B for 
further official objections to NGO food distribution. 
 
7. (U) On August 6, under the headline, "Food Aid Prolongs 
Nation's Suffering", the independent "Financial Gazette" 
commented that food aid is perpetuating and prolonging deeper 
suffering by giving Zimbabweans a false sense of food 
security when instead they should be confronting the 
political causes of their starvation. 
 
Straining NGO Resources 
----------------------- 
8. (C) Rudo Kwaramba, World Vision Country Director, has been 
occupied with responding to questions from the international 
community, setting the record straight in the local media 
with interviews and press briefings, and persuading offending 
politicians to correct their statements, all of which takes 
time away from actually feeding the hungry.  WFP Director 
Kevin Farrell also complained that checking every instance of 
abuse is consuming a significant percentage of their time. 
 
Monitoring Mechanism 
-------------------- 
9. (C) USAID, the UK's DFID, EU and WFP agree that an 
independent monitoring mechanism is required to investigate 
and prevent abuse.  We understand that USAID/DCHA/OFDA in 
Washington is pursuing, with the UN, the establishment of a 
permanent OCHA presence here to handle this task.  The USAID 
Mission here is working with other donors to develop a 
strategy and mechanism for establishing such an independent 
monitoring mechanism, in conjunction with local NGOs. 
FOSENET, a consortium of local NGOs, has already initiated a 
preliminary aid monitoring network with funding from several 
donors. 
 
Ramp-Up - Bottlenecks? 
---------------------- 
10. (U) In conjunction with the new expanded consolidated 
appeals, the WFP is in the process of expanding its program 
coverage and partner NGOs.  WFP's plan is to increase its 
food distribution from its current level of about 10,000 
metric tons per month, to 50,000 metric tons per month by 
December 2002.  The national consumption is 135,000 to 
150,000 metric tons per month.  According to Kevin Farrell, 
WFP is working to designate more NGOs and registering them 
with the GOZ, and ramping-up the capacities of the NGOs 
currently registered.  Farrell believes currently registered 
NGOs are reluctant to increase their staffs and logistics in 
advance of the food actually arriving in country. 
 
11. (U) Under the enhanced WFP program, World Vision is 
supposed to increase distribution to 12,186 metric tons a 
month by December 2002.  However, World Vision finds the 
terms of the WFP program difficult.  According to Kwaramba, 
they receive a fixed fee of US$24,000 per month, and a 
variable fee US$39.00 per ton distributed.  Submitting 
invoices to get reimbursed for the variable fee takes time, 
thus they are cash strapped at the same moment when they are 
trying to scale-up their operations.  Also, their agreement 
with WFP was to distribute 2,600 metric tons of food for the 
month of July.  But WFP only delivered 2,100 metric tons. 
Thus World Vision laid out the logistical costs to distribute 
2,600 metric tons--but will only be paid for their actual 
distribution of 2,100.  Additionally, WFP is proposing terms 
for the enhanced program that would be even worse from the 
World Vision perspective: an advance with most of the payment 
by variable fee, and no fixed fee.  World Vision finds the 
terms of the USAID bilateral program much easier--USAID hands 
over the food and the money to distribute it at the outset. 
 
Severity of the Crisis 
---------------------- 
12. (C) Jean-Claude Mukadi, World Vision Relief Manager, 
thinks that even the planned increase in supply of relief 
food will not meet demand.  That is, if WFP were able to 
ramp-up to 50,000 metric tons a month by the end of the year, 
and the GMB distributes what they have in stock and in the 
pipeline, and the smaller NGO and other programs continue or 
are increased as planned--still there will not be enough. 
The already high numbers of people suffering from 
malnutrition are increasing daily, in one month, people will 
be much worse Mukadi cautioned. (Note: We do not yet have 
concrete malnutrition rates.  End Note.)  Ref. A also 
predicts a shortfall. 
 
Comment 
------- 
13. (C) The good news is that the barriers to GMO food 
donations are coming down, (Ref. C), and the beneficiary 
identification process and criteria are mostly transparent. 
In addition, outright handing over of food along political 
lines seems confined to the GOZ's own distribution programs. 
An independent monitoring agency would undoubtedly contribute 
to more equitable distribution, and we will continue to press 
this issue actively.  However, the crisis is worsening, 
putting strain on NGOs to increase capacity.  At the same 
time responding to increased political rhetoric is also 
straining limited NGO resources, necessarily taking time away 
from actual food distribution.  End Comment. 
SULLIVAN 

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