US embassy cable - 05MANAMA892

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BAHRAIN: PROMOTING U.S. PRIORITIES ON UN REFORM

Identifier: 05MANAMA892
Wikileaks: View 05MANAMA892 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Manama
Created: 2005-06-22 13:53:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KUNR PREL PGOV BA UNSC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

221353Z Jun 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000892 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2015 
TAGS: KUNR, PREL, PGOV, BA, UNSC 
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN:  PROMOTING U.S. PRIORITIES ON UN REFORM 
 
REF: A. STATE 114051 
 
     B. STATE 111657 
     C. STATE 111637 
 
Classified by A/DCM Helen H. Hahn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Pol/Econ chief June 21 delivered reftel demarches on 
promoting U.S. priorities on UN reform to MFA Director for 
International Organization Affairs Ghassan Shaikho.  (Note: 
Ambassador will deliver Ref B demarche to Foreign Minister 
Shaikh Mohammed following the Minister's return to Bahrain 
from Europe.)  Shaikho promised to read through Ref A and C 
non-papers in detail, and offered comments on several of the 
issues. 
 
2.  (C) Shaikho gave his enthusiastic agreement, and relaxed 
considerably, upon learning that the USG wants to move 
forward on those issues where we can be successful while 
continuing to work on other issues that will take more time. 
He said there was no reason to hold up agreement on some 
items until there was agreement on all. 
 
3.  (C) On the Human Rights Council proposal, Shaikho 
wondered about the criteria the Council would use to label a 
human rights abuser, and suggested it be flexible enough to 
accommodate unexpected situations.  He agreed that the goal 
should be to prevent flagrant offenders from joining the 
Council.  On the point regarding voting Council members out, 
he thought this could be extremely difficult.  A "gentler" 
way would be to remove them after their term on the Council 
runs out, thus using an election rather than a confrontation 
in the Council to remove them.  He agreed on keeping the 
Council in Geneva. 
 
4.  (C) Regarding the Democracy Fund, Shaikho said that 
Bahrain is supportive but the MFA did not instruct the 
Bahraini PermRep to sign the letter to the SYG because of 
concern that signing the letter obligated or implied that the 
country would provide financial support for the Fund. 
Bahrain was not able to do this but is looking for the best 
way to support the Fund politically. 
 
5.  (C) Shaikho asked about the relationship between the 
proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 
(CCIT) and the 12 UN conventions on terrorism.  He 
recommended that the UNSC be the monitoring/supervisory body 
for adherence to the CCIT. 
 
6.  (C) Shaikho concurred with the U.S. message that there is 
no need to rush into decisions on UNSC reform, saying that 
the U.S. ideas "suit Bahrain well."  He suggested dealing 
with Security Council reform slowly, on "a low flame."  He 
understood U.S. support for Japan only, but asked if it was 
realistic to expect Japan to join the UNSC without the other 
members of the Group of Four.  He thought it better to take 
some time and develop a package of reform that all could 
agree on rather than pushing for a quick decision.  Shaikho 
commented that, given the U.S. position, Germany and Japan 
would likely put off a vote in the UNGA to avoid being 
embarrassed. 
 
MONROE 

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