US embassy cable - 05SANAA1723

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KISL, MOPS, YM 
SUBJECT: SAADA REBELLION FOCUSES ATTENTION ON YEMEN'S ZAYDI 
SHIA 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The on-going Shabab al-Moumineen (Believing 
Youth) rebellion against the Yemeni regime has brought 
international attention to Yemen's Zaydi Shia population. 
The line between Sunni and Shia is blurred in Yemen; Sunnis 
and Shiites pray in the same mosques, and identity is derived 
from tribe rather than sect.  Confusion exists even among 
Yemenis on what it actually means to be Zaydi, and about the 
difference between Zaydi teachings and the fundamentalist 
theology of Badr Eddine al-Houthi, founder of the Believing 
Youth.  Although the conflict between the ROYG and the Shabab 
is political and not religious in nature, the fighting in 
Saada has stirred up questions about the nature of the 
Sunni-Shia divide in Yemen, and whether or not it exists at 
all.  End Summary. 
 
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Yemen's Zaydi Shia 
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2. (U) Approximately 75 percent of Yemenis are Sunni Muslims 
of the Shafi'i school.  The Remaining 25 percent are Shia of 
the Zaydi sect.  Among Shia, Zaydis are considered the most 
moderate and the closest to Sunni theology.  Zaydi's believe 
neither in the infallibility of the Imams, nor in their 
divine guidance. 
 
3. (U) Zaydis come from the "fiver" school of Shia, based on 
the belief that there were only five legitimate Imams 
following the death of the Prophet Muhammed.  The 
overwhelming number of Yemeni Zaydis reside in the northern 
governorates -- the seat of tribal power.  The regime's 
ruling elite, including President Saleh, Speaker of 
Parliament Abdullah al-Ahmar, and General Ali Mohsen 
al-Ahmar, are of Zaydi origin.  Until the Yemen Revolution 
defeated the Imamate in 1962, Zaydi Imams ruled Yemen. 
Members of the ruling family, referred to as &Sayeds,8 
claimed to be Hashemites or direct descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammed. 
 
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Shia and Sunni in Yemen: What's the Difference? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (C) Yemen's Zaydis and Shafi'is pray in the same mosques 
and practice the same customs.  Yemen's Zaydis do not 
celebrate Ashura, the holiest of Shia occasions, with the 
traditional solumn procession and self-flagellation witnessed 
in other Arab contries. Last year in Sanaa, Ashura was 
celebrated with a fireworks display.  On matters of Islamic 
law, Zaydis are actually closer to Sunni Shafi'i beliefs than 
to other Shia sects.  Zaydis in Yemen have no significant 
institutional relationships or ties to the world's preeminent 
Shia leaders and their organizations -- Lebanon's Sheikh 
Fadlallah, Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and Supreme Leader 
of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei. 
 
5. (C) Unlike other nations with significant Shia minorities, 
Yemen has no history of a distinct Shia community with its 
own religious, social, or political agenda.  Zaydi Sheikh 
al-Ahmar heads the Islamic-based reform party Islah, and 
powerful Commander of the Northwestern Region, General Ali 
Mohsen, is known for his Salafi fundamentalist beliefs.  Both 
are Zaydi, yet hold leadership positions in Sunni political 
and religious movements. 
 
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Shabab al-Moumineen: What Sort of Shia are They? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6. (SBU) The "Shabab" follow the teachings of slain rebel 
leader Hussein Badr Eddin al-Houthi, who is from a prominent 
Zaydi and Hashemite family.  Al-Houthi's teachings can be 
described as "homemade" twelver Shia, the mainstream Shia 
found in Iran and throughout the Middle East.  Al-Houthi 
studied at the Badr Religious Center, founded with Saleh's 
tacit endorsement by Yemeni theologian al-Hatwari in 1997. 
Hatwari taught the twelver brand of Shia, elements of which 
al-Houthi took back to followers in Saada - with a Royal 
twist.  Al-Houthi preached that only descendant of a 
Hashemite family from the Sayed class (such as himself) could 
be a legitimate ruler of Yemen.  WHen this belief was made 
public, it naturally drew the attention of the regime. 
 
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Shia Leaders in Iraq and Iran Condemn ROYG 
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7. (U) Misunderstanding about Yemeni Zaydi practices and 
beliefs have led some in the regional and international 
communities to view the Saada conflict as Sunni versus Shia. 
In response to a letter from al-Houthi the father, Iraq,s 
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a statement in May 
condemning the ROYG for the "brutal massacre" of Shia in 
Saada.  The Najaf Muslim Council also described the regime's 
efforts to put down the al-Houthi rebellion as a "war on Shia 
Islam." 
 
8. (C) Head of the Qom Religious Seminary in Iran, Grand 
Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabilli, referred to ROYG efforts to 
defeat the insurgency as  "the slaughter of women and 
children solely for being Shiite."  The Iranian response led 
to a hastily arranged visit to Tehran by Foreign Minister 
Qirbi on May 24-25.  A senior member of Qirbi,s staff told 
Pol/Econ Chief following the FM,s return that the purpose of 
Qirbi,s visit was to correct Iranian misperceptions about 
the nature the Saada conflict. 
 
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Qirbi Sets the Record Straight 
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9. (C) Qirbi's message to Tehran appears to have had an 
effect. Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security 
Council, Hassan Rawhani, visited Sanaa to meet ROYG officials 
less than two weeks after Qirbi's trip.  In a public 
statement on June 9 Rawhani emphasized that "the Iranian 
Government could not be held responsible for statements made 
by Iranian Clergy."  (Comment: leaving aside that the clergy 
in Iran run the Government, Rawhani's comment signals Tehran 
is distancing itself from claims that Sadaa conflict is a war 
against Shia.  End Coment.) 
 
10. (C) Comment.  The al-Houthi rebels' ultimate political 
goal is unclear.  Statements and writings of both Hussein 
Badr Eddin al-Houthi, killed at the end of the first phases 
of the conflict last summer, as well as those of his father 
Hussein, suggest that they favor the revival of the Imanate 
theocracy with an anti-western twist.  The ROYG claims that 
al-Houthi followers envision an Islamic Regime based on the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.  So far, the insurgency's biggest 
accomplishment is being a serious thorn in Saleh's side. 
More than just an irritant, the al-Houthi movement has forced 
the regime to divert considerable military resource and 
political attention to the countering the "Shabab."  End 
Comment. 
Khoury