US embassy cable - 05CARACAS1865

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR C. BARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EPET, MOPS, VE 
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA-DUTCH ANTILLES: SOME IDEAS 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 01556 
 
Classified By: Amb. William R. Brownfield for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) The Ambassador discussed Dutch concerns about 
Venezuelan intentions vis-a-vis the Netherlands Antilles with 
his Dutch counterpart June 20.  The Ambassadors agreed to 
submit to their capital suggestions for how to respond to GoV 
assertiveness in the Antilles.  The suggestions include a 
significant U.S. Navy ship (carrier) visit, high-profile USG 
counterdrug related visit, conclusion of a bilateral 
U.S.-Antilles agreement, fostering better Colombia-Antilles 
links, and exploring posible U.S. participation in Curacao's 
Isla refinery.  The viability of these suggestions is to be 
determined, but each would help us sharpen our efforts to 
contain President Hugo Chavez and his revolution.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador met with Dutch Ambassador Dirk den Haas 
June 20 to follow up reftel conversations in The Hague about 
Dutch sensitivities in the Netherlands Antilles.  He 
acknowledged that he has been warning his government over the 
past year of growing signals of Chavez assertiveness in the 
Dutch Antilles.  Den Haas thought there was some domestic 
support in Curacao for the Chavez movement and vision.  He 
warned that GONL room for engagement in the Antilles was 
circumscribed by island sensitivities and desire for 
operational independence, and that he did not want to take 
steps that would give Chavez a big target to criticize in 
terms of Dutch provocation. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassadors agreed they would send five ideas back 
to capitals for possible consideration on how to respond to 
GOV assertiveness in the Antilles: 
 
--Port call by U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group.  Den Haas 
thought this would send a very clear signal to Chavez, a man 
who does not catch subtle messages.  Chavez accused us of 
sending a carrier four months ago during the USS Saipan 
visit; why not send a real one this time?  Chavez would 
scream, but he would grasp the underlying deterrence message. 
 The local governments would have to agree, but den Haas 
thought the economic value of a ship visit would produce an 
invitation.  Any large U.S. Navy ship visit would send a 
message; a carrier would send it emphatically. 
 
--High profile visit to Curacao/Aruba by senior USG official. 
 After some discussion, den Haas agreed that a USG official 
responsible for counterdrug efforts would be the best fit. 
Possibilities: the Attorney General, ONDCP Director, DEA 
Administrator, or Commander USSouthernCommand.  The very fact 
of the visit would advertise close cooperation between the 
US, Netherlands, and Antilles.  Chavez would get the message. 
 
--Conclude a USG agreement with Netherlands Antilles.  Den 
Haas said it did not really matter what the agreement 
covered.  Counterdrug cooperation, customs, trade, mutual 
legal assistance, bilateral investment:  anything would do. 
The idea was to signal to Chavez that the relationship 
between the US and Antilles was close, and getting closer. 
 
--Nudge Antilles and Colombia closer together.  One sure way 
to get Chavez,s goat was to encourage closer contact between 
Colombia and Aruba/Dutch Antilles.  Den Haas did not know the 
extent of the current contact or cooperation with Colombia, 
but any increase would be sure to catch Chavez,s attention. 
 
--Transferring Curacao refinery lease to a U.S. company.  The 
Isla Refinery, owned according to den Haas by the Curacao (as 
opposed to Netherlands Antilles) government, has a long term 
lease with Venezuelan national oil company PDVSA.  The lease 
calls for 50-50 split in expenses.  Den Haas does not believe 
it is a happy partnership.  He believes Curacao would be 
delighted to abrogate and sign with a US partner.  He 
believes the current deficit in worldwide refining capacity 
might offer possibilities. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
4. (C) Among EU ambassadors resident in Caracas, den Haas is 
one of the toughest on Chavez, although that is not setting 
the bar very high.  He promised to send these ideas to The 
Hague just as we would send them to Washington.  We take no 
position from Caracas on what would work well in the 
Netherlands, Dutch Antilles, or Aruba.  But each of these 
ideas would help us sharpen our efforts to contain Mr. Chavez 
and his revolution. 
Brownfield 
 
 
NNNN 
      2005CARACA01865 - CONFIDENTIAL