US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI594

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GENERAL ABIZAID TO PRESIDENT GUELLEH: LET'S MOVE FORWARD ON BASE NEGOTIATIONS

Identifier: 05DJIBOUTI594
Wikileaks: View 05DJIBOUTI594 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2005-06-21 09:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV MARR MASS DJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
MILITARY TREAT AS SPECAT 
 
STATE FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY CONSTANCE NEWMAN 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR ISA/AF DAS THERESA WHELAN 
NSC FOR AF DIRECTOR DR. CINDY COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MASS, DJ 
SUBJECT: GENERAL ABIZAID TO PRESIDENT GUELLEH: LET'S MOVE 
FORWARD ON BASE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE. 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  During his June 19-20 visit to Djibouti, 
General John P. Abizaid asked Djiboutian President Ismail 
Omar Guelleh for help in moving forward the process of base 
lease renewal negotiations for Camp Lemonier and closing a 
deal. He told Guelleh he would convey to President Bush how 
valuable the U.S. military presence and operation in 
Djibouti is to U.S. goals.  Guelleh stated that Djibouti 
had agreed to meet all U.S. requirements in renewal talks 
to date and that the ball was now in the U.S. court, 
including expectation of a response from President Bush to 
the "background" letter Guelleh had sent to him on base 
talks.  He said Djibouti wanted to continue support and 
service to the U.S., if the same is willed from the United 
States.  Guelleh expressed fear that the confidence and 
good will that had been built up over a long period, going 
back to 1993 between the U.S. and Djibouti, may now be 
threatened by those, in his view, who preferred to "haggle" 
over small details rather than see the larger picture.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) General John P. Abizaid, on a June 19-20 visit to 
Djibouti, met morning of June 20 with President Ismail Omar 
Guelleh at Guelleh's offices.  Ambassador, Combined Joint 
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Commander General 
Timothy Ghormley, Embassy U.S. Liaison Officer Major Brian 
Jenkins, and the Director or Djibouti's National Security 
Services, Hassan Said Khaireh, were in attendance. 
 
3. (C) President Guelleh initiated, with an inquiry on the 
situation on the ground in Iraq. He asked if General 
Abizaid saw eventual civil war breaking out between Sunnis 
and Shias there.  Guelleh said only Shias, who comprised 
the core ranks of the military and police, were being 
systematically targeted.  Sunnis appear unwilling to accept 
rule by Shia majority and also see Kurds as a threat. 
General Abizaid acknowledged the difficulties, but 
reassured Guelleh that despite all the pessimism emanating 
from the news media, the confidence of commanders on the 
ground is high. 
 
4. (C) General Abizaid took the opportunity to thank 
Guelleh for the level and consistency of Djibouti's support 
of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.  The presence of U.S. 
forces on the ground, he told Guelleh, is good for security 
in the region.  Abizaid also noted the good work being done 
by members of Djibouti's security services.  At the same 
time, Abizaid made clear to Guelleh that current 
uncertainty in negotiations for renewal of the base lease 
agreement is a cause for concern regarding the longevity of 
the U.S. base at Camp Lemonier.  He asked for President 
Guelleh's support in moving the process of negotiations 
forward. Abizaid explained that the longer the period of 
negotiations draws out, the greater the requirement that 
he, as commander, consider other options for his forces 
despite his desire to maintain operations in Djibouti. 
 
5. (C) Guelleh responded that the American presence in 
Djibouti has been a determining factor for stability and 
peace in the region.  Since the U.S. military set up a base 
of operations in Djibouti, confidence levels of foreign 
investors have increased.  He expressed pleasure in this 
and reiterated that, as president, he knew where he wanted 
to take Djibouti and he knew exactly what he was doing in 
moving in the directions he had chosen.  External threats 
are out there, yet the U.S. presence is a factor in the 
confidence investors have in the country in spite of those 
threats.  Guelleh further acknowledged the impact of 
U.S.-Djibouti cooperation in this state of affairs by 
noting that Djibouti, the United States military, and the 
United States intelligence community had been working in 
tandem since 2001, and even back to 1993, during the Aideed 
era in Mogadishu.  Djibouti, he added, had always supported 
and serviced U.S. policy in the region.  "We have decided 
to continue that support and service," he said, "if the 
same is willed from your side." 
 
6. (C) Guelleh went on to say that he feared the confidence 
and good will that had been built up over such a long 
period of time was now being threatened by those who wish 
to engage in petty "Chinese-style" bargaining.  He 
explained that in this style of bargaining, one can haggle 
for five hours over a price and in the end find that one 
has only managed to save a negligible sum.  "The people 
from the Pentagon," he said, "are of this spirit 
(mindset)."  Guelleh added that while this "spirit" is not 
a good one and exists at the Pentagon, the overall 
friendship of Djibouti with the United States is good.  "We 
are the smallest and the poorest of countries," Guelleh 
told Abizaid, "but we are the most desiring of good 
relations." 
 
7. (C) Guelleh told Abizaid that he had written a letter to 
President Bush "to give him some background" on the 
negotiations.   In addition, he had explained that a 
delegation had come to Djibouti to conduct negotiations and 
that Djibouti had accepted all that the delegation said the 
U.S. needed.  According to Guelleh, "the ball was now in 
the court" of the United States and he asked that General 
Abizaid convey to President Bush that it was Djibouti's 
desire to continue to support U.S. requirements here. 
 
8. (C) General Abizaid responded that he would like to see 
the relationship with Djibouti regularized.  He noted 
excellent support projects already underway in Djibouti, 
such as the Doraleh port, which the U.S. Navy will use and 
which he, personally, had visited the day prior.  In 
addition, Abizaid said, the presence of the base and the 
increase in the number of high-level official visitors 
traveling through Djibouti had created opportunities to 
move further.  He indicated his willingness to look at 
other defense needs for Djibouti as the relationship 
progresses. Abizaid also said both sides should not let 
small issues cloud the larger vision. 
 
9. (C) Guelleh responded that Djibouti's confidence is high 
and that his country's willingness to facilitate the U.S. 
military's work in the region is fulsome. He pledged that 
his country would make the work of the U.S. in Djibouti 
smooth.  He reiterated that the U.S. needed to think about 
the larger picture, rather than small details, and urged 
that U.S. lawmakers be made aware of this.  Abizaid pledged 
to convey to President Bush how valuable the U.S. military 
presence and operation in Djibouti is to U.S. goals. 
 
10. (C) Guelleh told Abizaid that Djibouti was closely 
monitoring events in Somalia, in cooperation with other 
intelligence communities.  He said Djibouti wants to "wipe 
out" all the small terrorist cells and bring about peace 
and stability there.  Some problems remain, Guelleh 
continued, on the border between Ethiopia and Somalia.  In 
addition, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden remain quite 
"destabilizing."  Abizaid reassured that U.S. naval forces 
have been working in these areas, specifically against 
piracy and the flow of narcotics.  He said he also 
recognized that with peace will come stability in Somalia. 
 
11. (C) In closing, Abizaid advised Guelleh that his 
message back will be "let us close the deal and move 
forward."  President Guelleh replied that Djibouti is 
waiting for a response from the U.S. side, and 
specifically, for a reply from President Bush to his 
letter.  He also asked Abizaid to convey to President Bush 
the need for him to "give appropriate instructions on this 
matter to his people." 
 
12. (C) Comment:  Guelleh consented to a meeting with 
General Abizaid after the latter agreed to delay his 
departure from Djibouti by two hours to accommodate the 
President's schedule.  In addition, businessman Abdurahman 
Boreh, with a considerable economic stake in projects that 
have grown out of investor confidence in Djibouti as a 
result of the U.S. presence here, acted as facilitator. 
Boreh told us that President Guelleh had sought rental 
payments of USD 50 million annually, as conveyed in the 
letter to President Bush, because it would be impossible 
for the President to seek less than what France (with less 
territory) is paying for its presence (30 million euros 
annually, or approximately USD 42 million.)  The U.S., 
Boreh said, would have the same benefits as France -- range 
and airport use, etc.-- but have access to a far larger 
stretch of land.  Boreh did not sit in on the meeting he 
helped facilitate.  End comment. 
 
13. (U) General Abizaid has cleared this message. 
RAGSDALE 

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