US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA1013

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001013 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KPKO, PGOV, CG 
SUBJECT: REDUCED ITURI MILITIAS SHOWING RENEWED LIFE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d). 
 
1.  (U) During his recent visit to the DRC (septel), UN DPKO 
Africa Chief Dmitry Titov spoke at some length regarding 
continuing security concerns in Ituri District.  These 
comments echo those of MONUC, GDRC, and international 
community representatives of renewed dangers in the key 
northeastern DRC district. 
 
Substantial Progress 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) For the past several months, MONUC has adopted a much 
more aggressive posture in Ituri District, actively using its 
mandate to protect the civilian population and Chapter 7 
authorities, and with active cooperation to the extent 
possible with the FARDC First Integrated Brigade.  The risks 
in Ituri, and MONUC,s new aggressive posture, are reflected 
in the deaths of 12 MONUC soldiers in Ituri District thus far 
this year as a result of combat operations.  Nonetheless, the 
effort has won broad endorsement by international community 
representatives, GDRC officials and, by all apparent 
accounts, the great majority of the Ituri population. 
Combined with arrests by the GDRC of many of the most 
notorious former warlord leaders, substantial progress in 
Ituri has been recorded.  Roughly 14,000 former militia 
combatants have submitted to disarmament programs.  The 
former unchallenged control of most of the district by 
various armed militias has begun to crack, along with the 
solid control of militias of the DRC/Uganda border with its 
lucrative customs revenues.  MONUC officials in Kinshasa 
estimate that there are only about 1,000 - 1,500 armed 
militia still operating in the district. 
 
But All is Reversible 
------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Recent reporting from Ituri unfortunately suggests 
renewed threats.  Most notably, Titov reported extensive 
evidence that remaining Ituri militia are clearly showing new 
signs of consolidation, better operational control, and 
improved weaponry.  This echoes very recent comments from 
many MONUC officials that Ituri militia are better organized 
and better armed, including weapons never previously seen in 
Ituri militia stocks.  The prevailing clear conclusion is 
that Ugandans have been actively involved responding to the 
threat to militia control in the District, and to entrenched 
mining and other economic interests.  MONUC points to 
apparent free movement of militia leaders and troops across 
the Uganda border, and reported meetings of militia leaders 
in Kampala with Ugandan officials, ongoing suspicious 
activity on the military side of the Entebbe airport, and the 
clear continuing Ugandan involvement in illegal resource 
exploitation in the district. 
 
4. (C) In addition, MONUC notes that the weapons collected 
from the militia undergoing disarmament appear old and not 
particularly serviceable, and do not include heavier weapons. 
 In general, the implication is that extensive weapons caches 
have been established, likely as a contingency for future 
options.  Very few of the former militia have opted for 
integration into the new national army, with the deployment 
to other parts of the country that would entail, and instead 
are being processed for demobilization staying close to their 
Ituri homes.  As well, there has been little progress 
extending GDRC authority to the district, evidenced by the 
continuing struggle of the Bunia local government to maintain 
even basic operations and the lack of GDRC border control 
personnel.  While MONUC and the FARDC First Integrated 
Brigade are maintaining a robust pattern of &search and 
disarm8 activities, militias appear increasingly willing to 
actively resist through combat engagement, and even to launch 
their own attacks. 
 
Solutions 
----------- 
 
5. (C) The impressive progress realized in the first half of 
this year in Ituri presents the best opportunity available in 
many years to establish reasonably secure political and 
security conditions in this large district.  The resident 
population is tired of ongoing conflict and exhibits little 
popular support for the militias who have preyed on them. 
Emerging from various discussions within the International 
Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT), senior GDRC 
officials, and MONUC, there is a general sense that the 
following three areas represent key areas to realize future 
progress to stabilize northeastern DRC. 
 
a) Limit Ugandan Involvement:  MONUC officials are convinced 
that Ugandan individuals or groups have stepped up their 
support to militia groups through the supply of arms, and 
likely in other ways possibly including military operational 
advice or organizational support.  There is, however, little 
available at this point in the way of hard evidence. 
Nonetheless, MONUC and GDRC officials are convinced that 
increased pressure must be brought to bear to put an end to 
what is seen as continuing Ugandan destabilizing involvement 
in Ituri.  Related, the UN Arms Trafficking experts panel is 
in the region now, and it is clear that cross-border arms 
trafficking in Ituri is a significant focus of their 
interest, along with trafficking in the Kivus.  It is quite 
possible that the panel report will bring out further details 
regarding international support for Ituri militia activity. 
 
b) Extend State Authority:  Kinshasa has been slow to get 
necessary funds to the Bunia government and begin to 
establish government authority along the DRC/Uganda border. 
The CIAT pressed the Espace Presidentiel on this issue in a 
June 10 meeting.  Vice Presidents Bemba and Ruberwa both 
indicated that there are proposals in process for imminent 
action, including the ability of Ituri officials to retain 
for local government operations a portion of the tax revenues 
now being collected.  These funds now flow into a central 
revenue account, and little finds its way back to the region. 
 For example, the Bunia government reportedly received less 
than $6,000 from January 1 - April 30 for operational costs, 
while collecting in excess of $500,000 in tax revenues. 
Local revenue retention would have a potential major impact 
in Ituri. 
 
c) Increase military operational effectiveness:  There are 
two major issues.  The continuing inadequate equipment 
available to the FARDC First Integrated Brigade (e.g., 
communications equipment) and general weak ongoing logistics 
support clearly limits its effectiveness.  Indeed, salary 
payments, while generally better than for most FARDC troops, 
is a continuing problem.  These issues fall within the 
general category of endemic FARDC problems, but their effects 
are particularly damaging in sensitive areas such as the Kivu 
provinces and Ituri District.  Concerning UN forces, there is 
poorly disguised widespread frustration by MONUC forces 
regarding New York-imposed regulations that de facto preclude 
night operations, even though there are forces in Ituri 
capable of carrying them out fully consistent with their home 
nations, rules and procedures.  Lifting the regulations 
would give MONUC forces a substantial tactical advantage 
against militia forces.  MONUC Divisional Commander Cammaert 
also continues to emphasize the need for intelligence to 
support military operations. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
6. (C) Comment: The UN is breaking some new peacekeeping 
operations ground in Ituri with a very aggressive military 
strategy, operating under the general label of ongoing 
"cordon and search" operations that put the militias on the 
run.  The operations have worked, and a lot has been 
accomplished.  Certainly, few would have predicted six months 
ago that 14,000 Ituri militia members would be in the 
demobilization process.  Nonetheless, it is clear that there 
are some major tasks ahead, and insofar as the remaining 
militia forces are being re-equipped or retrained to be more 
effective military units, the effort to stabilize the region 
is being set back.  Even if the measures outlined in para 5 
move forward, it is clear that a fair amount of time will 
still be required to establish fully durable security 
conditions and stability in the district.  End comment. 
 
MEECE