US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2620

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TNA PETITION PROTESTS JAFARI REQUEST FOR MNF-I EXTENSION

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2620
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2620 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-20 13:21:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ National Assembly Reconstruction
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, IZ, National Assembly, Reconstruction 
SUBJECT: TNA PETITION PROTESTS JAFARI REQUEST FOR MNF-I 
EXTENSION 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  A bloc of 83 TNA legislators 
presented a petition June 19 protesting the Jafari 
government's call for an extension of the MNF-I 
mandate.  Several Sadrist promoting the petition 
argued that a timeline for withdrawal would reduce 
the legitimacy of the insurgency.  Many of the 
petition signatories, however, appeared to be 
protesting that the TNA was not consulted in the 
decision, not the MNF-I extension itself.    End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Leading Sadrist representative Falah Shanshal 
announced a petition protesting the extension of the 
MNF-I mandate at the June 19 TNA session.  He pointed 
out that with 83 signatories and only 130  members of 
the TNA present at that day's session, the petition 
represented a bloc with commanding legislative 
authority.  Our subsequent conversations with TNA 
members revealed that many signatories were protesting 
the Jafari government's decision-making process, not 
the decision itself.  The majority of the signatories 
appear to be following the first of the following two 
motivations: 
 
-- OBJECTING TO A VIOLATION OF THE TAL:  Many of the 
signatories to the petition appear to have been 
protesting the TNA's exclusion from the decision- 
making process, not the decision itself.  They pointed 
to TAL Article 39 (A), which states that the 
"international treaties and agreements" must pass from 
the council of ministers to the presidency council 
before being ratified by the TNA.  (Comment: Embassy 
legal counsel has concluded that the call for an 
extension of a UNSCR mandate, as made by FM Zebari, 
was legal.  TAL Article 39 does not cover a request 
for the extension of the UNSCR mandate. End Comment) 
 
-- CALLING FOR A TIMELINE:  Some 26 Sadrists who most 
likely backed the petition appear to have been making 
a larger political statement.  Shanshal told Poloff 
that he believed the absence of a withdrawal timeline 
spreads fears that the MNF-I presence would continue 
indefinitely.  He said these fears were feeding 
support for the insurgency.  Shanshal also said he 
believed a pressing timeline would motivate the U.S. 
to train Iraqi forces more urgently.  He said he was 
pushing for a phased withdrawal as Iraqi forces are 
trained, not an immediate pullout.  Poloff told 
Shanshal that a timeline for MNF-I withdrawal would 
actually motivate the insurgency, not demoralize it. 
Shanshal responded that he heard press reports that 
several U.S. congressmen shared his position. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
3.  (C) This challenge to the MNF-I presence is 
significant but less alarming than it appears.  Many 
of the signatories to the petition probably support 
the MNF-I extension but oppose that the TNA was not 
consulted.  Those who support legislation for a 
timeline appear to still be a minority in the TNA. 
Shia Political Council Member Ali Yoshua, himself a 
signatory to the petition, urged Poloff not to over- 
interpret the document.  He said he and others had 
signed the document to send a warning to Jafari, not 
the USG. 
 
4.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK, minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield 

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