US embassy cable - 02AMMAN4589

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004589 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2012 
TAGS: PREL, XF, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: FORMER IRAQI OIL MINISTER SAYS SADDAM IS VULNERABLE 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM.  REASONS 1.5 (B,D) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Former Iraqi Oil Minister Issam Chalabi told visiting 
SFRC Staffer Puneet Talwar August 12 that Saddam's hold is 
fragile, that most Iraqis believe the U.S. is serious about 
regime change "this time," and that they "want to see Saddam 
gone, preferably while they are asleep."  Saddam will use the 
fear of chaos to try to keep his populace quiet, and the fear 
of mass casualties from potential WMD strikes to keep the 
U.S. from launching operations.  Given heightened regional 
tensions and low U.S. credibility stemming from the ongoing 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regime change by covert means 
would be far preferable to a more conventional approach 
requiring a longer, and more visible, U.S. military build-up, 
according to Chalabi. 
 
2. (C) Turning to "the day after," Chalabi argued that the 
Iraqi army should focus on providing order, that the 
on-the-ground U.S. presence should be minimized, and that a 
provisional government made up of technocrats, not military 
men, should be put in place.  U.S. security guarantees will 
be essential in allaying Iraqi fears of possible future 
Iranian or Turkish ambitions.  Most Iraqis, he stated, 
understand that their future is dependent on good relations 
with the West in general and the U.S. in particular.  Iraq 
could rebuild itself "within five years" by boosting oil 
production to six million barrels per day, along with debt 
and loan forgiveness.   If the U.S. does not act this time, 
Chalabi cautioned, many Iraqis will give up the future once 
and for all, and Saddam will emerge stronger than ever.  End 
summary. 
 
3. (C) Visiting SFRC Staffer Puneet Talwar, accompanied by 
Poloff, met former Iraqi Oil Minister Issam Chalabi August 
12.  Chalabi, who was Oil Minister from March 1987 to October 
1990, has been resident in Amman since 1993.  He currently is 
an oil industry consultant. 
 
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A Fragile Regime Dependent on Fear of Chaos 
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4. (C) Chalabi began by arguing that, behind all the bluster, 
Saddam's regime is fragile.  The regime, he said, seeks to 
keep its own populace quiet and loyal, and the U.S. at bay, 
by heightening fears of the chaos and destruction that could 
ensue should military operations commence.  Looking back to 
1991, Chalabi said "he (Saddam) was spreading rumors of 
chaos, rumors that the intelligence services were behind. 
People didn't rally around Saddam because they loved him. 
They did so because they were scared."  Although not 
minimizing the potential for Saddam to use WMD against U.S. 
forces, Israel, or his own people, he said that the regime 
will seek to use those fears as a deterrent against threats 
from within or without. 
 
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But Once It Cracks, It will Fall 
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5. (C) That strategy notwithstanding, Chalabi said he 
believes that once an operation to change the regime begins 
"Saddam will not be there for long.  What you need to do is 
separate Saddam from the people, block his lines of 
communication to the Special Republican Guards, and then 
flood the airwaves with your message.  If the people are 
convinced that Saddam has fled or is cornered, everybody will 
run after themselves.  Iraqis think you are serious now and 
most want to see Saddam go, preferably while they are asleep." 
 
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Covert is the Way to Go 
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6. (C) Chalabi offered that a quick, precise, covert action 
would be far preferable to a more conventional military 
approach for a number of reasons.  First, U.S. credibility in 
the region is at a very low point as a result of the ongoing 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thus making the pre-positioning 
of large numbers of U.S. troops and material difficult. 
Second, Saddam would, with some success, paint a conventional 
U.S. military assault as "an invasion force, not a liberation 
force."  This would result in greater, and better 
coordinated, Iraqi resistance.  Finally, a large 
on-the-ground U.S. presence "would begin to look like an 
occupying force after a while.  You don't want this." 
 
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The First Day After: An Immediate Need for Order and Calm, 
And U.S. Security Guarantees 
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7. (C) In this immediate "day after" environment, it will be 
critical, Chalabi argued, that the Iraqi people be reassured 
that order and calm will prevail and the country will not 
fall into chaos.  The Iraqi Army should focus on this task, 
not overall governance, Chalabi said.  Rather than military 
rule, "a provisional government of technocrats should be 
installed."  (Note: Chalabi declined to identify anyone 
specifically who should be included in such a government, and 
recognized the difficulties of such a task.  In his view "the 
Iraqi opposition outside the country has no real constituency 
and there is no Karzai.  Saddam has gotten rid of anybody who 
even had that potential."  Chalabi also dismissed the notion 
that there is any significant nostalgia for restoration of 
Hashemite rule either.) 
 
8. (C) In addition to internal order, Iraqis will also want 
immediate reassurance that their national sovereignty will be 
protected: "People understand that their future lies with the 
West in general, and the U.S. in particular.  You (i.e. the 
U.S.) don't need to be there physically, but they need to 
know that you will support them against Iranian or Turkish 
ambitions." 
 
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Iraqis Must Think of Themselves as Iraqis First 
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9. (C) Peering further down the road at a post-Saddam Iraq of 
the future, Chalabi said that "the question of federalism 
needs to be looked at closely."  Five to seven regional 
governments would be feasible, he offered, including one for 
the Kurdish areas.  That said, for the most part these 
divisions should not fall along ethnic lines: "People need to 
think of themselves as Iraqis first."  Future leaders should 
work to include members from all groups in their governments, 
but "somebody should not be hired because he's a Kurd or a 
Shiite, or whatever.  To follow the Lebanese model would make 
matters worse and would be a constant source of instability 
for years to come." 
 
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Reconstruction: Oil and a Bit of Debt Forgiveness 
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10. (C) Turning to the longer term aspects of Iraqi 
reconstruction, Chalabi struck a very positive chord, 
predicting that, under the proper conditions, the country 
"could rebuild itself in five years."  Iraq, Chalabi said, 
"could go to 6 million barrels per day easily.  I had that 
plan in 1990."  Increased petroleum revenues, along with 
forgiveness of some Iraqi debts and loans, would hasten 
Iraq's reintegration into the international community. 
 
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It's Now or Never 
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11. (C) As the meeting drew to a close, Chalabi made clear 
that, in his view, the time had come for the U.S. to rid Iraq 
of Saddam.  If that does not happen, and the U.S. continues 
with a policy of containment, "we will all feel disheartened, 
disenchanted, and that there is no hope for our country. 
People will believe that Saddam really does have some special 
power and that he is here for good. There should be an 
ultimatum from the Security Council about the return of the 
inspectors.  When they go back in, I'm sure they will find 
things Iraq should not have.  You need to have the support of 
the international community, and you need to deal with this 
problem now, before new (internal) problems arise in Saudi 
Arabia or Kuwait and make the prospect of regime change in 
Iraq even more complicated." 
Gnehm