US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI2781

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 002781 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR PDAS CHENEY FROM AMBASSADOR SISON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KMPI, PTER, ETRD, PHUM, MASS, IZ, AF, TC 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PDAS CHENEY'S VISIT TO THE UAE 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary: We look forward to welcoming you to Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai.  The UAE leadership will be very interested in 
hearing your perspectives on the latest developments in Iraq 
and on the Mideast peace process, as well as listening to 
your views on reform in the region.  We have requested 
meetings with Dubai Crown Prince and UAE Minister of Defense 
General Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR), Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh 
Hamdan bin Zayed (HbZ), and Minister of Education Sheikh 
Nahyan bin Mubarak Al Nahyan.  You will also have an 
opportunity to discuss camel jockey and labor issues with 
Labor Minister Ali bin Abdullah Al Kaabi and Interior 
Ministry representatives during a visit to a camel jockey 
rehabilitation center near Abu Dhabi.  (The UAEG appreciates 
the fact that you have accepted their invitation to visit the 
center.)  These meetings will allow us to review our 
substantial bilateral agenda, to include excellent 
military-to-military and counterterrorism cooperation, slow 
but solid progress on a Free Trade Agreement, reform efforts, 
and trafficking in persons concerns.  We have included some 
points that your interlocutors might raise with you in para 
12, and some suggested points for you to make with them in 
para 13.  You will also meet with Emirati educators, civil 
society, women, and students during a Zayed University event 
in Abu Dhabi and a small dinner in Dubai.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (SBU) The UAE remains a key partner intent on cooperating 
with us to create a stable economic, political, and security 
environment in the Middle East.  Through our bilateral 
cooperation, we have been able to maintain U.S. access to 
their military facilities and work closely with them on the 
military and law enforcement fronts.  We are working to 
bolster our bilateral law enforcement and export controls 
programs to promote our global counter-terror and 
nonproliferation concerns.  One of the world's wealthiest 
countries, the UAE has adopted progressive economic policies 
that will strengthen its position as the region's pre-eminent 
hub for trade, transportation, investment and tourism, and 
contribute to regional economic stability.  We are 
negotiating a free trade agreement that will significantly 
advance mutual economic interests and ensure that the UAE 
remains among the top ten countries with which the U.S. runs 
a trade surplus.  We are deeply engaged with the UAE 
leadership about combating human trafficking.  We are also 
engaging them about their plans to create a more robust civil 
society that could lead to a more open political system. 
 
3. (C) The political transition following the November 2004 
death of UAE President Sheikh Zayed has been smooth. 
President Khalifa has ensured stability by pursuing the same 
domestic, regional, and international policy priorities as 
his father.  Khalifa and his half-brother, Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), have shared political 
and economic portfolios in what appears to be an even way, 
although Khalifa retains ultimate control over Abu Dhabi 
emirate's, and by extension, the federal government's, purse 
strings.  The composition of federal and emirate-level 
governing bodies is getting younger and more technocratic. 
The federal Cabinet's first woman, Economy and Trade Minister 
Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi, is a model for younger Emirati 
women who aspire to play more of a role in the country's 
political, economic, and social life.  (Lubna regrets that 
she will not be able to meet you during your visit, but told 
the Ambassador June 20 that she hopes to see you this summer 
in Washington.) 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
-------------------- 
 
4. (S) The Emirati leadership has tried in earnest to 
accommodate every U.S. request for military cooperation and 
assistance.  This entails some political risk as the 
leadership seeks to avoid publicizing our presence on their 
military installations.  This presence is significant, with 
the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing operating KC-10 and KC-135 
tankers, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and Global Hawk 
remotely piloted vehicles conducting non-combat support 
operations from Al Dhafra Air Base.  There are 1,250 
steady-state USAF personnel at Al Dhafra, although the 
numbers fluctuate during surges and rotations.  The ports of 
Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction 
operations, resupply and sustainment, and combat support 
efforts across the region, and have hosted in excess of 500 
USN port visits for each of the past two years (more than any 
other port outside the U.S.).  UAE intelligence officers have 
deployed to Baghdad and Bagram, participating in coalition 
intelligence operations. 
5. (S) In May, the UAE received the first installment of 80 
F-16 Block 60 combat aircraft, a transaction that will cement 
our relationship for years to come.  However, there remain 
severe training and maintenance challenges for the F-16 
program.  Citing technology release concerns, the USG has 
rejected the UAE's request to allow pilots and technicians 
from Turkey to train pilots and technicians from the UAE and 
to allow technicians from Turkey to maintain the aircraft. 
Despite some setbacks in major foreign military sales offers 
(our rejection of their request for an armed Predator and 
their rejection of five re-furbished E-2C airborne early 
warning aircraft in April 2004), our military-to-military 
relationship remains very strong. 
 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
---------------- 
 
6. (S) The UAE is well aware of its vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks and has taken a number of steps to enhance 
its border security and critical infrastructure -) including 
the use of iris scans at airports -- but there is no overall, 
coordinated strategy for these efforts.  In July 2004, the 
UAE strengthened its legal authority to respond to 
terrorist-related activity with the passage of an 
anti-terrorism law.  The law defines terrorism, specifically 
criminalizes terrorist financing, and sets stiff penalties 
for violations.  The UAE's legal framework to combat 
counterterror finance is robust.  The Central Bank has 
implemented policies to reduce the potential use of the UAE 
financial system to finance terror by strictly regulating 
financial institutions and freezing suspect accounts.  To 
further enhance our robust cooperation in the security and 
counterterrorism fields, Homeland Security Advisor Fran 
Townsend proposed establishing a Joint Terrorist Finance 
Coordination Committee (JTFCC) to the Central Bank Governor 
during her visit to the UAE in February.  This committee will 
set terror finance priorities and formalize and coordinate 
information exchange.  Washington is drafting a proposal to 
submit to the UAEG. 
 
7. (S) Dubai also plays a critical role in advancing our 
counterterrorism and WMD transshipment priorities.  In March 
2005, the port of Dubai became the first Middle East seaport 
to join the Container Security Initiative aimed at screening 
U.S.-bound cargo containers from being exploited by 
terrorists.  In May 2005, Dubai Ports became the first Middle 
East seaport to sign an agreement with the U.S. under the 
U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security 
Administration Megaports Initiative, which will allow the 
port to install special equipment to detect hidden shipments 
of nuclear and other radioactive materials.  In addition, MbR 
told us last fall that his State Security Directorate had 
uncovered a network of people, one of whom headed a company 
in Dubai, that was providing transportation assistance to 
fighters headed to Fallujah and safe havens to terrorists 
fleeing Fallujah. 
 
8. REGIONAL ISSUES: 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
-- (C) We have been able to count on the UAE's strong public 
support for the Iraqi political process and significant 
humanitarian and military support.  The UAE leadership was 
disappointed that more Sunnis did not participate in the 
January 30 elections and that Shi'a moderate Iyad Allawi, 
whom MbZ and HbZ regard as a friend and the best leader for 
Iraq, had faired poorly.  (Allawi remains a regular visitor 
to Abu Dhabi.)  The UAEG shares our concerns about Iranian 
interference in Iraq,' internal affairs, but it has not 
publicly criticized Iran to avoid antagonizing Iran and 
jeopardizing the considerable commercial ties that exist 
between the UAE and Iran. 
 
-- (SBU) According to the MFA, the UAE provided Iraq with 
$216.8 million in assistance from January to December 2003. 
During former Secretary Baker's visit in January 2004, the 
UAE committed to cancel Iraq's estimated $7 billion bilateral 
debt.  However, the UAE has not yet officially negotiated 
debt-reduction terms with Iraq, although UAEG officials 
confirm that they have not asked the Iraqis to repay any of 
the debt that is owed them.  We continue to remind the UAEG 
that a public statement on debt reduction would be useful. 
 
-- (C) The UAE has been working with Germany to provide 
police and military training to Iraqis in the UAE, as well as 
100 trucks for the Iraqi armed forces.  In addition, the UAE 
contributed over $8 million toward the transfer of M-113 APCs 
from Jordan to Iraq, and it donated four light reconnaissance 
aircraft to Iraq (and trained Iraqi pilots to fly the 
planes), as well as 45 French-built Panhard APCs, with a 
pledge of 80 additional M-113 APCs purchased from 
Switzerland.  Iraqi Defense Minister Dulaimi visited Abu 
Dhabi June 19. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
-- (S) The UAE's political relations with Iran are strained 
over Iran's nuclear program and the possibility of a 
clandestine weapons component, Iran's interference in Iraq's 
internal affairs, and Iran's continued military occupation of 
three disputed islands.  While the UAE has responded to the 
perceived threat from Iran by reinforcing its military 
capability to protect its borders, it has been careful not to 
jeopardize its substantial business interests with Iran by 
antagonizing the militarily superior Islamic Republic.  The 
UAEG has also cooperated with us to clamp down on Dubai-based 
Iranian WMD proliferation activities.  Nonetheless, Iran 
remains one of Dubai's key trading partners. 
 
-- (C) Peace process/aid to Palestinians: The UAE would like 
to see tangible progress on the Mideast peace process.  It 
continues to support the Palestinian people through 
substantial project and humanitarian assistance.  During a 
May 7 visit to Gaza, Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah 
inaugurated Zayed City, a new neighborhood comprising 736 
apartments built with $61 million in UAE assistance. 
Palestinian President Abbas told Sheikh Abdullah that the UAE 
was at the forefront in supporting the Palestinians, and that 
other countries were beginning to emulate the UAE's work in 
the area of housing, health and infrastructure.  According to 
the MFA, the UAE provided the Palestinians with $389.6 
million in assistance from October 2000 to November 2003. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
 
-- (S) The UAE has been a strong supporter of President 
Karzai.  A 215-man UAE Special Operations contingent operates 
alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, where they have 
suffered some casualties.  The UAE also trained 35 Bahraini 
Special Forces who are now deployed at Bagram with their 
Special Forces, bringing the contingent up to a total of 250 
combined troops.  UAE assistance to Afghanistan totaled $41.4 
million from September 2001 to December 2003, according to 
the MFA. 
 
JORDAN 
------ 
 
-- (C) We understand that the Abu Dhabi leadership is looking 
to support the Jordanians and have provided them with project 
assistance in a number of areas.  We have asked the UAE to 
renew its commitment to provide Jordan with oil assistance, 
but have not yet received a response. 
 
9. (C) REFORM: 
 
-- POLITICAL: The UAEG's commitment and continued ability to 
use its sizeable wealth to satisfy the needs of its small 
citizenry constitute the "ruling bargain" and explain the 
absence to date of significant popular pressure for change. 
However, as the UAE becomes an increasingly developed and 
modern society and its population continues to grow rapidly, 
traditional consultative mechanisms, such as the open majlis, 
are becoming less effective.  Our democratic reform strategy 
aims to encourage the ruling families to introduce 
representative government/elections.  We expect there will be 
a gradual introduction of representative government, most 
likely at the municipal level in individual emirates.  It 
will be a slow process that the leadership will monitor 
closely.  We suggest you take up this issue in a quiet 
conversation with HbZ. 
 
-- In addition, we are advocating progress toward an open and 
independent operating environment for civil society, a free 
and independent media, and greater transparency and public 
participation in the legislative and regulatory process. 
There are no elections, political parties and trade unions 
are not authorized, and civil society as a whole is weak. 
Advancing reform in the UAE requires a two-fold approach: 
quiet -- but frank -- diplomacy with the senior leadership 
and a bottom-up strategy of programming and dialogue (to 
include targeting of both youth and female groups) to 
increase support for reforms among the population at large. 
Our efforts to strengthen press freedom provide an example of 
how this two-fold approach can work through MEPI.  The 
bottom-up strategy led MEPI to offer technical assistance to 
the UAE Journalists Association as they provide the UAEG 
input on needed press law reforms.  In addition to political 
reforms, the Mission has supported opportunities for economic 
reform that simultaneously advance our overall reform agenda. 
 For example, FTA negotiations provide leverage and a 
possible vehicle for expanding labor rights and improving 
transparency in the UAE legislative process. 
 
-- MEDIA: The UAEG is in the process of reviewing the 
outdated and restrictive press and publications law.  The 
existing law exposes journalists to criminal charges for 
defamation and libel.  Information Minister Sheikh Abdullah 
and MbR have called on the media to push for greater freedom 
and have said they wanted a new law which emphasizes 
transparency and openness.  The establishment and rapid 
development of Dubai Media City (DMC), a media free trade 
zone, is attracting journalists from all over the Arab world. 
 There are currently over 1100 media organizations operating 
in DMC, including all international media organizations 
operating in the Arab world. 
 
-- EDUCATION/WOMEN: The UAE leadership, under the forward 
thinking Minister of Education Sheikh Nahyan, is very open to 
interaction with the United States in the education sector. 
The Education Minister encourages program linkages between 
UAE and U.S. universities and has single-handedly pushed 
forward an ambitious U.S. consultant team proposal to 
completely revamp K-12 education.  With the exception of some 
faculties at the UAE University, the language of instruction 
in all tertiary institutions is English and the 
administration is predominantly American.  Education is free 
for all nationals.  The leadership has encouraged youth to go 
to the United States, but many Emirati students are choosing 
Canada and Australia, which they perceive as safer and more 
welcoming destinations.  To facilitate modern, Western-style 
education for women, the Ministry of Education created the 
all-women Zayed University, which has campuses in both Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi.  Women comprise approximately 70 percent of 
the 17,000 student body of the UAE University, the entire 
student body of the two Zayed University campuses, and half 
of the students of the Higher Colleges of Technology. 
Despite the wealth of the country, resources are unevenly 
distributed, leading to unequal access to educational 
opportunities found in urban centers.  We responded to this 
need by conceiving and implementing the ACCESS 
Microscholarship Program.  We provided 200 hours of English 
teaching with American cultural materials, supplemented by 
field trips and visits by USG officials, to 100 11th grade 
Emirati boys and girls from disadvantaged areas.  Their 
English levels increased significantly, as did their positive 
feelings towards the United States.  The success of this 
year's program led ECA to fund our 2006 program at the 
$300,000 level. 
 
10. (C) TIP/CAMEL JOCKEYS: The UAE leadership reacted calmly 
to being downgraded from Tier 2 to Tier 3 in the 2005 TIP 
report.  The leadership viewed the 60-day action plan as 
"doable" and has taken a proactive stance.  UNICEF signed a 
project agreement with the Ministry of Interior on May 8 to 
assist the UAEG in the rehabilitation and repatriation of the 
underage jockeys, as well as their reintegration back into 
their families and societies.  The UAEG has invited you to a 
camel jockey rehabilitation shelter where young boys, 
primarily from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sudan, are receiving 
care from social workers before they are humanely repatriated 
to their home countries.  While the UAEG has publicized, and 
begun to act upon its commitment to address camel jockey 
issues, the government has been slower to act on trafficking 
in women for sexual exploitation, or abuse of domestic 
workers and laborers.  G/TIP will send out an officer in 
mid-July to determine whether the UAEG's progress on the TIP 
action plan should be reassessed as having made "significant 
efforts" to bring itself into compliance with the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act's minimum standards. 
 
11. (C) FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:  The UAE is the second largest 
economy in the Arab world, behind Saudi Arabia, and 
(according to preliminary IMF estimates) grew by almost 8 
percent in 2004.  U.S. non-defense exports to the UAE last 
year were $4 billion (about a $3 billion trade surplus), and 
there are approximately 500 U.S. companies present in the 
UAE.  We have held two negotiation rounds on a free trade 
agreement in 2005, will hold a video teleconference between 
the lead negotiators on June 27, and are aiming for a third 
round in September.  Progress, so far, has been solid, but 
slow.  This is due to the decentralized nature of the UAE 
federal system, the large complex economy here, and the 
relative inexperience of the UAE team in dealing with complex 
negotiations like this.  We have identified a number of key 
issues for both sides including: federal-emirate 
jurisdictional issues, national treatment for U.S. investors, 
and the UAE labor law.  The UAE's population and private 
sector workforce are overwhelmingly expatriate, and the UAEG 
is concerned about the security implications of allowing 
foreigners full union rights.  If the UAE remains on the TIP 
Tier 3 list, USTR will be unable to bring an FTA to the Hill. 
 While USTR remains hopeful that we can conclude FTA 
negotiations by the fall, the slow pace may delay completion 
of negotiations to 2006. 
 
12. (C) The Emiratis are likely to want to raise the 
following with you: 
 
-- Iraq,s Political Process:  Your interlocutors will be 
keen to hear your views on the evolving political process, 
and to offer advice on how to generate greater participation 
from the Sunni community.  They will appreciate the 
Washington perspective on political, economic, and security 
developments in Iraq. 
 
-- FTA: The UAEG is looking for more exceptional 
treatment/USG flexibility in its FTA negotiations with the 
USG than USTR is able to provide; 
 
-- Trafficking in Persons: The Emiratis have indicated to us 
that they will work diligently on each of the steps suggested 
in the TIP action plan by August 2 (the end of the allotted 
grace period).  You could reiterate our message that 
fulfillment of the action plan will demonstrate significant 
efforts by the UAEG to eliminate trafficking and elevate the 
UAE to Tier Two Watch List status. 
 
-- Status of Iran/EU-3 negotiations:  The UAE shares our 
concerns about Iran's nuclear program development.  Your 
interlocutors will be interested in hearing what the USG's 
strategy is going to be in the coming months, and how the 
results of the Iranian presidential elections might affect 
the course of events.  President Khalifa met June 7 with 
Hassan Rowhani, the SecGen of Iran,s Supreme Council for 
National Security.  During that meeting, Khalifa stressed the 
need for commitment from all countries to eliminate all 
banned weapons. 
 
-- Saudi Arabia: The Emiratis closely watch developments in 
Saudi Arabia, and will be keen to compare views on security 
and political developments in the kingdom.  President 
Khalifa's first official visit was to Riyadh.  Your meetings 
with Sheikh Hamdan would be an opportunity to inquire about 
the status of negotiations over the Saudi-UAE border, and 
about the UAE leadership's views of Saudi political process. 
Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud 
discussed border issues with President Khalifa and HbZ June 
14-15. 
 
13. (C) In your meetings, it would be appropriate for you to: 
 
-- thank the UAEG for its strong and continued support for 
the Iraqi political process, as well as political and 
humanitarian efforts to support stability in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and in Gaza/West Bank; (all interlocutors) 
 
-- urge the UAE to commit publicly to Iraqi debt relief; (HbZ) 
 
-- thank the UAE for its commitment to Afghan stability and 
effective Special Operations deployment to Afghanistan ) the 
first Arab country to commit troops; (HbZ, MbR) 
 
-- thank the UAEG for the progress made in combating 
terrorism and urge continued efforts, especially in the area 
of terrorism financing; (HbZ) 
 
-- inquire whether authorities have yet prosecuted anyone 
under the new counterterrorism law; (HbZ, MbR) 
 
-- thank Dubai for being the first Middle East port to join 
the Container Security Initiative and Megaports Initiative; 
(MbR) 
 
-- reassure the UAE that the US will continue to take a tough 
line on Iran's nuclear program; (HbZ, MbR) 
 
-- note that prompt action on the TIP 60-day action plan 
could result in the UAE being raised from Tier Three to Tier 
Two "Watch List";  salute the political decision to abolish 
practice of using underage camel jockeys (HbZ, MbR, Al Kaabi) 
 
-- acknowledge steps taken to identify, care for, and 
humanely repatriate the boys; underscore need to take prompt 
action on TIP action plan; (Al Kaabi) 
 
-- inquire about the status of the new labor law and the new 
law that will allow the creation of trade unions; (Al Kaabi) 
 
-- express appreciation of U.S. business for conducive 
business and investment climate (there are over 500 U.S. 
companies operating in the UAE).  Note progress on FTA 
negotiations and importance of this agreement to both 
countries; (MbR) 
 
-- note that passing an export control law would give the UAE 
greater ability to act against transshipments of controlled 
items; (HbZ, MbR) 
 
-- note solid law enforcement cooperation, but that it is 
both our interests to restore cooperation on the return of 
fugitives and timely exchange of evidence on criminal 
proceedings; (HbZ, MbR) 
 
-- commend the Minister of Education for his bold education 
reform initiatives.  Underscore our readiness to work with 
Ministry of Education and Educational Zone officials to 
support their reform efforts; (Nahyan) 
 
-- thank the Minister of Education for the Ministry's 
cooperation in helping us develop the Microscholarship 
Program this past year; program will be expanded in coming 
school year. (Nahyan) 
SISON