US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2611

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2025 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MOPS, IZ, Security, Sunni Arab, Reconstruction 
SUBJECT: FALLUJAH: GRASS ROOTS POLITICS -- LEADERS INITIATE 
POLITICAL AND SECURITY MEETINGS 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a step promoting more political 
engagement by large segments of Anbar, 200 religious, 
tribal, political and academic leaders from around 
Fallujah on June 4 hammered out a fifteen-point 
document outlining a more participatory Sunni posture 
in the political process.  Beyond the standard demand 
for a Coalition Forces withdrawal, the declaration 
condemns attacks against Iraqi civilians (not 
Coalition Forces) and urges participation in drafting 
of the constitution.  A follow-on meeting is 
tentatively set for July in Fallujah with over 300 
area participants expected.  Internal dialogue about 
national political issues will remain the primary 
focus of future gatherings, according to organizers. 
They also flagged that similar meetings might be held 
in Ramadi and Al-Qa'im in coming weeks.  A similar 
gathering of tribal leaders in Ramadi was scheduled 
for June 15 but was postponed due to insurgent 
intimidation in the city in advance of the session. 
These meetings and efforts to organize them do not 
mean that Anbaris won't boycott future elections, but 
they do suggest that Anbaris are more willing to 
engage in politics after the bitter January 2005 
election experience.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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SUNNI GRASS ROOTS POLITICS? 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) According to one of the principal organizers, 
Engineer Fawzi Mohammed (local business leader and 
manager of a large Fallujah cement factory -- site of 
the meeting), the gathering of 200 area leaders mainly 
focused on the upcoming referendum and follow-on 
election.  While a stated goal remained the withdrawal 
of Coalition Forces (and other now standard objections 
or complaints), increased Sunni political 
participation represented the primary impetus for the 
self-initiated meeting.  Participants for the meeting 
included the full spectrum of local leaders from the 
tribes, clerics, business community and ex-military. 
(COMMENT:  This gathering marks the first time that 
such a large group of Fallujans have met independently 
-- and at the grass roots level -- to discuss national 
political issues.  Until now, most area caucuses have 
been almost exclusively geared toward Fallujah 
reconstruction specifics (water, power, sewer lines) 
or local political issues (compensation payments, 
etc). END COMMENT.) 
 
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FALLUJAH SHOULD NOT BE HAND THAT DESTROYS IRAQ 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3.  (C) Fawzi acknowledged to Fallujah PolOff 
privately that "you know what happened in the last 
election" - adding that Sunnis did not want to repeat 
the mistake of failing to vote.  He continued that 
Iraq should not be "stung by bombings; we want Iraq to 
be stable."  Fawzi conveyed that when he went on trips 
to Baghdad, his family phoned him a dozen times each 
visit, to check on his safety.  He did not want this 
situation to continue.  (COMMENT:  In December 2004 
and January 2005, Fawzi used to reiterate to PolOff 
familiar Sunni arguments critical of the national 
political process and the need for election delay.  He 
did the same in a January 2005 session, pre-election, 
with Senator John Kerry at Camp Fallujah.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
4.  (C) Fallujah, according to Fawzi, had suffered too 
much - and, as a city leader, he did not want Fallujah 
to "destroy the union of Iraq."  He said that the city 
cannot be the "the hand that does that."  Most wanted 
the situation to return back to normal.  The meeting 
was intended to help pull some insurgents into this 
larger group.  As for the next election, Fawzi 
declared it was more a matter of Sunnis having to 
vote, rather than wanting to vote. 
 
5.  (C) In a separate discussion, Fallujah 
reconstruction committee coordinator Basil Mahmoud 
(who supplied Fallujah Poloff with a copy of the 
consensus document) confirmed Fawzi's characterization 
of the meeting.  Basil noted that he had stayed in the 
back of the room throughout the two-hour session; the 
heated discussion had been wide ranging and included 
elements who opposed all aspects of the Coalition 
presence in Iraq. (NOTE:  Basil did not categorize 
these participants as "insurgents" but implied as 
much. END NOTE).  He added that Fawzi had brought 
together "not all the good people, but all the right 
people."  More meetings needed to be held; a follow-on 
gathering in Fallujah proper was set for July.  Basil 
said coalition forces would likely be asked to help 
provide security, given that 300 plus participants 
might attend. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
CONSENSUS DOCUMENT: SOME NEW POINTS AMID USUAL 
COMPLAINTS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  (C) The cement factory meeting resulted in a 
consensus document (full text, paragraph 14), listing 
15 key points.  Noteworthy in the list are the 
following: 
 
--Condemnation of "all criminal activities against 
citizens and innocent Iraqi people.  Any such action 
will be considered an act of terrorism." (number 3) 
 
--Reforming a national committee to write the 
constitution that should include all the people's 
rights now and in the future. (number 8) 
 
--Reforming the Iraqi Army with new technological and 
modern methods to be a strong army using the 
experience of ex-Iraqi officers.  (number 9) (NOTE: 
Fallujah is home to a number of former military 
officers, many of whom served in key Iraqi army 
positions.  They have established their own 
association in the city.  END NOTE). 
 
--Asking all neighboring countries not to interfere 
with Iraqi internal issues.  (number 12) 
 
--Allowing the people to participate in political 
actions and the writing of the constitution.  (number 
13) 
 
--Ensuring that Iraq will be one nation that will 
stand against anybody trying to separate it.  This 
will be considered the red line that nobody should 
pass under any circumstance. (number 14) 
 
 
7.  (C) Other points reflect usual demands or 
complaints, such as:  specific timetable for Coalition 
Force withdrawal from Iraq; release of detainees; 
canceling the de-Ba'athification law; and formation of 
Fallujah security forces from city recruits.  One 
additional request stands out:  post-invasion 
compensation for damages "from all the countries that 
participated in the war in Iraq on unproven 
allegations, such as weapons of mass destruction." 
The group proposed that a United Nations body be 
established as was done in Kuwait after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait to oversee compensation payments. 
(COMMENT:  The text drafters are unlikely to consider 
billions in appropriated U.S. reconstruction funds 
equivalent to war reparations.  END COMMENT). 
 
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A GATHERING OF TRIBES 
--------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Several area tribal leaders (Sheikh Abdulwahed 
Hamed Khalel al Janabi, Hameed Farhan Abdullah Mohamdi 
al Hamda, Ahmad Sarhan Abed Mashan, Kamel Mohammed 
Saif) told poloff June 11 that the meeting's 
objectives were political in nature.  When asked if 
local residents were intending to take part in the 
referendum and vote, even at this early stage, a half 
dozen nodded and raised hands expressing they would. 
(NOTE: This weekly meeting with so-called "street 
sheikhs" at the Fallujah Civil Military Operations 
Center incluesabout a dozen local tribal leaders, 
who in effect are the closest to the Fallujah-area 
people; the most senior tribal leaders sit on the new 
city council.  END NOTE). 
 
9.  (C) At a June 14, 2005, Fallujah city council 
session, Sheikh Khamis Hisnawe Aifan al-Esawe (al- 
Buessa tribe) -- considered by many residents to be 
Fallujah's most influential and senior tribal leader - 
- made a notable, and uncharacteristic, public 
statement.  He informed everyone gathered that he 
would convene all area tribes in nearby Amiriyah, a 
community where "five or six dead bodies" were being 
found daily.  The purpose of the gathering would be to 
address security issues.  Khamis said the harassment 
needed to stop, as "these are our brothers." Coalition 
Forces and police should not be present, in order to 
avoid problems.  Khamis added that the meeting would 
be held at the Amiriyah mosque, lists with names would 
be brought by tribes to "identify crooks and robbers." 
(NOTE: Initial reports indicate that the meeting was 
well attended.  END NOTE) 
 
------------ 
RAMADI, TOO? 
------------ 
 
10.  (C) Fawzi told PolOff June 7 that some Sunni 
leaders in Ramadi were considering forming their own 
political group, like the one in neighboring 
Fallujah.  He did not offer details but noted that 
political interest among Sunnis had noticeably 
increased.  Al Qa'im residents might do the same. 
According to a separate Marine intelligence report, an 
Iraqi source claims Ramadi leaders intend to hold this 
kind of meeting June 16.  Marines in Ramadi confirmed 
at a June 15 meeting at the provincial government 
center that the political gathering would be held. 
 Anbar Governor Ma'moun told Marines that he was 
notified by organizers about the event, but believed 
he was not extended an invitation.  He added "an 
uninvited guest at a banquet sits in no chair."  The 
Governor stressed that that the official voice of Al 
Anbar would remain through the Provincial Council and 
his office.  (NOTE:  The June 16 gathering in Ramadi 
was postponed; insurgents effectively intimidated 
potential participants from attending the meeting. 
END NOTE) 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
11.  (C) While these political and security 
initiatives by Fallujah and other area leaders remain 
in the initial stages, they mark a surprising shift. 
Organizing to such a degree at the local level will 
need to be sustained in coming weeks.  A return to 
status quo Sunni indifference is possible, but 
unlikely if locals follow-up on these early 
initiatives.  They could spread to other parts of 
Anbar. 
 
12.  (C) Engineer Fawzi Mohammed and Sheikh Khamis are 
representative of two key Sunni constituencies central 
to reversing insurgent intimidation and fostering 
political participation:  the former is a major Anbar 
business leader and ex-Ba'athist; the latter a senior 
tribal sheikh.  Both have considerable "wasta" 
(influence) in the community.  If they are getting off 
the proverbial fence, others should follow. 
 
13.  (C) These meetings will not ensure high Sunni 
turnout for the referendum or on election day; taken 
together, however, they could be the basis for 
sustained political dialogue and voter education that 
equals sizeable turnout.  In December 2004 and January 
2005, Fallujah-area Sunnis fell largely silent on 
overarching political matters; today, there is at 
least the beginning of self-initiated and frank 
discourse, including about the costs of non- 
participation.  The 15-point consensus document 
produced at the Fallujah meeting reveals -- for now -- 
this more balanced, and pragmatic, Sunni mindset at 
the grass-roots level. 
 
14.  (U) The consensus document agreed at June 4, 
2005, meeting of Fallujah-area leaders is translated 
as follows. 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
FINAL REPORT 
The national political gathering in Fallujah held its 
initial meeting on June 4, 2005. The meeting included 
different groups from religious leaders, tribe 
leaders, political and education leaders. 
 
The committee had a heated discussion about the future 
of Iraq regarding internal and international 
relationships. This will help avoid all kinds of 
discrimination and tribal differences. Fallujah will 
have one democratic group. This has been done through 
a democratic discussion between different people from 
Iraq. We will form a national team that will be 
working day and night to rebuild a democratic Iraq. 
This team will also help the citizens of Iraq to 
participate in all political actions and decisions 
including the right to vote. We will not have a 
separated Iraq anymore. The committee also discussed 
all the issues that face Iraq at the present time. The 
committee agreed on some issues, to include politics 
and the constitution. 
 
The points that the committee agreed on are: 
 
-Setting a specific schedule for the occupational 
forces to withdraw from Iraq. 
-Accepting a peaceful and a national force that 
follows all international laws. 
-Condemning all criminal activities against citizens 
and innocent Iraqi people. Any such action will be 
considered an act of terrorism. 
-Asking the occupational forces and the interim Iraqi 
government to release all political detainees. They 
will also stop raiding houses and mosques. 
-To disband all illegal political parties in Iraq. 
-Asking that the interim government to work on 
canceling all the Iraqi debt, as well as compensations 
that have been put on Iraq by unjust international 
decisions. 
-Canceling Albaath law, and consider it as a legal not 
political issue. 
-Reforming a national committee to write the 
constitution that should include all the people's 
rights now and in the future. 
-Reforming the Iraqi army on new technological and 
modern methods to be a strong army using the 
experience from ex-loyal Iraqi officers. 
-Calling for the withdrawal of the occupational forces 
from Fallujah; and forming an Iraqi police and an army 
from the people of Fallujah itself to do their duty in 
keeping peace. 
-Allowing all Middle Eastern and foreign mass media to 
get in Fallujah to send to the world a picture of what 
really happened. 
-Asking all neighboring countries not to interfere 
with the Iraqi internal issues. 
-Allowing the people to participate in political 
actions and the writing of the constitution. 
-The committee will ensure that Iraq will be one 
nation that will stand against anybody trying to 
separate it. This will be considered the red line that 
nobody should pass under any circumstances. 
-The committee will ask for compensation from all the 
countries that participated on the war in Iraq on 
unproven allegations; such as weapons of mass 
destruction. This compensation will be given to a 
committee that the United Nations will establish as 
they did in Kuwait. Any Iraqi, company, or government 
institution has the right to turn in their claims to 
get their compensation. 
 
Finally, the committee's door is open for any efforts 
that will help the abovementioned points. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
 
Satterfield