US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA5802

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 005802 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PHUM, SNAR, CO, ETRD 
SUBJECT: CLIPPED WINGS: COLOMBIA'S AIR ASSET LIMITS 
 
Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (S) Colombia's size and terrain make military air 
operations vital to the nation's security.  However, the 
Colombian Air Force (COLAF) accounts for less than 8 percent 
of the 2005 defense budget.  The COLAF's primary offensive 
aircraft are based in Cundinamarca and Atlantico Departments, 
which limits their already marginal international deterrent 
value.  Most of the COLAF's offensive helicopters -- used in 
anti-insurgency operations -- are based in central Antioquia 
Department, but their value is limited by an operational 
radius of only 150 miles.  Maintenance problems mean that 
probably less than 70 percent of all COLAF air assets are 
operable at any given time.  A lack of infrastructure in the 
Plan Patriota Phase 2B area of operations would severely 
limit the COLAF's ability to quickly reinforce COLMIL ground 
troops in the event of a major FARC offensive.  Despite 
repeated criticism from the USG regarding specifications and 
uses being skewed to Brazil's Embraer, the GOC is once again 
actively considering the purchase of new light attack 
aircraft.  The Colombian Congress approved the purchase on 
March 15, however the COLAF has not finalized the contract 
yet.  End Summary. 
 
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Background 
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2. (C) Colombia's size and diverse geography make military 
air operations essential to the Government's efforts to 
provide security to a nation plagued by narco-terrorist 
violence.  Unfortunately, COLAF lacks the assets to operate 
in many parts of the country.  Moreover, recent agreements by 
the Spanish and Brazilians to sell defense equipment to 
Venezuela have raised concerns within the Colombian Ministry 
of Defense (MOD) that Colombia is increasingly outgunned by 
its neighbor. 
 
3. (U) The COLAF's 2005 budget of roughly 690 billion pesos, 
or approximately USD 265 million, is 7.5 percent of the total 
defense budget.  The COLAF is the smallest of the military 
branches, with only 9,000 military and 3,000 civilian 
personnel. 
 
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Capabilities 
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4. (S) The COLAF possesses four categories of air assets: (1) 
offensive "attack" aircraft and helicopters, (2) 
transportation aircraft and helicopters, (3) reconnaissance 
aircraft, and (4) training aircraft.  The total force is 
reported to be 172 fixed- and rotary-wing assets.  We 
suspect, however, that only 60-70 percent are operable at any 
given time, with many assets grounded by maintenance problems. 
 
5. (S) The COLAF's primary "attack" aircraft, assets capable 
of strafing or bombing a target from the air, are stationed 
at Palanquero Air Base in northern Cundinamarca Department 
(CACOM-1) and Pauwels Rodriguez Air Base near Barranquilla in 
Atlantico Department (CACOM-3).  These aircraft, which 
include 12 Israeli-manufactured Kfirs, 9 French-manufactured 
Mirage M-5s, and 13 US-manufactured A-37 Dragonflies, serve 
as deterrents against foreign air attack, support Army and 
Marine troops in the field, and participate in Air Bridge 
Denial operations to intercept civilian aircraft suspected of 
transporting narcotics.  Given COLAF base locations, it would 
take Colombian jets approximately 45 minutes to reach the 
Venezuelan border and at least an hour to reach any of 
Colombia's other international borders.  None of the local 
illegal armed groups have offensive air capabilities. 
 
6. (S) The COLAF possesses additional offensive aircraft 
scattered sparingly throughout the country.  These include 6 
AC-47 Fantasma aerial gunships, 8 AT-27 Tucanos, and 5 OV-10 
turboprops, all of which are used to support ground troops in 
combat. 
 
7. (S) Most of the COLAF's offensive helicopters -- used in 
counter-insurgency operations -- are based at Rio Negro Air 
Base, near Medellin in Antioquia Department.  Most COLAF 
strike helicopters are AH-60 Arpias with an operational 
radius of approximately 150 miles, and are used primarily for 
ground troop support.  These should not be confused with the 
141 NAS-supported Police and Army helicopters dedicated to 
counternarcotics missions. 
 
8. (S) For transport, the COLAF uses 7 C-130 Hercules 
4-engine turboprops, 2 CASA CN-235 twin-engine turboprops, 
and one Boeing 707, all of which are based at CATAM Air Base 
in Bogota.  These fly resupply and transport missions 
throughout the country.  One of these transport planes is 
based part-time in south-central Colombia near the Plan 
Patriota Phase 2B area of operations, but usually returns to 
a more secure area when not needed for specific operations. 
COLAF transport helicopters are based primarily at Rio Negro, 
although bases in Bogota, Cali, outside Villavicencio 
(Apiay), Barranquilla, northern Cundinamarca (Palanquero), 
and Tres Esquinas normally have one transport helicopter at 
the base. 
 
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Limited Options in the Air 
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9. (C) The COLAF's limited troop transport resources have not 
prevented it from evacuating the sick and wounded and 
soldiers rotating out of combat zones.  In summer 2004, 
however, the COLAF asked the Embassy to help it withdraw 
troops that had served three consecutive months in combat. 
We were only able to fill this gap with contract air for the 
most part, but it demonstrates a weakness in the ability to 
remove troops without outside resources. 
 
10. (C) Current resource constraints would limit the COLAF to 
transporting only about 1,000 COLMIL reinforcements a day. 
For the COLAF to permanently base air assets in the region to 
more easily conduct air strikes and provide support to COLMIL 
ground forces, it would have to establish and secure 
refueling locations in largely hostile, inhospitable 
territory.  Helicopters provide troop transport within the 
Phase 2B area of operations, although the heavy jungle canopy 
prevents them from landing in most areas, so hoists and other 
methods are often used to infiltrate and extract troops. 
 
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Shopping Around 
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11. (C) Beginning in the late 1990s, the MOD began 
investigating the possibility of purchasing new light attack 
aircraft. In 2002, SOUTHCOM Commander General Hill counseled 
then-Defense Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez against such a 
course at a time when the COLAF's C-130 fleet needed 
modernizing.  Hill argued that the USD 250 million needed to 
buy 20 light attack aircraft could be put to better use 
improving force transportation. 
 
12. (C) Last December, Vice-Minister of Defense Jorge Eastman 
discussed the proposed purchase with Washington visitors.  He 
told the group about disagreements within the GOC over 
whether to purchase the aircraft, and, if so, which to buy. 
For example, the Senate pressed Minister of Defense Uribe to 
abandon the solicitation last fall because it had 
specifications only open to Brazil's Embraer Tucano aircraft. 
 The debate ended when the Colombian Congress approved the 
budget request purchase of light attack aircraft on March 15 
and the Defense Ministry reopened a solicitation with 
slightly more flexible requirements. 
 
13. (C) The solicitation for bids reopened on May 10 and was 
slated to last four weeks.  Some companies, most notably 
Lockheed Martin, complained that the "new" specifications 
still allowed only Embraer to make a competitive bid. 
Although COLAF extended the deadline by two weeks, on June 
14, Embraer submitted the only bid, offering to provide 
twenty-two planes for USD 234.56 million.  While the contract 
has not been finalized, the other five interested bidders 
dropped out before the solicitation closed.  According to 
influential daily El Tiempo, Eastman expressed his 
disappointment that no other companies submitted bids.  He 
added that the contract winner would be announced in 
September, leaving the door open to a possible reopening of 
the bidding process if the Colombian Congress remains 
dissatisfied with the non-competitive results.  According to 
Eastman, the GOC plans to use the new aircraft to mount an 
air offensive against the FARC.  In addition, he said the GOC 
entertains hopes of starting its own indigenous aircraft 
industry, following the example of Brazil's Embraer. 
DRUCKER