US embassy cable - 05BRUSSELS2339

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UK PLANS FOR ITS EU PRESIDENCY: MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

Identifier: 05BRUSSELS2339
Wikileaks: View 05BRUSSELS2339 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2005-06-16 15:56:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PTER EAID UK XF EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 002339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, NEA/NGI, NEA/IPA, NEA/ELA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, EAID, UK, XF, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: UK PLANS FOR ITS EU PRESIDENCY:  MIDDLE EAST ISSUES 
 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  According to UK mission staff in Brussels 
who cover Middle East issues, the UK hopes to use its 
July-December EU presidency to work closely with the U.S. in 
promoting a common agenda.  On Iraq, the UK hopes the June 22 
conference will help move the EU to do more on rule of law 
and human rights.  On Syria, the UK and France are pressing 
the Commission not to move forward on the EU-Syria 
Association Agreement, and would welcome the U.S. weighing 
in.  On MEPP, the UK will push for full EU support for the 
Wolfensohn mission, and may seek to clarify what EU contact 
policy on Hamas is, and is not.  On Iran, the UK sees EU 
positions hardening; should EU3 negotations break down, UK 
believes it likely the EU will support referral to the UNSC. 
Once there, however, the UK will be in a somewhat awkward 
position:  as EU president, it must present member state 
views, but is free to vote as it wishes.  End Summary. 
 
Iraq:  Looking for the Iraq Conference to support ramped up 
EU presence 
----------------------- 
2.  (C) In a June 16 meeting with USEU Poloff and Development 
Counselor, UK mission staff that cover Middle East issues 
previewed the UK's July-December 2005 EU Presidency goals for 
the region. The UK has proposed a sentence for inclusion in 
the conclusions for the June 22 Iraq Conference in Brussels 
that it hopes will facilitate stepped-up EU activity in the 
areas of rule of law and human rights.  The UK thinks the EU 
has relevant expertise in these areas and can make a positive 
contribution, but it appears uncertain if the UK proposal 
will get much support among members.  The UK is sensitive to 
EU member state concerns that the UK plans to use its 
presidency to launch "a thousand Iraq initiatives," and would 
prefer having the June 22 conference provide some political 
cover for enhanced EU activities and presence in Iraq. 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner recently announced plans to open 
a Commission office in Baghdad "within the next few months," 
and the UK has offered to provide space, support and security 
in its mission.  The UK wants to build on this by proposing 
an agenda to accompany an enhanced presence on the ground, 
but building a consensus among member states will require 
some effort and is not automatic. 
 
Syria Association Agreement: UK nervous 
------------------------ 
3.  (C)   On Syria, the UK is concerned that the Commission 
will forward the Syria Association Agreement to the UK when 
it assumes the EU presidency on July 1, and asked the U.S. to 
weigh in with the Commission.  Poloff responded that he had 
raised the issue with Commission Middle East Director the 
evening before.  Leffler adamantly denied that the Commission 
sought to move the agreement forward.  He claimed the 
translation and other technical procedures involved in 
preparing the texts would last until September, nearly a year 
since the document was initialed.  The ball, he said, was in 
member states' court whether to move the agreement forward or 
not.  Our UK contacts disagreed.  They said Leffler had 
recently told UK Middle East Director Gooderham that the 
translations would be completed by the end of June "at the 
latest;" Leffler planned to forward the agreement to the UK, 
as EU president, in early July.  The next step in the process 
involves the Council referring the texts to juris linguists, 
who need approximately six weeks to consider them.  Due to 
the August break, this means it would be September before the 
Council could act on the texts.  If agreed, the Council would 
then forward the texts to the European Parliament for 
approval.  The earliest the agreement could be signed would 
thus be late September. 
 
4.  (C)  The UK wants to put off the signing and also wants 
to avoid having to discuss this agreement immediately upon 
assuming the EU presidency, and is pressing the Commission to 
delay further the translation process.  Our UK contacts 
claimed the French are "furious" with the Commission on this 
point, and are also pressing for further delay.  The UK would 
welcome the U.S. weighing in on this issue with the 
Commission, and noted that Gooderham did not mince words when 
he spoke recently with Leffler.  They said we also might want 
to touch base with the French.  UK Foreign Secrtary Straw 
plans to place Syria on the agenda for the July EU Foreign 
Ministers' meeting (GAERC), but would prefer not to discuss 
the Association Agreement.  Rather, Straw wants to highlight 
how unhelpful Syria has been on a range of issues, from 
Lebanon to Iraq to support for Palestinian extremists and 
Hizballah, in the hopes of generating a consensus within the 
EU that now is not the time to be making any gestures toward 
Damascus.  But the UK wants to avoid internal discussion 
among member states about the Syria agreement, which could be 
divisive and which would signal Damascus that it can try to 
divide and separate member states. 
 
MEPP 
---- 
5.  (C)  Given the complexities surrounding Gaza withdrawal 
and PA elections, it is hard for the UK to plan an MEPP 
agenda for its EU presidency.  The UK's focus will be on 
supporting the Wolfensohn mission, and will work with member 
states to be as responsive to his requests for assistance as 
possible.  The UK is pleased with the Commission's 
representative, Christian Berger, who has been detailed to 
work with Wolfensohn.  Berger will come to Brussels one week 
per month, and the UK will look to him to act as liaison with 
Wolfensohn. 
 
MEPP/Hamas 
-------- 
6.  (C)  We raised the June 16 wire service reports reporting 
a meeting between Hamas mayors in Gaza and EU officials, 
noting that Washington would be monitoring this with 
interest.  Our UK colleagues repeated that, while EU 
ministers had approved a policy of limited, low-level 
contacts with elected officials in localities where the EU 
had projects under way, Hamas remained on the EU's terrorist 
list.  They promised to provide us the exact wording of the 
EU policy, and acknowledged that the EU has not done a good 
job articulating its policy in terms that emphasize that 
Hamas is still considered a terrorist organization.  They 
said they would highlight this issue for London, indicating 
that the UK will want to manage this issue constructively. 
 
Iran: Italy a weak link? 
---- 
7.  (C)  EU policy toward Iran is focused primarily on the 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations, and the 
parallel political dialogue, currently underway.  The next 
round is planned for mid-July in Tehran.  These EU contacts, 
however, are very much dependent on the EU3 discussions on 
the nuclear issue.  As long as the EU3 process is on track, 
the EU negotiations will continue; if the EU3 process breaks 
down, EU talks will also be suspended.  Our UK contacts said 
that, since the EU3 talks have been under way, EU member 
state positions toward Iran have hardened.  As a result, the 
UK is reasonably comfortable that member states would support 
referral to the UNSC if the EU3 talks break down.  However, 
our contacts were not certain how much could be achieved once 
the Iran issue was in the UNSC.  The UK would be in a bit of 
an awkward position.  As EU president, it would have an 
obligation to represent the consensus views of EU members, 
but would be free to vote as the UK.  Regarding ways the U.S. 
could help, 
their suggestion was that we might want to weigh in 
bilaterally with Italy, which has the most commercial 
interests in Iran, has the most developed political dialogue 
with Tehran, and has been the hardest to "keep on board" with 
a toughening EU position on Iran.  In part, they explained, 
this was a hold over from the time of the formation of the 
EU3, when Italy held the EU presidency.  Italy was invited to 
join the group, but declined due to it holding the EU 
presidency.  The offer was not extended again after Italy's 
presidency expired. 
 
SCHNABEL 
 
 
 
. 

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