US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2552

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KDEM, IZ, Kuristan Regional Government, Kurdistan National Assembly 
SUBJECT: KRG KURDS DEMAND ACTION ON KIRKUK, ALMOST SEAL 
DEAL ON COUNCIL 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for reasons 
 
 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (U) This is a REO Kirkuk cable. 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY: Kurdish leaders told DCM and MNF-I DCS for 
Political Military and Economic Relations June 13-15 that 
Kirkuk's provincial council will elect new leaders this week, 
but the two parties -- who are now directly dictating 
solutions in the city -- had not agreed on exact outcomes. 
Kurdistan Regional President Massoud Barzani and other senior 
leaders were adamant that Kirkuk will be Kurdish, most want 
to see it incorporated into Kurdistan (the PUK deputy was 
flexible on this option).  Barzani wants the incorporation 
and boundary changes to be effected more swiftly than 
provided for in the TAL.  All Kurds are fed up with the lack 
of progress on Article 58.  The DCM made clear the U.S. 
commitment to implementation of Article 58, following 
completion of the Constitution and December elections, but 
underscored the urgent need for dialogue among all Kirkuk 
residents and a halt to unilateral steps to predetermine the 
status of Kirkuk.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (C) In meetings with Kurdish leaders in Irbil and 
Sulimaniya on June 13-15, DCM and MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Political Military Economic Relations reiterated the U.S. 
commitment on Article 58 of the TAL, but counseled strongly 
against unilateral political and other steps that could 
prejudge outcomes on Kirkuk.  RC Kirkuk and DCM Assistant 
attended the meetings on the U.S. side, Iraqi participants 
are noted in paragraph 13. 
 
------------------------------------- 
KURDS ANGRY NO PROGRESS ON ARTICLE 58 
------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani 
was generally sour about the lack of progress on Kirkuk.  At 
his swearing-in June 14, he noted that "a genuine solution 
has been stipulated in the TAL and must be applied without 
further delay.  We will not accept retreat.  Similarly, all 
other detached areas (of Kirkuk) should be returned because 
they are integral parts of Kurdistan." 
 
5. (C) PUK Deputy Noshirwan Mustafa said the issue of Kirkuk 
was an emotional one.  Three years before Saddam Hussein was 
defeated, he sent a delegation that was ready to cede control 
of the city.  Kirkuk is the geographic center of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, people transit the city to go from Sulimaniya to 
Irbil.  It was the center of Iraq's north for 80 years. 
Indeed, Mustafa said much of the Kurds' pique with the 
central government centered on Kirkuk.  Iraqi PM Ja'aferi had 
met with officials in Turkey who had provocative views on 
Kirkuk.  Ja'aferi had not mentioned Kirkuk or Article 58 in 
his government program. 
 
6. (C) KRG Sulimaniya Prime Minister Omar Fattah said Kirkuk 
forms the central struggle for all Kurds.  In 1984, the Iraqi 
regime offered the Kurds part of the city east of the Khasa 
River, but the Kurds refused this offer.  That's why we need 
to implement Article 58 now, so Kirkuk can become part of 
Kurdistan. 
 
7. (C) The new Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) speaker 
Adnan Mufti appealed for U.S. help to address Kirkuk 
normalization as stipulated in article 58.  He said the 
Kurdish parties would pay for "Arabization" Arabs to all 
leave.  When DCM noted that there must be agreement among all 
parties, Mufti said "you cannot ask me to live next door to 
the people who shot my brother and raped my sister." 
 
------------------- 
DEFINING ARTICLE 58 
------------------- 
 
8. (C) Leaders were united on the concept that Arabs must 
leave and that Kurds must control the province, but were 
vague on details.  Only Mustafa said that perhaps the 
province could remain outside Kurdistan, with a separate 
"special" status.  KDP leaders agreed that dialog between all 
parties was needed now, but President Barzani insisted that 
Arabs in (Kirkuk's second city) Hawija were "refusing to 
cooperate."  Fattah said he had proposed to some Turkish 
officials to let the Turkmen "live with us in Kirkuk (under 
KRG administration) for two years, and see if we don't 
provide them their rights." 
 
9. (C) DCM indicated to both President and PM Barzani that 
the U.S. would look for ways to activate the Article 58 
process in Baghdad.  RC Kirkuk, on the margins of the Barzani 
meeting, suggested to Iraqi Deputy PM Rowsh Showays a 
parallel dialog at the provincial level to get community 
buy-in. 
 
------------------------- 
AVOIDING UNILATERAL STEPS 
------------------------- 
 
10. (C) The DCM in all conversations reiterated the U.S. 
commitment to TAL 58 but said the U.S. was concerned about 
unilateral steps -- particularly by the KDP -- in both Kirkuk 
and Ninewah that could prejudge outcomes in the north.  All 
Iraqis must have a say in determining the future of Kirkuk 
and other areas, it was a topic for constitutional drafters; 
parties must not usurp that process. There must be consensus. 
 Barzani said he did not understand, if Arabs and Turkmen 
think Kirkuk will not change, they are mistaken.  Likewise in 
Ninewah province, the district of Makhmur must return to 
Irbil.  Sheikhan was 100% Kurdish, Sinjar historically was 
mostly Kurdish.  The Kurds will not tolerate the perpetuation 
of Saddam's mistakes. 
 
---------------------------- 
CITY COUNCIL - KDP ASCENDANT 
---------------------------- 
 
11. (C) DCM stressed that the U.S. wanted to move forward on 
Article 58 and overall assistance on aid coordination, but 
such efforts required that Kirkuk have a new government that 
could take decisions. (NOTE:  Kirkuk Provincial Council has 
been stymied by political infighting among Kurds, and between 
Kurds, Turkmen and Arab council members, and parties outside 
the province.)  All interlocutors confirmed that Kirkuk's 
city council would be formed within days.  PUK and KDP 
leaders indicated they sent a delegation to Kirkuk June 13 to 
discuss council formation.  DCM stressed to all that the 
council should contain credible and authentic members to 
ensure consensus and build confidence between communities; 
Kurds were supporting similar efforts at the national level. 
All leaders agreed and said their respective options would 
meet that criteria. 
 
12. (C) As on other issues discussed during DCM's trip north 
(see septels), the two parties differed on Kirkuk leadership. 
 PUK leaders confirmed that the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), 
which had taken 8 seats in the council, should be offered the 
deputy governor slot.  They felt the Kirkuk Brotherhood List 
(KBL, the Kurdish led-list) should take the other two slots 
(governor and council chairman.)  The PUK did not envision 
any of the top three posts going to Arabs.  KDP leaders, on 
the other hand, said that the KBL would name all three 
leaders (and draw a Turkmen from within the Kurd list to 
become deputy.) 
 
13. (C) Massoud Barzani said that the Mustafa Abdulrahman 
(KBL independent Kurd) would remain as governor.  He noted 
there were three contenders for deputy governor and mentioned 
two names.  (NOTE:  Irfan Kirkukli, previously assistant 
Kirkuk governor for de-Ba'athification, is a Turkmen who ran 
with the KBL; and Umid Kurkilu, who is not a council member, 
is a well-known writer for a Turkmen journal Turkmen Shin, 
who lives in Altun Kupri, a Turkish-Kurd town on the Green 
Line that is closely allied with the KDP.)  Nechirvan Barzani 
confirmed this lineup and added that either Rizgar Ali Hamjan 
or Ahmed Askeri would be the PUK head of the Kirkuk 
provincial council. 
 
14. (C) When DCM asked about credible representation of 
Turkmen and Arab blocs, Barzani said the ITF "was not 
acceptable" because they were loyal to Turkey and the Arab 
bloc contained "some Ba'athists."  The PUK's deputy, 
Noshirwan Mustafa, said that Barzani was holding tough on the 
city council, and would not permit members of the ITF to take 
part.  This stemmed from the ITF's desire to put Barzani on 
trial for his role in the disappearance of senior ITF leaders 
who were arrested July 13, 1996.  (At the time, Barzani had 
brought in Iraqi government forces to help defeat the PUK, 
which was being aided by the ITF.)  The PUK's Speaker Mufti 
told DCM that Turkmen were divided, and "many were now 
prepared to join the Kurds" on Kirkuk and other issues.  PUK 
politburo leader Rasul told DCM that "we cannot marginalize 
Turkmen and Arabs in Kirkuk." 
 
15. (U) PARTICIPANTS: 
 
KRG President Massoud Barzani (KDP) 
KRG-Irbil Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani (KDP) 
KRG-Sulimaniya Prime Minister Omar Fattah (PUK) 
PUK Deputy Secretary General Noshirwan Mustafa Amin 
PUK Politiburo Executive Committee Chairman Kosrat Rasul Ali 
PUK Politburo Member Omar Sayid Ali 
Kurdistan National Assembly Speaker Adnan Mufti (PUK) 
Kurdistan National Assembly Deputy Speaker Kemal Kirkuki (KDP) 
 
16. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Jeffrey