US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2548

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, KISL, IZ, National Assembly, Sunni Arab, Kuristan Regional Government 
SUBJECT: KEY IRAQI LEADERS PROMISE SUPPORT FOR SUNNI 
INCLUSION IN CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: On the margins of the June 14 swearing-in of 
Massoud Barzani as Kurdistan Regional President in Irbil, DCM 
engaged leaders from all Iraqi political groups to urge them 
to support the inclusion of 15 credible Sunnis in the 
constitutional committee.  All interlocutors were supportive 
of our approach, but with varying degrees of optimism 
regarding the ability of the fragmented Sunni political elite 
to come together on names or numbers.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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ENGAGING KEY LEADERS ON SUNNI INCLUSION 
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2. (C) On June 14, on the margins of a ceremony to swear-in 
KDP leader Massoud Barzani as president of the Kurdistan-Iraq 
Regional Government, DCM (accompanied by MNF-I Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Political, Military and Economic Operations MG 
Hank Stratman) pressed key Iraqi leaders to settle the issue 
of the constitutional committee with an inclusive process 
that brings in up to 15 Sunnis.  DCM spoke separately with 
President Jalal Talabani; Vice President Adel Abdul-Mehdi; 
Hassan Hamoudi, chairman of the constitutional committee in 
the TNA; Hachem al-Hassani, speaker of the TNA; 
Kurdistan-Iraq Regional President Massoud Barzani; and 
incoming Prime Minister of the Kurdistan-Iraq (unified) 
Regional Government Nechirvan Barzani to drive home the 
urgency of resolving the Sunni constitutional role.  He asked 
them to weigh in with both Sunnis and their own 
constituencies to ensure positive outcomes.  DCM noted that 
the most senior levels of the USG are concerned at the 
prospect of further delays in the process, as this would 
benefit the insurgents and cause Iraqis to lose hope in the 
electoral process. 
 
3. (C) In a detailed discussion touching on a range of 
constitutional issues, Hassan Hamoudi told Charge that he 
could accept limiting the numbers of Sunnis to 15.  He said 
that Sunni Waqf leader Sheikh Adnan Dulaymi wielded real 
influence on this issue, but he was playing a spoiler role 
because he believed he was about to be relieved from his 
post.  DCM said the U.S. was prepared to weigh in with 
Ja'aferi to prevent this, and committed to continued U.S. 
efforts with Dulaymi directly. 
 
4. (C) Adel Abdul Mahdi and Hachem Hassani were both more 
skeptical that they, or we, could win broad Sunni acceptance 
of the latest initiative.  The Sunnis are pressing for larger 
numbers because they are not united.  Both leaders advised 
DCM to weigh in with Salah Mutlaq, although Abdul-Mehdi said 
he believes in the end the U.S. would simply have to choose 
15 names from the Sunni list and "have done with it." 
Hammoudi told DCM that he had a fallback plan to constitute a 
separate advisory committee of 57 Sunnis, whom the 
constitutional committee would consult with weekly to solicit 
views.  Hammoudi said he would not broach this "plan B" 
unless all else failed, viewing it as unwieldy and less than 
likely to gain Sunni support.  DCM agreed on both points, 
noting that Iraqis must keep the process within the 
(enlarged) committee.  Hammoudi also reiterated concern 
regarding the UN, saying that "some Sunnis" are listening to 
"some voices from the UN" and expect that "Ashraf Qazi would 
come at the end as their savior" to arbitrate the issue of 
Sunni inclusion.  Hammoudi dismissed such talk as "dangerous 
nonsense."  For his part, Hassani said he would be traveling 
in the next week, but would weigh in with key figures upon 
his return. 
 
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BARZANI WILL ENGAGE SUNNIS IN BAGHDAD AND IRBIL 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5. (C) Massoud Barzani said he had twice convened Sunnis 
before the elections to urge them to participate in 
elections, but most had been too afraid to vote.  This would 
not happen again because they now realized the price of 
non-participation.  He said there were some former Ba'athists 
who were organizing.  They were still waiting in the wings, 
but the Kurds were exploring engagement.  In the meantime, he 
committed to weigh in with Adnan Dulaymi, who had asked to 
come see him upon Barzani's return from Baghdad (on or about 
June 20). 
 
6. (C) Barzani said he thought that Dulaymi, although a 
hardliner, would come around to limiting the Sunnis to 15 new 
members.  Barzani agreed with DCM's characterization of a 
splintered leadership among Sunnis that complicated all 
dialog with them.  Sunnis must realize, he said, they are now 
"only one part of" a political process that includes others. 
They had not yet adapted to this reality.  DCM agreed they 
had experienced a psychological earthquake, which had 
reverberated throughout the whole region.  Barzani claimed 
that his "longstanding ties" to the Sunni leadership gives 
him a special influence, greater than that of Kurdish rival 
President Talabani, whose calls for 25 Sunnis to join the 
drafting committee had been "unhelpful". 
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TALABANI BACKTRACKS 
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7. (C) An upbeat President Talabani told DCM he regretted his 
earlier ("misinterpreted") call for 25 new Sunnis, and that 
he too would support the addition of only 15 new members, and 
committed to work with Iraqi Islamic Party Leader Mohsin 
Abdul Hamid (present at the swearing in).  KRG Prime Minister 
Nechirvan Barzani, in a separate meeting, told DCM that 
Talabani had felt obliged to publicly support up to 25 Sunnis 
in order to make amends for his earlier statements supporting 
the integration of Badr Corps into the Iraqi Army (an idea 
strongly opposed by the Sunnis).  Nechirvan agreed that 
President Barzani had credibility with Dulaymi and had agreed 
to leverage him.  He said that the Kurds would also weigh in 
with key Shia.  SCIRI leader Abdul-Aziz Hakim was currently 
in Iran, but the Kurds would follow up upon his return.  He 
said Hammoudi was also a critical player. 
 
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JA'AFERI NOT COMMITTED TO TAL OR THE KURDS? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Barzani said he believes once the constitutional 
committee meets, things could move rapidly, perhaps within 
weeks.  But only if the Shia remained true to their 
commitment they would treat the TAL as "the" constitutional 
framework.  If they deviated from the TAL as the foundation 
-- and there were real fears among Kurds that Ja'aferi would 
waffle -- it would be an entirely different story. 
 
9. (C) Nechirvan Barzani said the Kurds were very wary of 
Ja'aferi.  He had not attended the President's swearing in or 
the Kurdistan National Assembly opening, nor sent greetings, 
he had stalled on convening the Article 58 committee, he had 
not mentioned federalism or Kirkuk or the Kurds in his 
government program, he has never mentioned Kurdish suffering, 
and he has gutted some of the powers of key Kurdish 
ministers, such as the Minister of Planning Barham Salih. 
 
 
10. (C) COMMENT: Barzani is prepared to use his influence 
with key Sunni leaders, although the meeting with Dulaymi 
will have to await his return from Baghdad.  Although 
Abdul-Mahdi and Hassani were more downbeat than usual, they 
recommended that Embassy continue to work over the Sunni 
leadership -- notably Mutlaq and Dulaymi -- to press for 15 
names coinciding with our own approach.  We will continue to 
stress that there will be no understanding in Iraq or 
elsewhere, certainly the U.S., if a consensus-based 
constitutional drafting process is held up over two or three 
names. END COMMENT 
 
11. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Jeffrey