US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2542

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Dr. Anthony Cordesman U.S. Speaker Program in Iraq: June 3-11, 2005

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2542
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2542 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-16 10:20:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: KPAO PGOV PTER SCUL IZ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002542 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR R, IIP, NEA, NEA/I, NEA/PPD 
EMBASSIES/CONSULATES FOR PAOS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KPAO, PGOV, PTER, SCUL, IZ 
SUBJECT:  Dr. Anthony Cordesman U.S. Speaker Program in 
Iraq: June 3-11, 2005 
 
1. Summary:  Dr. Anthony Cordesman of CSIS participated 
in an eight-day speaker program in Iraq (Baghdad and Al- 
Hillah) June 3-11, 2005.  His program included meetings 
and events with senior officials and opinion leaders from 
all major ethnic and sectarian elements of Iraqi society, 
and representatives of the full Iraqi political spectrum. 
The discussions covered all aspects of Iraqi political, 
security, energy and ethnic/sectarian issues.  Dr. 
Cordesman used his program events to provide his 
perspective on how to best counter the insurgency in 
Iraq, on building a viable state and society, and on Iraq 
as an aspect of broader political developments in the 
Mideast.  He also used his discussions to plumb current 
Iraqi views on the country's progress towards democracy 
and the continuing U.S. role in that process.  Because 
Dr. Cordesman is so well known, this program had a major 
impact in engaging key Iraqi officials and opinion 
leaders at the highest levels, and received positive 
Iraqi broadcast and print media coverage, with at least 
seven press placements to date.  End Summary. 
 
2.  Dr. Cordesman began his program with three full days 
spent visiting Iraqi military and security forces, 
accompanied by the U.S. military, throughout the country. 
This comprehensive overview of the security environment 
in Iraq included operational units as well as training 
and command and control centers of both the Ministry of 
Interior and Ministry of Defense, in addition to American 
and NATO experts and advisers.  This prelude to his 
speaker program activities enriched and strengthened his 
credibility with his Iraqi (and, likely, future American) 
audiences. 
 
3.  A short trip into the Red Zone to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs provided the first venue for a Cordesman 
lecture.  About 100 Iraqi officials, including the head 
of the Transitional National Assembly's foreign affairs 
committee, heard Dr. Cordesman say that the circumstances 
in Iraq most resembled - at least superficially - the 
U.S. engagement in Vietnam, with the huge difference that 
both Americans and Iraqis have so far avoided the major 
mistakes which doomed that conflict.  There is a 
realization that political means, not military measures 
alone, will defeat the insurgency.  Unlike in Vietman, 
the Iraqi military and security forces that are being 
built are not so dependent on American supplies and 
weapons for their survival. These local forces are 
getting stronger and better trained every month.  The 
Iraqi democracy is already more mature and successful 
than anything in South Vietnam ever was. 
 
4.  But, noted Cordesman, major challenges remain: 
ensuring that corruption is curtailed; strengthening 
local government presence in the governorates; winning 
over the people by ensuring full political participation 
by all groups; and splitting the insurgency's base 
between the disgruntled and the unredeemable hardcore -- 
are all urgent priorities.  He added that Iraq will 
succeed or fail by the efforts of the Iraqis alone; 
America can and will help, but the final arbiters of 
victory will be the Iraqi people. 
 
5.  Dr. Cordesman also discussed oil policy and how a 
dependence on petroleum alone cannot build a prosperous 
and stable Iraqi economy.  He spoke as well about 
domestic politics in America and the situation in Iraq - 
how popular ambivalence about the American presence in 
Iraq is matched by strong support for the U.S. military. 
As with all his sessions, dialogue was lively and very 
positive. He was treated as something of a cross between 
an oracle and a rock star. There were many more questions 
than could be answered before Cordesman's security detail 
shepherded him back to the International Zone. 
 
6.  The same themes continued in the next event, a lunch 
hosted by the Charge' which gathered a top level 
audience, including the Ministers of Interior and 
Finance, the National Security Advisor, the Minister of 
State for National Security, and several key generals 
involved in the ongoing "Operation Lightning" campaign to 
weed out terrorists from Baghdad. 
 
7.  A follow-on press event with the Iraqi media, 
covering the issues discussed above, has so far generated 
seven very positive press placements: articles in five 
dailies: "Al-Adala" (SCIRI), "Al-Furat" (Independent), 
"Al-Mu'atamer" (INC), "Al-Manar al-Yawm" (Independent) 
and "Kul al-Iraq" (Independent) and prime-time news 
coverage on the leading "Al-Iraqiyya" television and 
private "Al-Salam" TV (moderate Shi'a) stations. 
Additional placements are expected in weekly and monthly 
publications. 
 
8.  On June 9, Dr. Cordesman traveled to Regional Embassy 
Office (REO) Al-Hillah, in Iraq's Shi'a heartland.  At 
the REO he spoke to an enthusiastic and varied audience 
of about 75 local leaders, including five Transitional 
National Assembly deputies, regional and local officials, 
NGO activists, academics, journalists and several 
Interior and Defense Ministry generals. 
 
9.  This event was a highlight of his program; his 
presentation was extended by a lively dialogue that went 
on for over three hours.  Cordesman generously answered 
each and every question, which ranged from security 
issues (e.g., a plea for American heavy weapons for the 
Iraqi armed forces; answer: in fighting an insurgency the 
right tactics and training are more important than tanks) 
to political developments (e.g., complaints about 
American "coddling" of Sunni Arabs: "You talk about 
Sunnis all the time; what about our rights? We 
participated in the elections and they refused to"). In 
Al-Hillah, as throughout his program, Cordesman stressed 
the need for an inclusive Iraqi political process as the 
key for victory against the insurgents. 
 
10.  Upon his return from AL-Hillah, Dr. Cordesman was 
feted at a dinner hosted by former IIG Council of 
Ministers Secretary Zuheir Hammadi.  The attendants 
included Minister of Interior Jaber, the head of MFA 
Policy Planning, and other senior officials and advisors. 
 
11.  Comment:  Dr. Cordesman was a superb, thoughtful and 
comprehensive speaker who help us engage Iraqi officials 
and opinion leaders at the highest level in dialogue on a 
wide range of policy issues of highest interest to this 
Mission.  His graciousness and deep knowledge of so many 
topics truly impressed his large and enthusiastic Iraqi 
audiences, who navigated various security gauntlets to 
attend his programs.  Many thanks to IIP, NEA/I, REO Al- 
Hillah, and Embassy Amman for helping make this program 
happen, and especially to Embassy Kuwait for facilitating 
his last-minute, middle-of-the-night transit through 
Kuwait to Washington after he was delayed for two very 
frustrating days at the Baghdad Airport in the grips of a 
massive sandstorm. 
 
JEFFREY 

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