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| Identifier: | 05BAGHDAD2542 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BAGHDAD2542 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Created: | 2005-06-16 10:20:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | KPAO PGOV PTER SCUL IZ |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002542 SIPDIS STATE FOR R, IIP, NEA, NEA/I, NEA/PPD EMBASSIES/CONSULATES FOR PAOS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KPAO, PGOV, PTER, SCUL, IZ SUBJECT: Dr. Anthony Cordesman U.S. Speaker Program in Iraq: June 3-11, 2005 1. Summary: Dr. Anthony Cordesman of CSIS participated in an eight-day speaker program in Iraq (Baghdad and Al- Hillah) June 3-11, 2005. His program included meetings and events with senior officials and opinion leaders from all major ethnic and sectarian elements of Iraqi society, and representatives of the full Iraqi political spectrum. The discussions covered all aspects of Iraqi political, security, energy and ethnic/sectarian issues. Dr. Cordesman used his program events to provide his perspective on how to best counter the insurgency in Iraq, on building a viable state and society, and on Iraq as an aspect of broader political developments in the Mideast. He also used his discussions to plumb current Iraqi views on the country's progress towards democracy and the continuing U.S. role in that process. Because Dr. Cordesman is so well known, this program had a major impact in engaging key Iraqi officials and opinion leaders at the highest levels, and received positive Iraqi broadcast and print media coverage, with at least seven press placements to date. End Summary. 2. Dr. Cordesman began his program with three full days spent visiting Iraqi military and security forces, accompanied by the U.S. military, throughout the country. This comprehensive overview of the security environment in Iraq included operational units as well as training and command and control centers of both the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, in addition to American and NATO experts and advisers. This prelude to his speaker program activities enriched and strengthened his credibility with his Iraqi (and, likely, future American) audiences. 3. A short trip into the Red Zone to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the first venue for a Cordesman lecture. About 100 Iraqi officials, including the head of the Transitional National Assembly's foreign affairs committee, heard Dr. Cordesman say that the circumstances in Iraq most resembled - at least superficially - the U.S. engagement in Vietnam, with the huge difference that both Americans and Iraqis have so far avoided the major mistakes which doomed that conflict. There is a realization that political means, not military measures alone, will defeat the insurgency. Unlike in Vietman, the Iraqi military and security forces that are being built are not so dependent on American supplies and weapons for their survival. These local forces are getting stronger and better trained every month. The Iraqi democracy is already more mature and successful than anything in South Vietnam ever was. 4. But, noted Cordesman, major challenges remain: ensuring that corruption is curtailed; strengthening local government presence in the governorates; winning over the people by ensuring full political participation by all groups; and splitting the insurgency's base between the disgruntled and the unredeemable hardcore -- are all urgent priorities. He added that Iraq will succeed or fail by the efforts of the Iraqis alone; America can and will help, but the final arbiters of victory will be the Iraqi people. 5. Dr. Cordesman also discussed oil policy and how a dependence on petroleum alone cannot build a prosperous and stable Iraqi economy. He spoke as well about domestic politics in America and the situation in Iraq - how popular ambivalence about the American presence in Iraq is matched by strong support for the U.S. military. As with all his sessions, dialogue was lively and very positive. He was treated as something of a cross between an oracle and a rock star. There were many more questions than could be answered before Cordesman's security detail shepherded him back to the International Zone. 6. The same themes continued in the next event, a lunch hosted by the Charge' which gathered a top level audience, including the Ministers of Interior and Finance, the National Security Advisor, the Minister of State for National Security, and several key generals involved in the ongoing "Operation Lightning" campaign to weed out terrorists from Baghdad. 7. A follow-on press event with the Iraqi media, covering the issues discussed above, has so far generated seven very positive press placements: articles in five dailies: "Al-Adala" (SCIRI), "Al-Furat" (Independent), "Al-Mu'atamer" (INC), "Al-Manar al-Yawm" (Independent) and "Kul al-Iraq" (Independent) and prime-time news coverage on the leading "Al-Iraqiyya" television and private "Al-Salam" TV (moderate Shi'a) stations. Additional placements are expected in weekly and monthly publications. 8. On June 9, Dr. Cordesman traveled to Regional Embassy Office (REO) Al-Hillah, in Iraq's Shi'a heartland. At the REO he spoke to an enthusiastic and varied audience of about 75 local leaders, including five Transitional National Assembly deputies, regional and local officials, NGO activists, academics, journalists and several Interior and Defense Ministry generals. 9. This event was a highlight of his program; his presentation was extended by a lively dialogue that went on for over three hours. Cordesman generously answered each and every question, which ranged from security issues (e.g., a plea for American heavy weapons for the Iraqi armed forces; answer: in fighting an insurgency the right tactics and training are more important than tanks) to political developments (e.g., complaints about American "coddling" of Sunni Arabs: "You talk about Sunnis all the time; what about our rights? We participated in the elections and they refused to"). In Al-Hillah, as throughout his program, Cordesman stressed the need for an inclusive Iraqi political process as the key for victory against the insurgents. 10. Upon his return from AL-Hillah, Dr. Cordesman was feted at a dinner hosted by former IIG Council of Ministers Secretary Zuheir Hammadi. The attendants included Minister of Interior Jaber, the head of MFA Policy Planning, and other senior officials and advisors. 11. Comment: Dr. Cordesman was a superb, thoughtful and comprehensive speaker who help us engage Iraqi officials and opinion leaders at the highest level in dialogue on a wide range of policy issues of highest interest to this Mission. His graciousness and deep knowledge of so many topics truly impressed his large and enthusiastic Iraqi audiences, who navigated various security gauntlets to attend his programs. Many thanks to IIP, NEA/I, REO Al- Hillah, and Embassy Amman for helping make this program happen, and especially to Embassy Kuwait for facilitating his last-minute, middle-of-the-night transit through Kuwait to Washington after he was delayed for two very frustrating days at the Baghdad Airport in the grips of a massive sandstorm. JEFFREY
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